West Cannock No. 5 Colliery, Staffordshire.
Disaster 16th. May 1933.
I'm indebted to Joe Stocks for sending me the Mines Department report by
W.E.T. Hartley, H.M. Divisional Inspector of Mines.
It is the only source of information used on this web page.
An explosion occurred in the Shallow Seam in the Upcast Pit at West Cannock No. 5 Colliery, South Staffordshire at about 8:30am on the 16th. May 1933.
Six men lost their lives in the explosion.
Samuel Nickles Gwilt.
Benjamin Cornwall.
Charles Turnock.
John Henry Williams.
Joseph Williams.
William Thomas Higgs.
Two others were slightly burned,
Charles Abner Perks.
George Archer.
Thirteen other men were affected by after-damp, five of them, seriously affected.
Contents
Inquest. Proceedings.
Mr. W.W. Morgan, H.M. Coroner, Stafford held the inquest on the six men who lost their lives.
The first day's proceedings were formal identifications, on the three later days 18 witnesses were heard, and a full inquiry was made into all matters connected with the accident.
Representative's were-
West Cannock Colliery Company. Mr. E. W. Haden, Solicitor.
Cannock Chase Miners' Association. Mr. Wm. Bagnall.
Midland Miners' Federation. Mr. G.H. Jones and Mr. J. Blakemore.
Deputies Association. Mr. J. Clarke and Mr. Payne.
Also present were Mr. B. Madew and Mr. A.R. Latham, Agent and Assistant Agent of the Colliery.
Mr. E. Rowley and Mr. W.E.T. Hartley represented the Mines Department.
The Verdict.
The jury returned a verdict that the deaths of Gwilt, Turnock and Cornwall were due to carbon monoxide poisoning; J.H. Williams Joseph Williams and Higgs to toxaemia due to extensive burns, shock and the after effects of breathing carbon monoxide gas.
The deaths were caused by an explosion of firedamp at the No.2 (upcast) Pit, No. 5 West Cannock Colliery, on the 16th. May 1933.
The explosion was caused by sparking from the contacts of an electric bell used in 328's level.
The jury said they had no reason to doubt that the management believed that the bell was permissible to use in the area or district in which the explosion took place.
The jury stated that the deaths were accidental.
Contents
General description of the Colliery.
West Cannock No. 5 Colliery was situated at Hednesford in the northern end of the Cannock Chase coalfield.
The owners were the West Cannock Colliery Company Ltd. Mr. B. Madew was the Agent and Mr. A.R. Latham was the Manager of the No. 2 (Upcast) Pit, from which the Shallow Seam was worked. Mr. Latham was also the Assistant Agent.
The mine was in a geologically disturbed area, being in the neighbourhood of a large fault that was once regarded as the western boundary of the coalfield.
Owing to the presence of a second large fault the workings from the two pits were widely separated. The only connection between them was at the shafts.
The Shallow Seam had been extensively worked in the coalfield and gas was commonly met with. Though it was not considered as a gassy seam, this was indicated by the fact that open lights were used for many years and they were still being used in one mine at the time of the explosion.
At No. 5 Colliery Proctector flame safety lamps were used.
The coal was described as fairly hard and little dust produced.
The seam was 9ft. thick, above the seam was 4ft. of Black Bass overlain by 1ft. 6in. to 2ft. of jointy rock, which in turn underlies 9ft. of hard rock.
The floor of the seam was fireclay. The top 2 1/2ft. of the seam was left up to form a roof on the faces. Some of this coal was later recovered from the roads and the wastes.
Contents
Methods of working.
The Upcast District of the Shallow Seam was reached by travelling two undulating roads leading from the shafts at a depth of 310 yards from the surface.
The seam was about 1,400 yards from the shafts.
One of these roads was the main haulage and also the main return airway as well as the travelling road.
Originally the seam was opened with two narrow headings. It was intended to work the coal as retreat Longwall faces. The headings were driven about 130 yards from the main roads when roof problems caused the retreat system to be abandoned. The seam was developed by hand-got advancing faces.
The faces were supported by six yard packs built from material obtained from the ripping. There were wastes from six to eight yards in width between the packs.
The packing materials were Black Bass and rock above the seam, sometimes as much as 4ft. of the rock was blown down for packing material.
The seam was liable to spontaneous heating; it was decided to remove the pillars formed when driving the narrow headings. This had an adverse effect on the roadways in the district.
The district was developed to the East and West of the two main roadways from the shaft.
The explosion did not affect the area to the West.
The area to the East was accessed by two main levels, No. 328's and 340's. These were driven slightly to the rise with gateroads turned off them.
The length of face on the North side of the area between 377's stall and 360's level was not being worked at the time of the explosion.
The face haulage was operated by compressed air and a winch was installed at the face in 328's level for hauling the empty tubs to the face and lowering the full ones outbye.
The signal system on this level was by electric bell with bare iron wire conductors. The current for the bell was produced by a battery of three-pint porous pot Leclanche' cells.
There was no electric power in the area affected by the explosion.
An average of 40 shots per 24 hours were fired in the East half of the district, for coal getting and ripping.
Ventilation was by a single air current which entered at its Western end, travelled round the faces, then passed into the main return airway at the foot of 340's level.
Ventilation measurement of 2,835 cubic feet of air per minute was recorded as entering the district on the 5th. May 1933. The measuring point was 100 yards outbye of the first working place.
A small fan, a Typhoon Blower, driven by compressed air, was installed near the face in 360's level to drive air into the extreme rise corner of the face.
The fan was running at the time of the explosion.
Contents
Narrative of the accident.
From the reports of the night fireman, Bertie Reynolds, and the statements of men on the night shift, conditions in the district appear to have been normal except for a fall that had occurred at about 6:00am in 328's level, 70 yards from the coalface.
The fireman, who completed his round about 6:45am, reported no firedamp.
The night engineman at the winch at the face of 328's level noticed nothing unusual up to the time he left the place at 7:00am or a little later.
The day fireman, Charles Abner Perks, met Reynolds at the fall in 328's level and received the report that, apart from the fall, the district was "All right."
He then proceeded to the outbye end of 360's level, then through 327's road, where he repaired a sheet, to the fan near the top corner of the face.
He had only been at the fan a short time when he was knocked down and burned by a flash, which came from the direction of 362's stall.
After the meeting of the two firemen, the men had proceeded to their places, John and Joseph Williams to 362's stall, Cornwall and Higgs to 337's, Gwilt and Turnock to 333's and Craddock to the engine at the face of 328's level.
The fall in 328's level had damaged the signal wires, though they could still be used, and a machinery examiner, Arthur Thomas Lote, who was sent to repair them, reached the place about 8:25am.
A tub of dirt was dealt with by the haulage engine while Lote was in the level, and before he repaired the wires.
After repairing the wires he gave a signal of 10 rings on the electric bell to inform Craddock that the wires were in order.
In the meantime Craddock's two lamps had been extinguished as he had two of the lamps belonging to John and Joseph Williams.
Craddock took his lamps outbye to be relighted and a man named George Archer had taken the other two lamps out, and as he returned with them had passed Lote in 328's level. Archer met Joseph Williams about 30 yards from the face and gave him the lamps, and then he started outbye to look for tubs, while William's returned to the face.
Archer had gone about 30 to 40 yards when the explosion occurred. He saw no flame but was knocked down and slightly burned. Lote, a little further outbye, was knocked down but was unhurt.
The men in 328's Pillar, T.J. Middleton and E.A. Handy, saw a flash and felt the shock of the explosion.
The flame of the explosion extended from the fan near the top corner of the face, along the East face to a fall between 361's and 356's stalls, and travelled a distance of about 70 yards down No. 328's level and 30 yards down 361's.
There's was evidence that the men in 337's stall had realized that the ventilation in the stall was unsatisfactory shortly before the explosion. William Higgs before his death stated that the place was very hot and not fit to work in, and that he was going to leave it.
He was preparing to dress, after telling Cornwall he was going out, when the explosion occurred.
Contents
After the explosion.
When the explosion occurred all the men in the Eastern half of the district, with the exception of Gwilt, Cornwall, Turnock and Abner Perks, immediately made their way out from the faces.
The men in the Western half were unaware that anything had happened until the officials withdrew them.
William Challoner, the day overman, entered the district just after the men from Eastern face had reached the main level.
Upon hearing that Russell Cowdell, a pony driver, was missing, he and two men, H. Lyons and F. Gough, attempted to go up 328's level. They were driven back by the afterdamp.
They then went up 340's level to 342's road where they met Cowdell. Cowdell told them that Gwilt and Turnock were still inbye. They eventually succeeded in reaching 361's roadhead, but could get no further. As they were returning they heard some ponies in 328's passbye, but were unable to reach them.
They returned to the main level, Challoner learned that Perks, the fireman, was missing, with G. Devall he proceeded through 377's stall to 327's roadhead, where Perks was found; he was conscious and was able to make his way out. Challoner attempted to go further up the face but was prevented by bad air.
During this time Reynolds, the night fireman, had returned, and with a man named Parton succeeded in getting to within about 10 yards of the face in 328's level. Returning they rescued two ponies from 328's passbye, but only with extreme difficulty.
Two other ponies in 324's road were too far gone to be rescued.
At this time the first rescue team arrived and started to explore 328's level. Passing up that level their bird died 30 yards from the main level. On reaching the face they found Cornwall's body on the flat sheets in front of the engine.
Gwilt's body was found leaning over a toolbox near 333's roadhead.
The electric bell at the haulage engine was ringing when they reached it. A zinc bar was removed from the battery to stop it ringing.
The two bodies were recovered by a second team, and as the air was improving Mr. E. Rowley, H.M. Senior Inspector of Mines, Mr. Latham, Manager, and Mr. W. Bagnall, Miners' Agent, followed the team in to the face, where Turnock's body was found in the face between 333's and 361's roads.
The idle face on the North side of the district was explored up to a point near to the fan, when progress was stopped by foul air. A sheet, which had been at the end of 327's road, was found to be down, and air was short-circuiting along this road.
The sheet was re-hung and the air resumed its normal course up the face. Later another rescue team reached the Williams' toolbox in 362's stall.
The face was closed by falls extending from the fan near the North East corner almost to the fault in 362's stall.
Contents
Nature of the Explosion.
The explosion was caused by firedamp; the part played by coal dust was very small.
The roads were well treated with stone dust, the efficiency of the treatment being shown by the rapidity with which the flames died out in the gateroads.
At the time of the explosion a bag of stone dust was standing in the short gateroad near the face of 360's level; the bag was blown to pieces and the dust scattered by the blast. This is thought to have saved Perks' life, the stone dust checking the propagation of the flame in that part of the face.
Contents
Ventilation and Firedamp Occurrence before the explosion.
Ventilation of the Mine was by a Bumstead & Chandler exhausting fan supplying a total air quantity of 110,000 cu. ft. of air per minute with 3 inches of water gauge.
A measurement taken on the 5th. May 1933 showed that 11.440 cu. ft. of air were passing into the intake airway from the downcast pit bottom.
Only 2,835 cu. Ft. of air per minute passed into the district at a point 100 yards from the first working place. 8,605 cu. ft. was lost due to leakage through connections between the main intake and main return airways. The management knew about the leakage and steps were being taken to deal with it. Little had been done before the explosion.
After the explosion most of the leakages were dealt with. A measurement was taken on the 6th. July that showed the air current entering the first working place was increased to 6,450 cu. ft. per minute.
The airflow was directed by sheets hung in the roadways and by separation doors, two in 335's road and two in the short road connecting 347's passbye with the intake airway.
There was considerable leakage from the 347's doors due to crush.
The doors in 335's were found open after the explosion, no evidence was found that this door was in use the previous day. It was believed the door was probably jammed open by the rush of air from the explosion.
The number of sheets used, especially in 328's level where tubs continually passed must have led to a great deal of leakage from the face. Some leakage was allowed to ventilate the pillars that were being extracted. Probably the air current in the face affected by the explosion was sufficient to keep the faces clear in normal circumstances but was not sufficient to deal with exceptional circumstances.
Separation doors near the foot of 328's level and in 327's road would have been preferable to sheets, as any damage to the lowest sheet in 328's level or to the sheet in 327's road would have left only a single sheet between the face and the main return airway. The single sheet would have to withstand about half the ventilating pressure required to drive the air around the district. The leakage of air under such conditions would be serious in its effect on the whole district affected by the explosion.
Deputies had reported firedamp on three occasions during the previous twelve months. When an H.M. Inspector took air samples, on the 16th February 1933, when the face was obstructed by a fall, 1.06 percent was found in the general body of air in the face near 333's road.
Later samples taken on the 6th. April showed no firedamp on the face on the intake side of 335's road, and 0.76 percent in the return air in 340's level.
The seam was not considered a gassy one, however the emission of firedamp may be expected.
In his evidence at the Inquest, Mr. Latham, the Manager, stated that when falls of roof occur on the face, the presence of gas may be looked for.
More than one witness at the Inquest stated that the fan near the face of 360's level had served no useful purpose for some little time. It had been installed when 360's level formed a long narrow corner, at which time it had use. It was carrier forward as the face advanced.
Contents
Cause of the explosion.
Examinations after the explosion showed that the explosion originated in or near 337's stall.
Clothes, props and a toolbox near the face of 360's level all showed evidence of a force coming from the direction of 328's road head. Clothes in 333's stall and a tub which had been driven outbye from the face of 361's level pointed to the same centre of disturbance.
Also Perks at the fan, Archer and Lote in 328's level and then men in 328's pillar all felt force coming outbye from the point indicated.
Severe burning of the men working near the face of 328's level also indicated that the chief centre of the flame was around 337's stall and face of 328's level.
William Higgs, who held a Deputies Certificate, stated to his father before he died in hospital, that the place was very hot and not fit to work in, and that he went up the face to his mate Cornwall and said "Come on - I am not going to have this. I am going back-let's put our shirts on-come on-let's go!"
He had just finished speaking when the flash came.
Between the haulage engine at the face of 328's level and the fault in 362's stall, the clues left by the explosion indicated forces in more than one direction.
A full tub in 337's stall had clearly been driven away from the engine towards the fault. A waistcoat wrapped around the signal wires at the corner of the heading behind the engine showed, that force had come out of the heading. As did the removal of the battery box lids to a point on the south side of 328's heading.
Broken fence rails from around the engine showed a blast coming from the direction of 326's stall.
Captain Platt Superintending Testing Officer of the Mines Department Testing Station in Sheffield, the flame safety lamps which had been recovered from the explosion area. In his evidence to the Inquest he stated: -
" When firedamp burns for some time within the inner gauze of a flame safety lamp, the gauze attains a characteristic appearance over the area in contact with the flame. The inner gauze of lamps Nos. 1438, 1439, 1533, and 1668 had the characteristic colour of one that had been subjected to the heat of firedamp burning within it.
I am of the opinion that lamps Nos. 1438, 1439, 1533 and 1668, had been burning for some time in an atmosphere containing firedamp in inflammable proportions.
All lamps examined were in good condition. They were incapable of passing flame from a firedamp air mixture burning within them to the outside atmosphere."
(Q.) What do you mean by firedamp in inflammable proportions?
(A.) A mixture of firedamp and air that will propagate flame.
(Q.) You say "for some time"-can you fix a definite period?
(A.) I should say at least 10 or 15 minutes.
The lamps numbered 1438 and 1439 were used by Clarence Craddock at the engine, one of which he carried on his belt while the other was hung about two feet from the roof close to the electric bell which was secured to a prop alongside the engine.
These lamps, as has been stated, had been extinguished about ten minutes before the explosion, and Craddock had taken them to the lamp station to have them relighted, and was still outbye when the explosion occurred.
Craddock stated that he may have knocked or jerked these lamps out, but his statements on this point were not very definite.
The lamp number 1533 belonged to one of the Williams who were working near the fault in 362's stall, while No. 1668 lamp was used by Turnock, who was working in 333's stall not far from the engine.
Captain Platt also gave evidence on No. 1664 lamp, which with two others showed slight discolouration of the gauzes pointing to them having burned in firedamp. This lamp and one numbered 1534, which belonged to Joseph Williams, had both been put out by some unknown cause. Though it is not known definitely at what time these lamps were extinguished, there is evidence that they must have gone out at least 20 minutes before the explosion.
This fact coupled with Craddock's evidence shows that a considerable percentage of firedamp must have been present in the air near the face of 328's level at least 20 to 25 minutes before the explosion.
Two theories were suggested to account for the presence of firedamp.
At the Inquest Mr. Latham, the Manager, stated: -
"Since the explosion I have made repeated underground inspections and in my opinion the gas was definitely released by a fall of roof above the fault in 362's, and occurring somewhere in 362's stall-this fall of course interfering with the ventilation. I consider it was sudden, and gave little warning."
(Q.) It was a fair size?
(A.) Yes.
(Q.) Enough to block the face up?
(A.) Yes.
In answer to a later question Mr. Latham said: -
"It is not unusual for a fall of roof to take place on the coalface-the bass to come down, and the rock-and when you get a fall of that description, gas nearly always comes."
Mr. Hartley, (HMI), found this theory untenable. (See reasons below).
Indications given by the dust and props at the fall all point to the fall occurring after the explosion. Though it is impossible to say with certainty that a small fall may not have occurred before the explosion, and have been buried by a later one.
It is notable, however, that neither Craddock, who left his engine 10 minutes before the explosion, nor Archer, who spoke to Joseph Williams only two or three minutes before, had heard anything of such a fall, and the condition of the safety lamps shows clearly that firedamp was present at the engine itself at least 10 minutes before Craddock left the face.
As Archer was assisting the brothers Williams, it is most unlikely that Joseph Williams would have failed to mention such a fall if it had occurred, when he received the safety lamps from him.
Lastly we have the statement made by Higgs to his father in hospital Higgs was working in 337's stall, and was in a position to judge the state of the air, and had such a fall occurred and interfered with the ventilation, he would probably have noticed and commented on it.
I am therefore of the opinion that a fall on the face was not the cause of firedamp collecting. In my opinion the presence of firedamp was due to the normal bleeding of the strata coupled with an emission from the extension of 328's level beyond the engine and assisted by some derangement of the ventilating current.
That there was a certain amount of bleeding from the strata is shown by the fact that when the ventilation was intentionally cut off at 335's road, the heading rapidly filled with firedamp, while the samples of air taken for analysis on the 6th. April showed that the air had taken up 0.76 percent of firedamp between the foot of 335's road and the main return airway.
As regards the extension of 328's level, there is no evidence that firedamp had been found in it prior to the explosion, but since the explosion quantities up to five percent have been found only a short distance beyond the entrance on more than one occasion.
Firedamp has also been found in the cavity left by the fall in 362's stall in percentages up to about 1 ¼.
Seven weeks after the explosion when the face had been reopened, the experiment was carried out of opening the separation doors between the main intake and main return airways.
This cut off the air from the whole face. The doors were kept open for 2 hours 20 minutes; by this time the firedamp content of the air in a small cavity in the roof of the top corner of the face near the fan had risen from 0.12 percent to 26.47 percent.
The air eight yards to the rise side of the fault in 362's stall showed a methane content of 1.07 percent, while the percentage of methane in the extension of 328's level beyond the engine had risen from 0.23 percent to 0.33 percent.
The experiment was carried out in conditions that differed materially from those which existed at the time of the explosion. The face had been standing for some time, and the normal ventilation in the district had been increased.
In Mr. Hartley's opinion the firedamp came out of the extension in 328's level forming a layer next to the roof, and followed up to the face towards 360's roadhead, which was about 27 feet higher than the face in 328's level.
Levellings showed that a short distance above the fault in 362's stall there was a distinct rise in the roof followed by a level portion forming a pocket in which the firedamp could accumulate.
Probably it was the firing of this accumulation that caused the blast that had evidently travelled from the direction of 362's stall towards the engine.
The accumulation of firedamp in this manner suggests some falling off in the air current along the face.
The explosion blew away all the sheets in the vicinity of the coalface, so it was impossible to judge the state they were in before the explosion.
Evidence from the firemen and other witnesses was that the sheets were in good order before the explosion, except for the sheet in 327's road, which was repaired by Perks, the day fireman, as he made his way inbye to the fan a few minutes before the explosion.
The sheets had been in order when the night fireman, Reynolds, examined it on his inspection about 6:30am. But when Perks reached it at about 8:30am one corner was hanging down, leaving a small opening. It's possible this may have allowed sufficient leakage to affect the air current between 360's level and 333's road.
Tubs were continually passing 328's level; it's possible the sheets in this road were worn.
If the lowest sheet were leaky, air would pass from 327's level directly into the main return airway. If the middle one, air would pass directly into 333's road.
In the first case the leakage would affect the whole face. In the later only the face between 360's level and 333's road. In either case there would be a falling off in the air current through 337's stall.
It's not possible to say definitely that the breakdown of the corner sheet in 327's road caused the reduction in air current on the face. But combined with other leakages, it's possible it caused the velocity of the air current to fall to a point where it was unable to break up and remove a layer of firedamp lying against the roof.
This is rendered more likely because the coalface formed an area of considerable size in which the velocity of air current would tend to be low.
Contents
Ignition of firedamp.
No electricity other than for signalling was employed in the area covered by the flame.
The seam is liable to heat spontaneously, though no such heating existed.
No shots had been fired in the area for many hours before the explosion.
There was a bed of rock six feet above the seam, though there were heavy falls of roof after the explosion, there was no sign of this rock having fallen in masses which rendered the ignition of firedamp by this means probable.
The possibility of a static electrical charge was considered but no possible cause for such a discharge was found.
The flame safety lamps were suspected and all the lamps in the area affected by the flame, except one, were recovered and sent unopened to the Mines Department Testing Station at Sheffield for examination, plus the two lamps used by Craddock.
All these lamps were found to be in perfectly safe order.
The lamp used by Perks (fireman), was not recovered, the position this lamp occupied at the time showed it could not have initiated the explosion.
Enquiries into the presence of contraband, matches etc. eliminated this source of flame.
The electric bell at the engine in 328's road was found ringing when the first rescue team reached it. It was stopped by removing a zinc bar from the battery.
This bell was sent to the Mines Department Testing Station for examination by Captain Platt.
His conclusion was: -
"The bell was not of a type certified by the Mines Department as safe for use in an inflammable atmosphere of firedamp and air.
The estimated current taken by the bell on the circuit used in the mine was 325-350 milliamperes if contact were made across the remote end of the signalling wires. If contact were made at an intermediate point between the bell and the end of the wires, thus excluding the resistance of some of the line wires, the current would be more than 350 milliamperes; if contact were made near the bell, thus excluding the resistance of most of the line wire, the current would attain a maximum value of about 370 milliamperes.
The result of the test showed that the spark, produced on the line wires by a current less than that possible in the circuit in the mine, ignited an inflammable atmosphere of firedamp and air.
The tests also showed that the spark which was produced at the trembler contacts of the bell also ignited firedamp and that the flame of the ignited gas within the case passed out and ignited an external inflammable atmosphere."
Craddock's lamps had been burning in an inflammable mixture of firedamp and air for at least 10 to 15 minutes; one of these lamps had been close to this bell only 8 or 10 minutes before the explosion.
Mr. Hartley considered that an electric spark caused by the ringing of the bell was the means of igniting the firedamp that caused the explosion.
Objections to this theory.
The evidence of Lote, who after repairing the bell wires in 328's level about ten minutes before the explosion, gave a signal of 10 rings on the bell, and a short time before Craddock left his engine, a signal of 2 was given.
Why did these signals not ignite the firedamp?
Possible explanation was that men were moving about near the engine, their movements might have temporarily removed the firedamp from the immediate vicinity of the bell.
Or, the atmosphere surrounding the bell, when the signals were given, may have been too rich or too weak to ignite the firedamp.
No evidence was found to account for the ringing of the bell, nor was there any apparent reason why any signal should have been given at the time of the explosion.
Possibly a stone may have fallen and caused the signal wires to come into contact.
The state of 328's level after the explosion made any definite conclusion on this point impossible.
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Conclusion and remarks by Mr. Walter E.T. Hartley.
H.M. Divisional Inspector of Mines.
1. The explosion was one of firedamp, the part played by coal dust being relatively small.
2. The presence of firedamp was due to the normal bleeding from the strata combined with an emission from the extension of 328's level beyond the engine.
3. The firedamp accumulated through the ventilating current on the coal face being too weak to remove it.
4. The weakness of the ventilating current was due partly to leakage through stoppings and sheets, some of which was allowed in order to ventilate the pillar workings, and partly to some derangement of the sheets or doors, of which it was not possible to get evidence.
5. The means of ignition was an electric spark caused through the ringing of the signal bell at the engine in 328's level, but there is no evidence to show what caused the bell to ring.
6. The bell was not of a type certified by the Mines Department, but was believed by the Colliery officials to have been wound with protective winding, and to have been incapable of ignighting firedamp.
In conclusion I desire to mention the work of the eight rescue teams who assisted in the recovery operations after the explosion.
A team was at the Hednesford Rescue Station preparing for a practice when the call for assistance was received, and the Superintendent of the Station, Mr. J. Payton, at once took his team to the Colliery, arriving there only a few minutes after the call had come through.
All the teams carried out their duties quickly and well, and their reports as to the conditions of the workings were clear and accurate; their work was very creditable both to themselves and to the officials of the Rescue Station responsible for their training.
Excellent arrangements were made at the Colliery for the treatment of the injured, and special reference is necessary to the use that was made of Oxygen. Dr. S.W. Fisher, who was present, has referred to this matter in the following terms: -
"As usual, I went carefully into the treatment, by the First Aid personnel of the mine, of the men involved in the explosion, and I found that every man was taken to the surface ambulance room and effectively given oxygen from three or four Novita Apparatus by the man in charge of the room, and also by Mr. Payton, the Superintendent of Hednesford Rescue Station, who in fact supervised the whole organisation.
All the men I spoke to in the accident home (except the three very serious cases) told me in no uncertain manner that the oxygen did them good.
The slight cases were made to rest before proceeding home.
I do not wish to exaggerate, but in my opinion the prompt and effective administration of oxygen (in some cases against the will of the patient) probably averted very serious consequences, if not actual collapse and death, and credit is due to Mr. Payton and those working with him for their grasp of the situation and efficient manner of dealing with it."
Below ground I found that oxygen was being administered freely to anyone who showed signs of being affected by carbon monoxide gas, with equally good results.
A number of the slighter cases of carbon monoxide poisoning were probably due to the men coming out of the workings by way of the main return airway. This road was the usual travelling road, and the men used it automatically in spite of the fact that the afterdamp had to travel up to it.
The Overman, William Challoner, and the men I have referred to earlier in this report as assisting him, deserve credit for their actions immediately after the explosion. Challoner, in particular, acted very well under trying circumstances. In the saving of the two ponies in very difficult conditions, Reynolds and Parton showed courage of a high order.
View District Plan.
View area where 3 bodies found.
View area of district.
View area of district.
View area of district.
View area of district.
Group Photo. 1921. Photo courtesy Alan Dean.
Back Pit Shaft. Photo courtesy Alan Dean.
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