Garswood Hall No. 9 Colliery. Explosion, l2th. November 1932.
EXPLOSI0N AT GARSWOOD HALL, No. 9 COLLIERY.
LANCASHIRE.
REPORT
on the Causes of and Circumstances attending the Explosion
which occurred at Garswood Hall No. 9 Colliery,
Lancashire,
on the 12th. November, 1932.
By
SIR HENRY WALKER) C.B.E., LL.D.
H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines.
In compliance with your instructions, I have made investigation and held a formal inquiry under Section 83 of the Mines Act, 1911, into the causes and circumstances of the explosion which occurred in the Ravin Seam of the Garswood Hall No. 9 Colliery, Edge Green, Lancashire, on 12th. November 1932, causing the death of 27 persons. I now have the honour to report as follows.
The Inquiry was held in the Garswood Hall Collieries Institute, Bryn. The proceedings were opened on 6th. December and concluded on 17th. December, evidence being taken from 47 witnesses. For the use of the Institute and for the facilities granted me during the proceedings, I am indebted to Mr. James H. Edmondson, Managing Director of the Garswood Hall Collieries, and the officials of the Institute.
The parties interested who appeared at the Inquiry, with the
names of the representatives, are as follows:-
Representing the Mines Department.
Mr.. W. J. Charlton, H.M. Divisional Inspector of Mines.
Mr. T.L. McBride, H.M. Senior Inspector of Mines.
Representing the Garswood Hall Colliery Company.
Major A. Ratcliffe Ellis.
Mr. J.H. Edmondson.
Representing the Miners' Federation of Great Britain.
Mr. Peter Lee.
Mr. Guy Rowson.
Representing the Lancashire and Cheshire Miners' Federation.
Mr. J. McGurk.
Mr. W. Foster.
Mr. P. Pemberton.
Representing the Garswood Hall Branch of the Lancashire and Cheshire Miners' Federation.
Mr. J. Chamberlain.
Mr. W. R. Woods.
Representing the General Federation of Colliery Firemen's Examiners' and Deputies Associations of Great Britain.
Mr. W. Frowen.
Representing the Lancashire Colliery Firemen's Association.
Mr. W. T. Miller.
Mr. W. Barnes.
Representing the Lancashire and Cheshire Colliery Undermanagers and Underlookers' Association.
Mr. W. Abbott.
Mr. T. Ashton.
Representing the Safety in Mines Research Board.
Professor R. V. Wheeler.
Dr. H. F. Coward.
Contents
GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF CONDITIONS PRIOR TO THE EXPLOSIONS.
The Garswood Hall No. 9 Colliery is one of a group of Collieries owned by the Garswood Hall Collieries Company Limited, of which Mr. James H. Edmondson is the Managing Director. Mr. William Sword is the Consulting Engineer and Mr. H. J. Whitehead the Agent.
Mr. J. Latham is the Manager and Mr. Peter Bullough the Undermanager of the No. 9 Colliery, which has three shafts, namely:- No. 9, the downcast and coal-drawing shaft;
No. 2, the upcast and No. 3, a shaft close to No. 2 but not now in use.
The seams worked are the Ravin and the Orrell 4 Foot or Arley; the latter being reached from the Ravin by two tunnels driven through an up throw fault to the East of some 80 to 90 yards.
The strata dip to the South East at the rate of 1 in 5 ½.
The day was divided into three shifts-day, afternoon and night; about 202 persons being employed on the day shift, 105 on the afternoon shift and 116 on the night shift.
Coal was got on the day and night shifts and wound during the day and afternoon shifts, the average daily output being some 800 tons.
Repair work was done on the afternoon shift.
Contents
Supervision.
Supervision underground was exercised occasionally by the Agent and daily by the Manager and Undermanager, who had under them a staff of 11 firemen ; four on the day shift, three on the afternoon shift, and four on the night shift.
The workings were divided into four districts, three-" North Side", " No. 5 Brow", , and " No. 2 Brow " -in the Ravin Seam, and one, the "' Orrell 4 Foot"' in the seam known by that name as well as by the name "Arley".
On the day and night shifts, there was a fireman in each of these districts ; on the afternoon shift. one fireman supervised the No. 5 Brow and No. 2 Brow districts, there being no work in the latter district during that shift.
There were no overmen or other officials between the Under- manager and the. firemen.
An inspection made by each of the firemen towards the end of his shift constituted the inspection within two hours of the commencement of work in the succeeding shift; reports of these inspections were duly entered in the prescribed report book kept in the office at the pit brow.
The station for all the districts was at the No. 9 pit bottom.
Contents
Ventilation.
Ventilation of the mine was by means of a Walker '' fan, situated near the top of No. 2 shaft, which caused a total quantity of some 28,500 cubic feet of air per minute to pass through the workings of the mine. Of this total quantity, 10,500 cubic feet ventilated the '' North Side '' district, and the remainder passed along the South Level to ventilate the " Orrell, and the 4 Foot" , and the " No. 5 Brow" " and "No. 2 Brow" districts.
Incidentally it may be mentioned here that there is little of further interest to report in reference to the "North Side" district as it was not affected by the explosions, of which there were two, with an interval of some twenty minutes between them.
Travelling inbye along the South Level the No. 2 Brow is first reached and then the No. 5 Brow and finally the South Brow, which leads direct into the workings in the Orrell 4 Foot Seam beyond the upthrow fault already mentioned.
On No. 2 Brow, between Nos. 2 and 3 Levels, there were two wooden doors to prevent air passing down that brow. Accordingly the air current minus such amount as leaked through these doors, continued along the South Level to the No. 5 Brow where some 6,800 cubic feet per minute turned down that brow leaving the remainder to pass on and down the South Brow into the Orrell 4 Foot.
This split of some 6,800 cubic feet travelled down No. 5 Brow as far as No. 10 Level where its further progress downbrow was barred by two wooden doors placed across the brow, the one just above the No.11 Level and the other just above the No. 12 Level. Entrance to No. 11 Level was blocked by a brick stopping, but the entrance to the No. 10 Level being unblocked, this split of fresh air turned into that level and was guided along it to No. 8 Brow by brick stoppings built across Nos. 6 and 7 Brows.
Following now that portion of the air current which, having passed beyond the top of No. 5 Brow turned down the South Brow, it is found that after being coursed round the workings in the Orrell 4 Foot seam, it returns upbrow and eventually arrives in time No. 5 Brow district where, at the junction of No. 8 Brow with No. 10 Level, it rejoins the split which has reached this point by way of No. 5 Brow and No. 10 Level. The quantity of air in the last mentioned split, measured on the 25th. October was 6,060 cubic feet per minute, and in the split coming from time Orrell 4 Foot, 6,068 cubic feet. There was thus a current of air of slightly over 12,000 cubic feet per minute which, after ventilating the workings in the No. 5 Brow district., passed on to, and around, the workings in the No. 2 Brow district, and thence, after joining the return air from the North district, by way of a long main return airway to the Upcast (No. 2) shaft.
This scheme of ventilation was in operation at the date of the explosion, but prior to 5th. September, the two doors in No. 5 Brow had been near the top of that brow and no fresh air, other than that which leaked past the doors, was passing down the brow. It was a scheme which appeared to have been sufficient so long as the workings were in the "whole", i.e. so long as the working of the Ravin Seam was confined to the getting of coal in "stret" places only, but when the predetermined boundary bad been reached and the taking out of the pillars, formed by the driving of the "stret" places, became necessary, then its sufficiency became doubtful, especially us the goaf to be laid down was to the dip of the district. The first sign of this, so far as could be ascertained from the firemen's report books or any of the witnesses, was the finding of firedamp, towards the end of the shift on 1st. September, in the working place of a collier William Edwards.
According to the evidence of Edwards, he had just found this firedamp when the fireman, William Marsh, came into the place and Marsh, after making a test, withdrew him from it.
In his report book in reference to the inspection made by him, Marsh reported under the heading Noxious or inflammable gases-" None, except a 3 per cent cap in W. Edwards' place in No. 8 splitting. Place fenced off.
A similar report was made daily by each of the three firemen inspecting in the No. 5 Brow district until the report at the end of the morning shift on 9th. September when William Marsh reported :-'' Edwards' place clear, all fences removed ".
A second sign of doubt as to the sufficiency of the ventilation scheme occurred in the report of the inspection made on the same day, the 1st. September, of the No. 2 Brow district, between the hours of 8 and 10.30 p.m., by the fireman of that district, Frank Clough. That report in reference to the finding of noxious or inflammable gases reads:- "A show of 2 per cent. cap of gas coming from No. 5 panel brow".
At this date, 1st. September, the Manager was on holiday. He returned to work on 5th. September and, after consulting with the Agent and the Undermanager, he set about to try and improve the ventilation in the No. 5 Brow district. As things were, he found his greatest difficulty was to concentrate the ventilating current on the goaf edge and on the working places, and to keep it from escaping through the stret places driven in the first working.
His first step was to take away the doors situated across No. 5 Brow near the top, and to hang brattice sheets across that brow just below the entrance to No. 10 Level. By these means fresh air was tree to go down the No. 5 Brow and into the panel side of No. 5 district by way of No. 10 Level, where it would join the air current which had been round the workings in the Orrell 4 Foot.
The brattice sheets below the entrance to No. 10 Level, however, allowed too much of the fresh air coming down No. 5 Brow to escape directly down that brow, so two wood doors were erected and the brattice sheets allowed to remain in addition. Brick stoppings were erected in Nos. 6 and 7 Brows between Nos. 10 and 11 Levels and across the entrance to No. 11 Level off No. 5 Brow.
On 8th. September, the Manager made a test with a McLuckie apparatus at the return end of the No. 5 Brow district to determine the percentage of firedamp in the general body of the air at that point, and found it to be 1.35. This he considered to be an exceptionally high percentage, so he returned to the district on the following day and on making a similar test he found that the percentage had risen to 1.5. He measured the Quantity of air passing down the panel brow intake and found it to be 10,000 cubic feet ; be also made a similar measurement either on No. 13 Level or in the working place below-he was not quite sure which- between Nos. 6 and 7 Brows, and found the quantity of air passing to be 8,800 cubic feet per minute and to be carrying 1.2 per cent. of firedamp.
Efforts to keep the air on the working places were continued and, on 22nd. September a door in a brick wall setting was erected on No. 12 Level about 18 yards on the inbye side of No 7 Brow. But two days later, the Manager finding, so far as he could remember--be had kept no record-0.3 or 0.4 per cent, of firedamp in the general body of the air at the intake end of the district, rising to 1.2 per cent. at the return end, prohibited all shot-firing in the district. The Manager's memory was also imperfect as to the further steps which were taken subsequent to 24th. September when he prohibited all shotfiring in the district but, by 29th. September, he considered the ventilation to be so improved that he felt justified in allowing the firing of shots to be resumed.
According to the reports of the firemen, they did not find firedamp anywhere in the district between 9th. September and 22nd. September when the afternoon shift fireman, J. H. Storer, reported "gas in right hand side of No. 6 brow, fenced off and being attended to". On the succeeding shift the fireman, J. Lowe, reported " 2 per cent. gas found in No. 6 brow, diluted as made". Storer reporting at 10.30 pm. on 23rd September, states "No. 6 brow fenced off for gas", and from 5.45 a.m. on the following day until 10.30 p.m. on 24th. October each of the three firemen in the No. 5 Brow district reported in reference to the presence of gas as follows:-" None, except 2 per cent. in No. 6 brow, diluted as made". From 6.45 am. on 25th. October to 2.30 p.m. on 7th. November, these same firemen reported in respect of gas-" None, except 2 per cent, in Nos. 6 and 7 brows, diluted as made". At 10.30 p.m. on 7th November, Storer reports-"None, except gas in No 3 Engine brow off No. 12 level. Fenced off and being attended to". At 6.45 a.m. on 8th. November, Lowe reports "None, except in No. 6 and 7 brows, diluted as made. No. 3 Engine brow and No. 12 level found clear at 5 am.'' In the report made by dayshift fireman, W. Marsh, at 2.30 p.m. on 8th. November and in all subsequent reports on the No. 5 Brow district up to 10.30 p.m. on 11th. November, the following entry appears in reference to gas-" None, except 2 per cent, in No. 6 and 7 brows, diluted as made".
These extracts from the firemen's reports have been interpolated here as it might well seem that, no report of firedamp having been found between 9th. September and 22nd. September, its appearance, as reported by Storer, on the afternoon of the latter day, by Lowe on the succeeding shift, and then again by Storer on 23rd. September, had been the cause of shotfiring being prohibited. but Mr. White head, the Agent, who visited the No. 5 Brow district on 26th. September, when asked if this was not the case, said it was not and explained that shotfiring was stopped because of the finding of "a slight percentage-1.2 per cent.- of firedamp in the general body of the air". At the same time he said he was concerned about the ventilation of the district, not because of the 1.2 per cent. of firedamp in the general body of the air, but because of the two per cent, of firedamp reported by the firemen in No. 6 Brow notwithstanding that it was also reported as being "diluted as made".
This explanation is difficult to understand if the two per cent. of firedamp reported by the firemen was, in fact, "diluted as made". These words, however, had been used either without regard to their significance as usually understood in mining parlance or, having been used once, were repeated time after time in parrot-like fashion. The fireman, Marsh, said the indication on his lamp of the firedamp coming from Nos. 7 and 6 Brows ceased only when, travelling outbye along No. 13 Level, he had nearly reached No. 5 Brow; that there was gas in the air all the way along No. 13 Level from No. 7 Brow to beyond No. 6 Brow, and that this gas was coming up No. 7 Brow continuously and was kept off the men working in the ribbing to the left of that brow by a brattice sheet stretched from the landing plate to the face.
It is difficult not to doubt whether the whole of the facts in connexion with the occurrence of firedamp in the No. 5 Brow district were divulged during the Inquiry, especially having regard to the evidence given on the last day of the Inquiry by a miner, Francis Smith. Smith said that three weeks before the explosion when packing rubbish behind a stopping in the brow to the dip between Nos. 5 and 6 Brows, he was "gassed" and had to be taken out of the mine. He was oft work for a fortnight, had to have a doctor and was paid compensation.
Mr. Whitehead, during his inspection of the district on '26th. September found that the ventilation was rather sluggish due to leakage along No. 12 Level, and he instructed the Manager to improve the brattice sheets on that level and to hang more of them. These sheets were not in a neglected condition, but they were being lifted up by the haulage rope, and the wood door on the inbye side of No. 7 Brow could not be kept shut because of the running of that rope. This door was on this account removed from its frame and replaced by a brattice sheet.
During October the general state of the ventilation would appear to have been improved except. that, as has been seen, two per cent. of firedamp "diluted as made" was continually reported until 10.30 p.m., on the 24th. as being in No. 6 Brow; and from that date onwards in the No. 7 Brow also-the same percentage being observed and the same remark, "diluted as made", being made in reference to it.
As already stated, on 7th. November at 10.30 p.m., the afternoon shift fireman Storer, reporting on his inspection made between the hours of 8.30 p.m. and 10.15 p.m., recorded that he found gas in No. 3 Engine (or No. 9A) Brow off No. 12 Level, and that it was fenced off and being attended to.
In evidence he explained that he found this firedamp at 3.45 p.m., about halfway down the brow below No. 12 Level ; he put a fence across the brow and then going down the. next brow outbye, No. 9 Brow, he also found firedamp in the right-hand ribbing about halfway along, and he put up a fence there too. He further explained that this firedamp had accumulated because a brattice sheet across No. 12 Level at the top of the No. 9 Brow had been disarranged. He repaired this brattice sheet and went away to attend to his duties, but returned at 10.5 p.m. when he found the firedamp had been cleared as far as the bottom of No. 3 Engine (9A) Brow.
The next report in reference to this accumulation of firedamp was. Made by the nightshift fireman, Lowe, who, on 8th. November, reported "No. 3 engine brow and No. 12 level found clear at 5 am.''.
There would appear to be a discrepancy in these reports in that Storer reported he found gas in No. 3 Engine Brow off No. 12 Level, whereas Lowe reported No. 3 Engine Brow and No. 12 Level found clear at 5 a.m. From the latter report it might be inferred that Lowe had in fact found firedamp on No. 12 Level it may be that he bad not read Storer's report with sufficient care and, when writing his own, had in his mind that Storer had in fact reported that he had found firedamp on No. 12 Level. The exact position in this matter will never be known as Lowe was killed in the explosion.
But the main point of these reports lies in the fact that when the dayshift fireman, Marsh, left the district towards the end of the morning shift on 7th. November and met Storer at the pit bottom between 2.30 and 2.35 p.m., he knew nothing of any firedamp in No. 3 Engine Brow and yet at 3.45 p.m. Storer found firedamp half-way up that brow, consequent upon, according to his evidence, the disarrangement of a brattice sheet, and then at 5 o'clock on the following morning this accumulation was found by Lowe to have been dispersed.
Such an occurrence shows how quickly firedamp accumulated, following derangement of a brattice, even at the intake end of the district.
Mr . Latham became Manager of the colliery in May, 1931, and it is fair to him to record that he did not consider the scheme of ventilating the Orrell 4 Foot, the No. 5 Brow and No. 2 Brow districts a good one. Accordingly, he determined to have two separate splits of air, one for the Orrell 4 Foot and the other for the No. 5 and No. 2 Brow districts.
To effect this it was necessary to build two air crossings, one over No. 5 Brow and the other over No. 2 Brow, and to drive a road in the coal for some 130 yards along which to lead the return air from the Orrell 4 Foot to the overcast over No. 5 Brow.
In September, 1931, Mr. William Roberts, H.M. Sub-Inspector of Mines, made inspection of the No. 5 Brow district and reported that he found an air crossing being built across No. 5 Brow below the doors, which at that date were near the top of that brow, and that those doors were to he taken out shortly.
Unfortunately this intended rearrangement of the ventilation had not been made prior to the explosion although everything had been completed for that purpose, the air crossing over No. 2 Brow having been finished about a fortnight previously.
Contents
Shotfiring.
Shots were fired in the coal by duly appointed shotfirers during the morning and night shifts and by the fireman during the afternoon shift. The explosive, Hawkite No. 2, was supplied free to the colliers who took it underground in locked canisters, the shotfirers only having a key.
According to the evidence of Storer and of Marsh, a shotfiring apparatus and its operating handle were kept in No. 6 Brow just above No. 12 Level.
Contents
Stonedusting.
The roads were dusted with carbonate of lime, between three and four pounds of this dust being spread per ton of coal drawn. The No. 12 level from No. 5 Brow to the shunt at No. 8 Brow was so treated on the Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday ( 8th., 9th., and 10th. November ) prior to the explosion.
Samples of dust taken from the roads in various parts of the mine prior to the explosion were low in combustible matter. The average percentage of combustible matter, to the nearest whole number, in 30 samples-ten each from the floor, the roof, and the sides-taken on No. 5 Brow after the explosion, was:- Floor 38, Roof 9, and Sides 11. In six samples taken on No. 10 Level-Floor 26, Roof 18, and Sides 19. In six samples taken on No. 11 Level-Floor 32, Roof 46 and Sides 46.
Three samples taken along No. 12 Level between No. 5 Brow and No. 8 Brow from the floor, roof and sides contained 45, 9 and 19 per cent, of combustible matter respectively, whilst three samples taken between Nos. 8 and 9 Brows on that level showed 66 per cent. of combustible matter in the sample taken from the floor, and 60 per cent, in the samples taken from the roof and sides. Further samples taken on No. 12 Level from the floor, the roof and the sides, ten yards on the inbye side of No. 9 Brow, were found to contain 57, 61, and 64 per cent. of combustible matter respectively.
Fifteen samples, five each from the floor, the roof, and the sides, taken between the entrance to No. 9 Brow and 40 yards down that brow, contained, on the average 64, 59, and 66 per cent of combustible matter respectively. Two samples, one from the floor and one the roof, taken at the bottom of No. 9 Brow near the goaf gave 59 and 60 per cent, of combustible matter.
These results show that it was only in the area on the inbye side of No. 8 Brow that dust comparatively high in combustible matter was found after the explosion.
Contents
Lighting,
The Manager, Undermanager, firemen and shotfirers used Protector flame safety lamps and the leading collier in each working place was provided with a similar lamp for gas testing purposes. He also had an "Oldham" electric lamp and this type of lamp was used by all other workers underground. The shaft siding to the top of No. 2 Brow was lighted by fixed electric lights.
Searching.
Two of the eight persons making each cage load were searched at the surface for matches and other prohibited articles and every person was searched at the shaft bottom.
Haulage.
An electrically driven hauling engine was placed near to the No. 9 shaft bottom for working the endless-rope haulage on the South Level and South Brow. All other hauling engines in the mine were driven by compressed air. Two, situated on the rise side of the South Level, hauled the sets of tubs up the No. 2 and No. 5 Brows by main rope; one, situated on the North side of No. 5 Brow opposite the entrance to No. 12 Level in No. 5 Brow district, worked a single track endless rope haulage along that level, the return wheel being fixed some 18 to 20 yards beyond the top of No. 8 Brow. There were also in that district, on the high side of No. 12 Level, small hauling engines at the top of No. 7, No. 8, No. 9 and No. 9A Brows for hauling the full tubs up those brows.
Contents
Signals.
Signalling on all the mechanical haulage roads just mentioned was by means of electric bells except in No. 7, No. 9 and No. 9A Brows.
The battery in each circuit consisted of several Leclanché three-pint cells and the conductors were, one of galvanized iron wire, bare, and the other of copper covered with vulcanized india-rubber.
Pushes were provided at places from which signals had, or might have, to be given, and it was intended no doubt that signals should be given only by means of these pushes. Detailed inspection made after the explosion by Mr. James Cowan, Junior Electrical Inspector of Mines, of the conductors in No. 5 Brow, which were not affected by the explosion, disclosed, however, many bare places on the conductor which was intended to be covered.
About ten of these bare places occurred where joints had been made, but the remainder, some 60, being some 2½ to 3 inches in length with the insulating material at each end of the bare part with clean cut edges, appeared to have been made deliberately in order that signals might be given by bridging the two conductors. And this would appear to have been the practice, for Mr. Cowan found only two pushes on this brow and one of those had no cover.
So far as was possible, Mr. Cowan also examined the conductors of the signalling circuit in connexion with the single track endless haulage system on No. 12 Level and at intervals, found the insulation similarly removed from the conductor which was intended to be covered.
In the hauling engine room of this No. 12 Level, Mr. Cowan saw a "Wigan Gastight" bell which was in circuit with the conductors led along that level; he noticed that the casing of this bell was broken and that the cover was held on by one joiner's wood screw. He saw that the battery for this bell consisted of 12 three-pint Leclanché cells connected in series and that the bell was in series with the cells. He also saw a push on the No. 12 Level circuit near the entrance to that level; it was a water-tight push, as manufactured, but the cover was missing thus leaving the contacts within the push exposed.
Mr. Cowan also examined the signal conductors in No. 8 Brow. He found parts of them were down. He searched carefully for a push at the bottom of the brow but found none; he saw the end of the insulated conductor and it had the appearance of having been broken, probably by the explosion; travelling up the brow on the way to No. 12 Level, he found the insulation had been removed from that conductor which was intended to be covered at varying intervals of two, three and four yards, just as he had found in No. 5 Brow and No. 12 Level.
In regard to the condition of the conductor which was intended to be covered and in regard to the pushes, it is right that it should be recorded that William Ackers, whose duties were confined to the care of the signalling circuits and telephones in the mine, in evidence given before that of Mr. Cowan, said that pushes were installed at intervals of from 30 to 40 yards; that it would not be possible, to his knowledge, to give signals other than by using a push; that he knew of no bare places on the covered conductor and that he had never seen a push without a cover.
He said the bell at the hauling engine at the top of No. 8 Brow was a "Wigan 1920 bell", and that the battery for this bell consisted of eight three-pint Leclanché cells. This statement was corroborated by evidence given by Arthur Holland who drove this engine during the morning shift.
Holland also said that he had to go down No. 8 Brow sometimes because the signal wires were crossed and the bell in consequence kept on ringing ; when this occurred, and it occurred about twice a week, he went down the brow and, having uncrossed the wires, he put a road nail underneath the insulated wire to keep it in its place; the insulation was missing from the part where the wires crossed, which was always at the same place; the fireman on his shift, William Marsh, had heard the bell ringing continuously just as he had, and when this had occurred he had said to Marsh he thought the wires were crossed and sometimes Marsh had told him to have a look. Marsh, in evidence, agreed that this had occurred.
Albert Tootle, who drove the hauling engine working the single track endless rope haulage on No. 12 Level said the bell at that engine during his shift sometimes rang continuously because the signal wires were crossed; he did not himself go inbye to uncross them and acknowledged that the bell might be made to ring constantly by a push sticking, but that soon after the boy had been sent in to remedy whatever was wrong, the bell ceased to ring.
Mr. William Maltby, Assistant Electrician at No. 9 Colliery, also gave evidence and he said that be had seen pushes without covers "occasionally" and had also seen places on the covered conductor from which the insulation had come off, he agreed with Mr. Cowan that there were only two pushes on No. 5 Brow and that there were places on the insulated conductor in that brow where the insulation was missing but he did not agree that either of the two pushes was without a cover.
Mr. Maltby said that about two pushes per fortnight came out of the pit for repairs, the usual repair needed being new screws or a new cover, that the reason screws were missing was because people stole them, and that covers went astray because, if a push was sticking, people deliberately took the cover off in order the more easily to signal. He added that he had reported both these kinds of interference with the pushes to the Manager.
Mr. Ralph Bowen, Electrician for No. 9 Colliery, said that, when be came to the colliery 14 years ago, both conductors in the signalling system were bare and that the change to one insulated and one bare conductor was made some 18 months or two years later. Bells with metal cases were also introduced at the same time and these bells, he understood, complied with the regulations. These alterations were made with a view to greater safety. He disclaimed having any direct responsibility for the signalling system underground but he had received, three and four times a week, reports from William Ackers and from the firemen, of covers of pushes being missing; he regarded this as a serious matter both from the point of view of safety and expense and, by locking the screws, he had tried to prevent the covers from being taken off the pushes; the Manager, the Undermanager and he had had a serious discussion about it.
Contents
THE STORY OF THE EXPLOSIONS RECONSTRUCTED FROM THE EVIDENCE OF EYE-WITNESSES AND OF THOSE WHO TOOK PART IN THE SUBSEQUENT RESCUE OPERATIONS.
The Explosions.
There were two explosions; they occurred in the No. 5 Brow district, the first shortly before 2 a.m. on 12th. November, and the second some 20 to 30 minutes later.
Patrick Daly, aged 20, gang rider on No. 5 Brow, James Duffy, aged 20, haulage worker at the top of No. 5 Brow, James Armstrong, aged 18, driver of the hauling engine situated at the top of, and working the haulage on, No. 5 Brow and Harold Hesketh, aged 18, driver of the hauling engine situated on the North side of No. 5 Brow opposite No. 12 Level and working the haulage on that level, were at their several posts when the first explosion occurred.
A set of ten full tubs was being hauled up the No. 5 Brow when according to Daly, who was accompanying that set, he heard a report- "a dull thud", the air seemed to change and a great cloud of dust came up the brow; he was going to signal to stop the set but before he could do so, the engine driver, Armstrong, stopped it and he (Daly) rang two "sixes" -the signal for help.
Hesketh said he had hauled an empty set along No. 12 Level to the inbye shunt situated between Nos. 7 and 8 Brows when he received a signal of four distinct rings "to stretch up", meaning he was to haul a set of full tubs outbye. He started his engine in obedience to the signal when he ''heard a report just like the firing of a shot". This sound, which seemed to come direct to him out of No. 12 Level was followed by dust, like a mist but not so thick that he could not see with his electric lamp.
He stopped his engine and came to the front of it and saw Patrick Quinn, the shotfirer on the night shift, without a lamp, coming out of No. 12 Level on to the No. 5 Brow. He asked Quinn, "What has gone wrong with your lamp, Mr. Quinn?" and Quinn replied "I don't know. Will you take me up the brow?" Quinn also said he had been having his food in the first splitting (i.e. No. 6 Brow) in the level and something fell on his head; he seemed dazed and did not speak very much. Hesketh took Quinn up No. 5 Brow. Except for the dust, there did not seem to be anything else wrong.
Duffy said that about ten minutes to two, he was in the shunt at the top of No. 5 Brow when a set was being hauled up. Suddenly there was a rush of wind and dust; he waved his lamp as a signal to Armstrong to stop the engine and then ran down the brow thinking there had been a fall.
Armstrong said he was at his engine hauling the sixth set up No. 5 Brow when he saw a cloud of dust coming up that brow. Duffy waved his lamp for him to stop the engine and this he did.
He then received a signal of two sixes which was the signal for help and Duffy went down the brow. He (Armstrong) then came from behind his engine on to the South Level.
To return to Quinn and Hesketh they were about to come up No. 5 Brow from No. 12 Level. According to Hesketh he found the two ventilation doors shut when he and Quinn came to them: they had to open them to pass through and he then shut them again. They continued on their way up the brow until they met Daly who was coming down. Daly turned upbrow with them and almost at once they met Duffy who was coming down the brow. The four then went up to the top of the brow and when they were on their way Quinn again complained that as he was coming out of No. 12 Level he was knocked off his feet and something seemed to hit him on the head. Quinn appeared to be dazed and Daly had a look at his head and found, as he described, a slight lump at the back.
On reaching the top of the brow, Quinn sent Hesketh to some men who were working a little way inbye to borrow a flame safety lamp for him; he then told Duffy to telephone to the engine-driver at the top of No. 2 Brow to ask if anything was wrong there; there was no reply. He (Quinn) had his detonator box with him and he gave it to Armstrong to put beside his clothes which he kept near Armstrong's engine and about this time he remarked that he thought the roof over the waste at the bottom of the No. 5 district must have fallen in and caused the gust of wind.
When Hesketh returned they-Quinn, Daly, Duffy and Hesketh -all went down No. 5 Brow again and by the time they reached the first ventilation door Duffy was leading followed by Hesketh, Daly and Quinn, in that order. They found this door open; they passed through and shutting it after them went down to the second door, which, according to Duffy, was "right open".
To digress for a moment: Daly when giving evidence on this point at first said he did not quite remember whether the second door was open or shut and he said he saw Duffy open it. Hesketh said "The second door was shut, I think" and then that he was not quite sure. Daly also said that Quinn asked Hesketh if he had shut the door when they came up the brow the first time but Hesketh, who gave evidence later, said that Quinn did not ask him, As the point was important, Duffy was recalled and he repeated that he was quite certain that the doors were open and that Quinn did ask Hesketh had he shut them when they first came up the brow.
No reflection rests on Hesketh for in such circumstances he may well be excused. In fact, his not shutting the doors proved, as will appear later, the salvation of the men at work in the No. 2 Brow district.
To resume the narrative. Duffy and Hesketh and Daly passed down below the second door, and shutting it after them went down towards the No. 12 Level from which they saw black fumes emerging; the air was warm and there was a peculiar smell like burning rubber. They returned up the brow to No. 10 Level where they found Quinn testing for gas. They told him what they had seen and Daly sent Hesketh to tell Frank Clough, the fireman in No. 2 13 Brow district he was wanted down No. 5 Brow at once. Hesketh left to carry out this mission and Quinn, Daly and Duffy went down the No. 5 Brow to below the first door where Quinn made a test and found the air free from firedamp. They continued down the brow and came to the second door, which they had closed when they retreated after seeing the black fumes coaling out of No. 12 Level, and Quinn opening it was just stepping through to test for firedamp again when there was a very loud report and Daly and Duffy were blown off their feet.
They (Daly and Daffy) came together and scrambled up the brow. Quinn, as will be told later, was not seen for some time. Although not burned, he was very seriously injured, and died in hospital a few days later.
When Daly and Duffy were nearing the top of the brow, they met Hesketh and Armstrong on their way down and they told them to go and bring help
as quickly as possible.
Contents
Rescue operations.
It will be remembered that Hesketh had previously been told to tell Clough, the fireman in the No. 2 Brow district, that he was wanted down No. 5 Brow at once. Hesketh had run up the brow and, being out of breath when he got to time top, had asked Armstrong to go to No. 2 and give the message to Clough. He (Hesketh) thus came to be standing at the top of No. 5 Brow when the second explosion occurred he said a blast of air came up the brow which nearly blew him off his feet.
Armstrong went outbye along the South Level to No. 2 Brow to try to find Clough. At the top of No. 2 Brow he saw William Bryan and Eric Garswood, the shunt minder and haulage engine driver respectively of that brow. He asked them to get Frank Clough and they said they would. Whilst at time top of No. 2 Brow he noticed the air seemed to go back towards the pit bottom; it behaved like a whirlwind. He then returned to the top of No. 5 Brow where Hesketh, who was still there, asked him if he was going down the brow with him as be was going. Armstrong told him to wait for him until he got his shirt off. Having done this, these two youths went down the No. 5 Brow and met Daly and Duffy coming up. Daly and Duffy, as has been said, sent them to get help.
Accordingly they went outbye to the top of No. 2 Brow and Armstrong went down that brow to below the No. 6 Level but finding the air there very hot he Came back a short way and, after resting awhile, returned up the brow to the South Level.
In the meantime, Hesketh had gone out to the pit bottom and had told the Onsetter, John O'Brien, to telephone to the surface for someone to come to help James Duffy, who was hurt. He also told O'Brien that something "had gone terribly wrong down No. 5 Brow". As he was talking to O'Brien, Duffy, who seemed to have recovered, and Daly came to the pit bottom and Daly told O'Brien to telephone to the fireman (James Bradshaw) of the North district to come out at once as an explosion had happened. This O'Brien did and Bradshaw came out quickly to the pit bottom where he found Duffy, Daly and Hesketh.
Bradshaw, having obtained from these youths an account of the happenings in No. 5 Brow, took them with him to the No. 2 Brow. He went down that brow a short way and saw Erie Garswood who, having changed places with John McHugh, the regular gangrider, was "scrambling up as best he could and another lad further down on his knees" Garswood had taken an empty set down No. 2 Brow and was coupling a full set to the hauling rope, when some colliers came out complaining. He signalled for the full set to be hauled up but stopped it at No. 12 Level, and then going up to No. 11 Level waited there until he saw some of the colliers, who were following him, collapse. He then went up the brow and meeting the North district fireman, James Bradshaw, coming down, told him what he had seen.
Bradshaw, having helped these two youths up the brow went back to the pit bottom and telephoned to the browman, William Deakin, to warn all officials, ambulance men, and doctors to come to No. 9 pit to render assistance. He then told Daly and Duffy to go to the top of No 5 Brow and wait for the fireman in the Orrell 4 Foot, ,James Smith, to whom he had told the Onsetter to telephone that he was to come outbye, by way of the haulage road, and bring his men with him. Daly and Duffy were to tell Smith what had occurred; hat he (Bradshaw) was dealing with the men in the No 2 Brow district and that he (Smith) had better take the No. 5 Brow district but, as he thought there had been an explosion, he was to use very great care.
He sent John McHugh to the pit bottom to wait for the Under- manager, Mr. Peter Bullough, and to tell him that he (Bradshaw) feared that an explosion had occurred in No. 5 Brow district.
Armstrong and Hesketh went with Daly and Duffy and, when on their way along the South Level to No. 5 Brow, they met a collier, George Dallimore, from the No. 5 Brow district walking outbye. Dallimore was carrying two electric lamps and these Armstrong took from him and offered to help him but he replied:- " I can manage better like this . I'm burned. I can feel the skin off my hands". Armstrong returned with Dallimore and took him to the fireman's report cabin at the pit bottom where he was later found by Christopher McBride., chief ambulance man of the Company's collieries, who took him up the pit on a stretcher and handed him over on the surface to Doctor Jones. Dallimore was taken to Hospital but, unfortunately, succumbed to his injuries.
Daly, Daffy and Hesketh, after Armstrong had taken charge of Dallimore, went on to No. 5 Brow and Daly sent Hesketh to bring out some colliers and datallers who were working a short distance inbye and with these men they (Duffy, Daly and Hesketh) came outbye to the No. 2 Brow. From there, Duffy telephoned to the No. 5 Brow and was answered by the fireman (James Smith) of the Orrell 4 Foot district, who had brought his men out to that point. Duffy and Daly then gave help to men in the No. 2 Brow and Hesketh, who had been sent to the surface for some flame safety lamps, on his return also went down No. 2 Brow and gave assistance.
After Armstrong had taken Dallimore to the pit bottom he returned and with Eric Garswood accompanied James Bradshaw, the North district fireman, down the No. 2 Brow. He gave assistance to men who were staggering or crawling on their hands and knees up that brow. He finally went to the pit bottom but being asked by the Onsetter to show a fireman, who had come from another pit, the way inbye, he took him down the No. 2 Brow and there, finding a man unconscious, helped to carry him out to the pit bottom. He returned again to the No. 2 Brow and from there, with Hesketh, took two men up the pit. They went down again but were told by Mr. Whitehead, Agent, who had arrived with Mr. Thompson, Manager of the Garswood No. 5, 6 and 7 Colliery, that they had better go home; they wanted their clothes, however, so went to No. 5 Brow, got them and then went up the pit with Daly and Duffy.
Of those youths who were in the mine at the time. the explosions occurred, there remains Eric Garswood, who went down No. 2 Brow with the fireman of the North district, James Bradshaw. They helped several men up the brow and finding one man in No. 12 Level they put him on a stretcher which they had taken with them, and carried him up the brow to No. 6 Level; they returned down-brow to No. 11 Level and there found two men, whom they were taking outbye, when Garswood collapsed and Bradshaw had to take him up the brow. After he had recovered Garswood again went down the No. 2 Brow to the No. 12 Level to give further help but, after helping to carry another man up the brow as far as No. 6 level, he collapsed a second time and had himself to be taken out.
The full tale of James Bradshaw's work is not yet told but I would like to remark here that I have given the story of the work done by these youths-Armstrong, Daly, Duffy, Garswood and Hesketh -at length because I think they deserve it. They showed that the spirit, which imbued their confreres in Yorkshire after the explosion at Bentley Colliery almost a year before, lives in the pit boys of Lancashire.
Bradshaw had made nine journeys down No. 2 Brow and, after satisfying himself that everybody was out of that district, he went on to the No. 5 Brow district where, on arriving just above No. 12 Level he found Mr. Bullough, William Marsh, dayshift fireman of the district ,James Smith, nightshift fireman of the Orrell 4 Foot district, and some men from that district. He. was advised by Smith not to go down to No. 13 Level so, with Christopher McBride and others, he went into No. 12 Level where they found a man named Occleshaw who had been exploring and had been overcome. They brought him out. They found another ma George Jones, who had also been exploring, a few yards down No. 6 Brow off No. 12 Level he was unconscious so they brought him out. After that Bradshaw went into the intake end of the district and down No. 9 Brow to a point about ten yards above No. 12 Level where he found it was unfit to proceed any further on account of the amount of firedamp in the air. Shortly afterwards the rescue teams came in and he remained in No. 9 Brow and helped to load the bodies, as they were brought out by the rescue men, on to stretchers. He came out of the mine about 2 p.m.
Mr. Bullough, with Christopher McBride and Sydney Patterson, dayshift fireman in the Orrell 4 Foot, went down the pit about ten minutes to four in the morning. They found a number of men at the pit bottom and saw George Dallimore in the firemen's office there. McBride stayed to attend to Dallimore whilst Patterson, on being told by the men who were at the pit bottom that James Bradshaw was calling for help down the No. 2 Brow, went, straight away down that brow. Of his and McBride's further work more will be said later.
Mr. Bullough called for volunteers from amongst the men at the pit bottom and then, telling the Onsetter to let those who did not follow him, go up the pit, set off inbye. According to the Onsetter none of these men went up the pit then; they all went inbye to help.
At the top of No. 2 Brow, Mr. Bullough saw the youths Daly and Duffy and learned from them that there had been an explosion; that James Bradshaw was then in No. 2 Brow district and that they had telephoned to James Smith to bring his men out of the Orrell. As he was talking to Daly and Duffy, there was a ring on the telephone and Daly, answering the call, said it was from James Smith who, with his men "had come out of the Orrell and were waiting at the top of No. 5 Brow". Mr. Bullough spoke to Smith telling him to stay where he was and he would come to him at once.
On arriving at No. 5 Brow two or three minutes later he asked Smith if all his men were with him and, being told they were, asked for volunteers and those who were not could go outbye and up the pit. He left Smith to see about that matter and went off down No. 5 Brow. He was followed at once by two of Smith's men-George Jones and Jack Fearnley.
When Bullough got down to No. 10 Level, be found that the air was not passing into that level and, on going further down, he found the first door open. He passed on and saw that the stopping which had been in the end of No. 11 Level had been blown out towards No. 5 Brow and then, going a few yards further down, he saw Patrick Quinn, the nightshift shotfirer in the No. 5 district, lying on top of the second door which was on the floor just above where it had been hung. Quinn did not appear to be burned at all but he was badly injured and too dazed to tell Bullough anything of what had occurred.
Jones and Fearnley were with Bullough and other volunteers had caught them up. They put Quinn into a brattice cloth and laid him on one side until McBride, the ambulance man could attend to him.
Bullough and Jones and Fearnley then went down to No. 12 Level where, much to Bullough's surprise, he found the air to be quite clear; he explained in evidence that he had expected to see "a rush of fumes or afterdamp or gas". The three then went down to No. 13 Level where again Bullough was surprised to find the air quite clear-not more than 1 to 1½ per cent. of firedamp. He then walked inbye along No. 13 Level thinking, to quote his own words:-
"that the air that was coming off 13 level was coming down No. 6 brow further inbye. I got to No. 6 brow quite comfortably, with Jones and Fearnley with me. 1 could not understand why it was so clear, and 1 was curious to know, knowing that there was a working place further on and the bricksetters on No. 7, and what might have occurred there. As long as the level was as clear as it was 1 went further, and I didn't think that I was going into danger because of its clearness.
'There was nothing whatever to prevent us seeing as far as usual. I was surprised. There was no haze in the air but a kind of burning smell.
Bullough, Jones and Fearnley went through the working place (Yates' place) to No. 7 Brow, where they found two bodies just at the landing at the bottom of the brow-they were stone cold- and Jones said there was another behind a tub, which Bullough did not see.
They went up No. 7 Brow and at the top they found three electric lamps-one of them alight; then turning outbye, went along No. 12 Level. They found that air was coming down No. 6 Brow and Bullough, "seeing that it was so clear", came out on to No. 5 brow to get the fireman Smith and his men to travel the same route that he had gone; but, knowing that the stopping at the end of No. 11 Level had been blown out, he thought it would be a good thing to have the bottom door on No. 5 Brow rehung on its hinges and this he had done.
Smith then started off down No. 5 Brow with eight men, including Jones and Fearnley who knew the way, and Bullough followed them. Smith examined the air as be went along and found it free from firedamp. William Marsh, the dayshift fireman of the district, joined the party on No. 13 Level before it reached No. 6 Brow and Bullough remarked to him that with the number in the party they would be able to bring out the bodies be had seen. They had gone along beyond No. 6 Brow when Bullough began to feel that all was not well-he felt a tickling feeling in his throat, his head was in a whirl and his legs began to fail; the smell was just as before.
He called to the men to come back and two came back; he came back to No. 6 Brow but did not go up there, he kept on and went along the level and came to the shunt at the bottom of No. 5 Brow and then his legs failed him entirely. He, and the two men who had come back with him, crawled on hands and knees to the top of the shunt. From that point they were carried up the brow to the end of the No. 12 Level where they were attended to by Christopher McBride.
So far, I have taken the description of Mr. Bullough's doings from his own evidence. I now turn to the evidence, which was given very clearly and with evident feeling, of James Smith, nightshift fireman in the Orrell 4 Foot, dealing with his experiences from the time he arrived at the top of No. 5 Brow with the men from the Orrell 4 Foot, and I cannot do better than quote that evidence exactly as it was given, but first stating that the "Peter" referred to is Mr. Bullough:-
"I got as far as No. .5 and I expected to see Daly and Duffy there, seeing that Daly gave me the last message. When I got there I saw nobody there. I got on the telephone. I was knocking to the pit bottom, and I believe Daly answered it. He was on No. 2. I says 'Now, Jimmy, how is it you're not here?' And he says 'Peter is coming along with some others. Peter wants to speak to you'. So with that Peter got on the telephone and he spoke to me. He asked me was all my chaps out here, and I said 'They're all close by me. They're all coming out'. He says " Keep them there. I'm coming into the top of No. 5". So I waited there while Peter came.
"Then Peter says 'Are they all here?' and I says 'I'm expecting so', so I says 'Are they alt here, boys?' and they said 'Aye '. So Peter says 'Come on, Jimmy, we'll go down the brow'. So Peter went, and I was following him down brow when we got just down the bank and he says 'Have you any lads for t'telephone ?' I says 'I've no lad', He says 'Have you anybody responsible?' and I said 'Aye, I've Jimmy Wood'. So I went back and fixed Jimmy Wood on the telephone.
When I started to go back there was six or seven got between me and Peter and the others on the top hadn't started off. I said, 'Come on, boys, follow us on'.
"As I went on down brow I couldn't see exactly where I was, but we were in No. 10 or something like that, and I dropped across four or five of them with Pat Quinn. I could see from the state of Quinn that it was no use us spending a lot of tune with him. We just tried to stop the bleeding, and then I says 'Now, lads, go on for a stretcher out of the ambulance room'. They went for the stretcher, and without anything more ado I sent six out with Quinn without a stop at all. So with these fellows having gone with Quinn and two gone with Peter (I believe Jones and Fearnley) I carried on clown the brow, the other fellows following on.
"When I got to No. 12 I didn't see any lights. I didn't know definitely where I was or what it was. 1 went to my right on No. 12. When we had gone in a bit I sees a light coming over what eventually turned out to be a fall. Peter came over along with Jones and Fearnley, so after a minute or two Peter says to me 'Jimmy, from all as I've seen they're all gone'. So after a few minutes he says 'Both them doors are off, Jimmy, in the brow'. I says 'Yes'. He says 'Do you mind going and putting one on?' So with that I put one on along with Frank Davies. After, Peter says 'Now, Jimmy, I think the best we can do for them is we will get them up on to this level'. So he says, 'If you'll take these fellows with you and be getting them on to the level'. Then he says 'Go down the main brow, first opening on the right and carry on on the level, and you'll come straight to them'.
"He said to Jones and Fearnley 'You know the road on that first road on the bottom' and they said 'Yes'. He said 'Will you go down there and Jimmy will be there when you get there?' So as I went round the main brow Jones and Fearnley were going down the first brow, and when I got there I said to Jones 'How much further, George?' and he said 'Thirty yards along the level now'. So with that I carried on, and I might say I was testing practically all the way away from the main brow, as I was going down this first opening, and just as we got past No. 6 I was still testing, and someone says 'Come on, let's be doing something'. So another says 'Tak thi time, Jimmy knows what he's doing'. So I carried on, and I was testing every three or four yards, and we carried on until we got to those fellows.
"I might say that I was all right until I got to those fellows, and Jones told me there were three. I only saw two, so I happened to he looking round for the third one. Then again I tested, and I might say that my head was beginning to go a little bit. When I tested again there was a lot more gas than there had been along the level, and then I realized the situation and I says 'Now, boys, come on, we will be getting them out'.
So I says 'Come on', and they said 'Well, there's some brattice there. Cut some bands, it'll be better for carrying'. So with that I cut some brattice strips and we placed it under these fellows. We got hold of the first one, and then they said-I remember I says 'How ninny more is there?' and George Jones says 'There is three besides these for the second one'.
I says 'Now I'm not carrying. 'Make two "fours" and I'll lead up and clear the road'. So with that they made two 'fours' and we just got hold of them and we'd gone about a yard, maybe two, when one of them says to me 'Jimmy, George Jones is fainting'. I just looked round and saw they had dropped the second fellow, and another fellow says 'Oh my head is going, and I'm going too'.
Another says 'Aye, and I'm going' and they were going out, in advance they went, leaving us. Jack Fearnley says 'Oh, my head is going too, Jimmy; I'm going'. With that I scanned the situation, and there was four of us left. I said 'Come on, boys, we must get George Jones out'. So we got hold of George Jones, and dragged him along as far as we could.
Eventually we were getting worse for wear, and we all got on our hands and knees and we dragged George Jones along as far as we could. Then we couldn't drag him no further, and they said 'Oh, Jimmy, I cannot drag no further' and I says, 'Well, boys, we'll have to do best we can, follow me'. So I crawled along with the lamp on my neck, and when I got a few yards further I felt a rush of wind, some fresh air coming down, and I turned round and I saw it was what was No. 6 Brow. So I got in there, and I tested it, and it was as good as here. I says 'Come on, boys we're all right here' and Dowie, Occleshaw and McIntyre come in, and we were in No. 6 brow.
"Billy Marsh comes on the scene then, and he says 'How many more is there, Jimmy?' I said 'there's George Jones. We've left him'. He says 'How far?' and I says 'Six or seven yards'. So with that he went in, and we (Marsh, Occleshaw and Smith) fetched George Jones out into No. 6 brow. George Jones to all intents and purposes was practically dead, and I started with artificial respiration with him. I might say I seem to have been agate a quarter of an hour; I had felt his pulse at first and there was very, very faint sign of anything. When I'd been agate a quarter of an hour, or what seemed to me like that, Dowie and McIntyre kept saying , 'Oh, Jimmy, he's gone. Come on, He's gone'. I says 'No, he's not', and just at that minute a flicker seemed to come in his eye, so I says to Jack Dowie 'Give me a help, Jack'. So Dowie aided, and at that point George Jones started sweating.
So we carried on with him for a few minutes, and then after I saw signs of him coming round I said 'Now, lads, we're no use here without strength. Now please yourselves, but if you say so I'll go and fetch some strength'. So they said 'Aye'. I said to Billy Marsh 'Which is the road out' He says 'Up the brow, and turn to the right on the top'. So I crawled up the brow and when I got to the top of the brow I turned to my right and when I'd been crawling up a bit there was somebody shouting 'Jimmy, Jimmy' and I believe it was Jack Cottam. He says 'Peter wants you'. I says 'No, we want some strength down here'. He says 'Come on, Peter wants you. We're getting some strength. There's some strength coming now'. So with that somebody come, and I told them how I was fixed. I was down there, and as far as I was concerned I couldn't go back.
"These chaps come, and they went down there, and they come out. When I was coming up the brow I says to these fellows 'if you move at all follow me. If it's for carrying on I shall come back, but if you move at all bring George Jones with you'. So as I say I carried on, and I got to where Peter and these other fellows were, and I'd been there a couple of minutes when some other chaps come, and I told them where they were, and these other chaps went down there.
I think it was them as fetched these other fellows down and up the brow. After I had been attended to on No. 12 awhile, and when I got something like, I began to have a roll call on my own. They told me, everybody assured me, everybody was out only Fearnley, and they said they thought he had gone, but they could not swear to it. As far as I know I kept pressing for Fearnley, but I didn't know whether he had got out or whether he had fallen on the floor.
After that the rescue party came down brow. They went in, and as I was at the end of No. 12 it was the rescue party that brought me up time brow to the top of the main level. That is practically, sir, as much as I know."
Q. You saw the rescue workers near the end of the story you have been telling us?-
A. When I was at the end of No. 12 after we had been in and they got the remainder of my party out the rescue party came down. I mean the rescue party with the apparatus.
Q. That was after you had had your roll call ?-A. Yes. I think it was after I had had my roll call about Fearnley. I will not swear definitely, but I am almost certain I had had my roll call before the rescue party arrived.
Q. Are you a trained rescue man ?-A. No. Might I say I attended the Institute ambulance class last session.
Q. You have only gone to the ambulance class for one session?-A. Yes.
Q. You knew how to carry out this artificial respiration?-A. Yes.
Q. You had attended the ambulance class?-A. Yes.
A simple tale; told by one of many courageous men who were in the mine that night, and one from which several useful lessons are to be learnt.
It may be that the restoration of the door on No. 5 Brow caused some of the foul air in the district to come outbye and so vitiate the atmosphere on the No. 13 Level beyond the bottom of No. 6 Brow to a greater degree than it was vitiated when Mr. Bullough first went round with Jones and Fearnley.
It also falls to be told that William Marsh and Sam Occleshaw went in again and carried Fearnley to near the bottom of No. 6 Brow, whence he was brought out by a rescue team, to whom he shouted, some nine or ten hours later.
Smith's narrative ends with the arrival of the rescue corps.
Christopher McBride, chief ambulance man, of whose work in the mine something has already been said, was called up shortly before 3 a.m. with the message that he was required at once at the No. 9 Pit with a Doctor and Henry Lomax, the regular ambulance man for this pit. Knocking up Dr. Jones of Ashton on his way, he arrived at the colliery at about 3.45 am., where he learned that there had been an explosion.
McBride showed a commendably rapid and intelligent grasp of the situation for, before proceeding underground with Mr. Bullough and Patterson, he telephoned instructions to John Deluce, timekeeper at the "Top" pits, to telephone to Mr. Whitehead, the Agent, and Mr. Thompson, the manager of the 5, 6, and 7 Colliery, notifying them of the explosion; also to tell P.C. Wilding at the General Colliery Offices to telephone to Howe Bridge Rescue Station to send a rescue party at once. McBride explained in evidence that he was sorry he omitted to instruct Deluce to telephone to the Inspector of Mines and that he did not know the address of Mr. Latham, the Manager.
As has already been stated, McBride returned to the surface with the injured man, George Dallimore, whom he handed over to Doctor Jones and Henry Lomax, the ambulance man. He then went down the pit again, taking with him various ambulance supplies, and was then himself taken down the No. 2 Brow where he met James Bradshaw, the fireman, who told him all the men were out of that district and he would go on to No. 5 with him, on arrival there, they found Mr. Bullough, William Marsh and James Smith. Mr. Bullough complained that his legs had failed him and that he had "terrible pains in his head". McBride then telephoned for more helpers, stretchers, and something to drink as everybody was parched. He had trouble with William Marsh who wanted to go inbye again although he was suffering from the effects of the afterdamp and he had to restrain him. Mr. Whitehead and Mr. Thompson came in and Mr. Thompson had to pull Marsh back as he seemed determined to go inbye for he said ''there were two men in there and he wanted to bring them out". No doubt Marsh was thinking of Fearnley and Jones.
At about 5 o'clock his brother, Joseph McBride, telephoned to him that the Rescue Corps from the Howe Bridge Station had arrived and was on the way inbye. He remained after the rescue corps arrived down No. 5 Brow attending to men affected by afterdamp until 9 a.m.
The work done by McBride, when set down in black and white, sounds simple, but it will be realized by those who understand that he did what was required of him with skill and despatch.
Mr. Whitehead and Mr. Thompson arrived in time No. 5 district at about 4.30 a.m. They found both doors on No. 5 Brow were open and that there was a good current of air, carrying two per cent. of firedamp, coming out of No. 12 Level, along which they went but finding a fall beyond No. 6 Brow, they came back and turned up No. 6 Brow. Finding air was coming down No. 6 Brow, they arranged for a brattice sheet to be put up there and then went on along No. 11 Level to No. 7 Brow and down that brow to No. 12 Level where they noticed a body lying near the low side at the junction of No. 12. Level and No. 7 Brow. Mr. Whitehead went to arrange for a stretcher and Mr. Thompson went down to the bottom of No. 7 Brow where he found a body near a tub and three electric lamps, two out and one alight. Going along the ribbing to the left, Mr. Thompson found another body. He made a test for firedamp here and found three per cent., so went up No. 7 Brow on to No. 12 Level where he found Mr. Whitehead, whom he told of the two bodies he had seen.
At this moment the Howe Bridge rescue team came over time fall on No. 12 Level between Nos. 6 and 7 Brows and Mr. Thompson went down No. 7 Brow with this team and explained where the two bodies were.
The rescue team brought these two bodies up on to No. 12 Level and then went along that level from No. 7 Brow towards No. 8 Brow, Mr. Whitehead and Mr. Thompson following as far as a small fall on the level. The rescue team went on but in a short time returned and reported that they had gone as far as a large fall on the shunt on the outbye side of No. 8 Brow; that they had not been able to get over the fall; and that the birds they were carrying had died when they reached some tubs near the fall.
Mr. Whitehead then arranged for the rescue team to bring out the bodies which they had brought up No. 7 Brow and told them to keep on the high side of No. 12 Level. He then went outbye to No. 5 Brow and instructed everyone there to move up the brow to above the two doors across that brow. He had those doors closed and arranged for brattice sheets to be fixed across Nos. 6 and 7 Brows on the low side of No. 11 Level, having in consultation with Mr. Thompson decided to try to restore the ventilation. Mr. Thompson remained to see these and one or two other brattice sheets erected and then travelled along No. 10 Level to No. 8 Brow, down No. 8 Brow to No. 11 Level, along No.11 Level to No. 9 Brow and down that brow to a point about ten yards above No. 12 Level where he found Mr. Whitehead and the fireman James Bradshaw. Further progress down No. 9 Brow was blocked by firedamp which was present in explosive proportions in the air next the roof and about two per cent. in the air next the floor.
Mr. Thompson and Bradshaw, thinking the hauling engine boy might be found at his engine just above No. 12 Level, keeping their lamps next the floor, crawled down as far as the engine and from there could see a body on the level but the atmosphere was so foul they were not able to reach it. They returned upbrow and after a little time Mr. T. L. McBride, H.M. Senior Inspector, followed by Mr. David Coatesworth, H.M. Junior Inspector, arrived at No. 9 Brow. This was about 8 a.m. There was then a consultation and it was decided to have the workings explored by rescue men. Mr. Whitehead and Mr. McBride left to go to the surface to discuss the position with Mr. W. J. Charlton, H.M. Divisional Inspector, Mr. Thompson and Mr. Coatesworth being left in charge of the operations to be carried on by the rescue teams from No. 9 Brow. Mr. Whitehead and Mr. McBride met Mr. William Sword, the Consulting Engineer to the Company, on No. 5 Brow above No. 10 Level. They explained to him the position and he went in to No. 9 Brow and joined Mr. Thompson and Mr. Coatesworth.
The recovery of the bodies by rescue teams working from No. 9 Brow above No. 12 Level continued until 2.40 p.m., 13 bodies being brought out. The first team to go in from this base was led by Sydney Patterson who, it will be remembered, had come down the pit with the Undermanager Bullough and Christopher McBride shortly before 4 am.
Patterson, it will also be remembered, hearing on getting down the pit that Bradshaw was asking for help down No. 2 Brow immediately went down that brow where, about five pillars down he saw Bradshaw who asked him to go down further and encourage any men who might be coming up until some more help came. He went further down and met one or two men whom he asked if there were any other men still further down. They were not sure so he started upbrow for assistance and Bradshaw came down and they then went right down to the bottom of the brow but did not find anyone. Further men arrived with Tom Johnson, the dayshift fireman of the district, and brought word that Frank Clough, the nightshift fireman of the district, said he had kept a check and there was only one man-Jack Thompson-unaccounted for.
Johnson knew which was Thompson's place of work so they went to it and found Thompson unconscious. He was put on a stretcher and carried upbrow. An inspection was made to make certain that everybody was out of the district and Patterson then came up the brow on to the South Level and saw there Mr. Whitehead and Mr. Thompson. After he had reported that No. 2 Brow district was clear, Mr. Whitehead told him to go and fence off the North district and Johnson was told to fence off the No. 2 Brow district. After fencing off the North district, Patterson went into the pit bottom and at that moment the rescue team from the Howe Bridge Rescue Station came down the pit. The time was 5 a.m. and the team was in charge of Mr. Wilson, the Rescue Station Superintendent and Mr. Waltham, his assistant. Knowing he (Patterson) was a trained rescue man, Mr. Wilson claimed him and he took the rescue team into No. 5 Brow district straight down the brow to No. 12 Level.
The rescue team went into the workings and Patterson remained on the brow, giving assistance to men who had been into the workings and been "gassed", until the rescue team returned. he then went up to the surface with the Howe Bridge team, arriving there about 7.30 a.m. and found four members of the Garswood Hall rescue team of which he was the captain. Patterson put on his rescue apparatus and took the team down the pit and down No. 5 Brow to No. 10 Level where he was informed a base had been established on No. 9 Brow. He took the team to this base and there found Mr. Sword and Mr. Coatesworth. His team and two other teams which followed, from then onwards were engaged in locating and bringing out bodies from the several roads and working places and each team as it returned to the base gave to Mr. Sword and Mr. Coatesworth information as to where they had found the bodies and the position in which those bodies were lying.
Of the two other teams one was comprised of Garswood Hall men captained by Harold Hayes and the other of men from Messrs. J. and Stone's colliery captained by John Bradshaw.
Patterson went up to the surface about mid-day and was told to go home. He did so, but returned at 3 p.m. and hearing food and coffee were wanted at the far end, he took down those refreshments and saw that they reached the men for whom they were intended.
The clear way in which, at the Inquiry, Patterson gave an account of the work done by the rescue teams was very impressive and it is certain that he and his team, and Hayes and Bradshaw with their teams and all the other teams carried out the tasks allotted to them very well indeed. Whether they should have been given such work is an entirely different question, on which something will be said later.
Mr. F. H. Wilson, Superintendent of the Howe Bridge Rescue Station, gave evidence and handed in a statement of particulars of the work carried out by the rescue brigades.
The call that a rescue team was wanted at Garswood Hall No. 9 Pit was received at the Howe Bridge Rescue Station at 4.20 a.m. Two rescue vans carrying a rescue brigade (five men) two Instructors (Messrs. Waltham and Meadows) the Superintendent Mr. Wilson, twenty complete sets of Proto breathing apparatus and other necessary equipment arrived at the colliery at 4.50 a.m. At 5 a.m. Mr. Wilson and a team, led by Mr. Waltham went underground and were taken in to the No. 5 Brow district by Sydney Patterson whom they met at the pit bottom.
Having formed a base on No. 5 Brow at No. 12 Level a team went inbye along that level and over the fall between Nos. 6 and 7 Brows where, as has already been said, Mr. Whitehead and Mr. Thompson were met, two bodies recovered from the bottom of No. 7 Brow, a heavy fall discovered on No. 12 Level on the outbye side of No. 8 Brow and two birds lost near that fall. There was no team at the base in support and the team, which had worked as already explained, was taken by Mr. Wilson to the surface about 7.30 am. and a team composed of Garswood Hall men with Sydney Patterson, as captain, went down the pit five minutes later. How this team, and others which followed, was made use of has also been explained.
Shortly before 8 a.m. rescue men summoned from the neighbouring collieries began to report for duty and a team made up of men from Garswood Hall and Bryn Hall Collieries went underground at 8.15 p.m. Mr. Waltham, the Senior Instructor at the Howe Bridge Rescue Station, also returned underground and proceeded to the base on No. 5 Brow to superintend the various teams as they arrived and to keep in touch by telephone with Mr. Wilson, who remained at the surface to organize matters there and to despatch the teams as they were required .
Mr. Wilson gave an account of the times at which the various teams were despatched from the surface, as follows:-
Q. Can 1 take it there was a good supply of trained rescue men available? A. Yes. I can give you some details.
Q. I think we might have them? -A. There was the Garswood Hall and Bryn Hall Composite team went clown at 8.15; a complete team from J. & R. Stone's Collieries went down at quarter to 9; a composite team of Richard Evans and Cross Tetley went down at 20 to 10; a complete team from Richard Evans went down at 5 past 10; a composite team from West Leigh and Richard Evans went down at 25 past 10; a team from Wigan Coal & Iron Co., Crompton & Shawcross and Richard Evans went down at quarter past 11; a team from Crompton & Shawcross went down at 10 to 12; a composite team from Collins Green and the Wigan Coal & Iron Co. went down at quarter to 2; a Composite team of Birkacre & Abram went down at 4-20; one of Ackers Whitley and Atherton Collieries at 5 minutes past 7; one of Atherton & Standish Collieries at 7. 25; a mixed team of Wigan Coal & Iron Co. at 10 o'clock; then two teams of Manchester Collieries went down at 10.22 p.m. Then we get to the Sunday. On the Sunday there were two teams from the Manchester Collieries went down at 10 minutes past 6; a team from Pemberton and Manchester Collieries went down at 25 past 6; Manchester Collieries sent another team at 20 minutes past 11; Wigan Coal & Cross Tetley sent a team down at half past one; Crompton and Sutton Manor sent a team down at. 20 past 2; and Richard Evans and Wigan Coal sent a team down at 4 o'clock. 1 term that the end of the first period, that is from 5 o'clock on Saturday morning to about 7 o'clock on Sunday, in which period they recovered the bodies.
Q. At the last time you have mentioned every body was accounted for that had been in the mine? A. Yes.
Q. At that time how many bodies had been brought out? A. 25, I believe.
When the Howe Bridge rescue team arrived at No. 12 Level off No. 5 Brow, its first duty should have been to explore the workings to see (1) if there were any survivors and (2) if there was anything alight or burning. If this had been done, Fearnley would have been discovered on No. 13 Level long before 3.30 p.m. which was the time be was brought out, and the ventilation in the district could have been restored and all the bodies which were recovered by men wearing breathing apparatus could have been recovered by men unhampered by that apparatus.
The primary object for which men are trained in the use of breathing apparatus is to save life. Such men may quite legitimately be used for other purposes, such as erecting stoppings or sheets in connexion with the restoration of the ventilation, or if a fire be discovered, in an attempt to extinguish it, but their first object is to explore the workings with the object of saving life.
Contents
INVESTIGATIONS FOLLOWING THE. EXPLOSIONS.
The time within which investigations of part of the area affected by the, explosions could be made was curtailed by a decision made by the Managing Director of the Company, Mr. J. H. Edmondson, to erect stoppings at certain points. It is desirable therefore to record the reason given by Mr. Edmondson for his decision-namely, from motives of safety only.
The Ravin Seam is one in which heating due to oxidization which may develop into a fire, is known to occur and has occurred in this seam at the Garswood Hall Collieries.
About 7 o'clock on the morning following the day of the explosion, Mr. C. M. Coope, Manager of the neighbouring Lyme Colliery of Messrs. Richard Evans & Company, who was in the No. 5 Brow district with Mr. Thompson, drew the latter's attention to the existence of a peculiar smell near a pack at the bottom of No. 7 Brow.
Mr. Thompson, in evidence, said the only thing this smell conveyed to him was "that there might be something left behind by he first or second explosion". it was not anything like as strong as the "gob stink" which, in his experience, came off heatings in the Ravin Seam but it did at the time suggest the possibility of spontaneous combustion. Mr. Coope did not express any opinion as to what the smelt might mean. Mr. Thompson went to the surface about 8 o'clock and there saw Mr. Whitehead and Mr. Sword, who had not been underground that morning, to whom be reported the finding of the smell which he told them he thought "was the paraffiny smell that you get in the very early Stages of any heating". He did not tell Messrs. Whitehead & Sword that there was an incipient heating; he did not think there was a heating but it was a sign that there might be something in the very early stages. He was, as he said, trying to be "ultra-cautious if possible, knowing there had been two explosions in the district ".
Mr. Coope, on leaving the mine, conveyed his views to Mr. F.B. Lawson, General Manager of the collieries of Messrs. Richard Evans & Company, who had hurried to the scene of the disaster and had been underground on the day of the explosion.
Investigation on. the spot was thereupon made by Messrs.Whitehead, Sword, Bullough, McBride and Coatesworth, and later in the day by myself, Mr. Charlton, Mr. Stevenson (late Manager of No. 9 Colliery) and others. In no case did anyone consider smell to indicate the presence of gob fire or incipient heating. Mr. Latham, the Manager, also did not associate the smell a heating in the goaf but he said that, the idea of a possible heating having been put into his head by other people, he was made anxious, knowing as he did that there was a good deal of firedamp in the district.
The opinions of Messrs. Stevenson and Bullough, as a great experience in this mine, carried much weight in reassuring me, personally, in the matter. I was also reassured I favourable results of analyses of the mine air for carbon monoxide content undertaken on the day of the explosion and following day by Mr. Ivon Graham, Assistant Director of the Birmingham Research Laboratory, and his assistant, Dr. T. D. Jones.
When the explosion occurred, Mr. Edmondson, who had been ill in bed for a week, came to the colliery office but was not able to go underground. I was present in the office on the day following the explosion, before my underground visit referred to above, when Mr. F. B. Lawson, having had Mr. Coope's message, first suggested that the smell might indicate a. heating in the gob and there was on this account further risk of another explosion with possible loss of life.
When I returned to the surface, Mr. Edmondson had left the colliery so 1 was not able to advise him that, personally, I was fully reassured about the position. He, ill as he was, being so concerned lest any further disaster should occur had however given orders for the district to be sealed off.
I fully accept Mr. Edmondson's statement that his sole motive for ordering the erection of stoppings was that of safety, and I do not consider that any party was prejudiced by the sealing off of the district. Especially is this so because, as there were two explosions, it was quite impossible to say whether such coking or signs of heat and of force, as could be seen, were due to the first or the second explosion.
Nevertheless it was unfortunate that, whilst the putting in of certain of the first stoppings was mutually agreed between Mr. Charlton and Mr. Edmondson, the final sealing of the district was effected without discussion between representatives of all who were interested.
Contents
Damaged flame safety lamp.
The results of the investigations made are shown on Plan 2. There is shown on that plan at the bottom of No. 9 Brow, a flame safety lamp with the legend "Damaged Flame Lamp No. 62". This damaged lamp was found on the evening of the day following the explosion when Messrs. Whittaker, Surveyor, Simons, Assistant Surveyor, and Messrs. Bloor and Roberts, H.M.. Sub-Inspectors of Mines, were engaged taking particulars of the position in the district for the purpose of making a plan showing the effects of the explosion.
This lamp, when found, was apparently minus its glass, the gauzes being down on the oil vessel. When examined later in the office at the Colliery, the gauzes were lifted and a piece of glass fell out. The lamp was examined at the Mines Department Testing Station, Sheffield, by the Superintendent Testing Officer, Captain C.B. Platt, who gave evidence at the Inquiry and presented a report to Mr. Charlton, copies of which were distributed at the Inquiry, on the condition of all the safety lamps submitted to him.
This report, so far as it referred to this particular flame safety lamp, read as follows:-
Flame lamp No. 62.
Flame lamp No. 62 was of the same type (Prestwich Patent Protector) as the others. The condition in which it was received is shown in Figures 1 and II. it was not locked and had no glass. The bonnet was dented and the crown crushed on one side as shown at (A) in Figures I and II.
The side el the bonnet was also crushed, as shown at (B) in Figures I and II. The outer gauze was slightly crushed at (C) and (D), corresponding to (A) and (B) on the bonnet.
''The outer rim of the middle ring of the lamp frame was bent inwards, as shown in plan view at (E).
"The bonnet was loose on its supporting ring, as shown at (F), Figure I, one of the rivets having been sheared, the others loosened.
"You handed to me on 23rd. November eleven fragments of glass reported to have been found within a radius of 3 ft. 6ins, from the lamp.
"You wished to know whether the lamp had been burning in firedamp; I found no evidence of this when I examined the gauzes. I then collected the dust from inside the lamp bonnet arid from the gauzes in order to ascertain, if possible, whether the dust had been affected by the heat of gas burning within the lamp.
"The dust from the interior of the bonnet was seen, under the microscope, to consist of a mixture of coal dust and stone dust; the small amount (52 milligrams) of deposit which I was able to collect from the gauzes consisted of soot, such as would he produced during tile normal burning of a flame safety lamp.
"I examined the fragments of glass but I was unable to arrive at any conclusion as to the cause of the fracture.
Conclusion.
"With the exception of lamp No. 62, all the lamps, both flame and electric, were in good condition and, as received, were incapable of igniting firedamp.
"I could find no evidence that lamp No. 62 had been burning in ass atmosphere containing firedamp."
The examination of Captain Platt on the particular point on which his opinion was desired when this lamp was taken to him was as follows:-
By The Commissioner:
Q. If gas had been burning in the gauzes what would you have expected to find? -A. A discolouration of various colours on the parts of the gauze.
Q. And would the gauzes have been weakened at all? A. If the temperature had been high, yes.
By Mr. Ratcliffe Ellis:
Q. Captain Platt, you said that in the gauze you examined, in the damaged lamp No. 62, you did not find any traces which would lead you to believe that gas had been burning inside that gauze? -A. No.
Q. You have made tests with gauzes, presumably, to see if it does leave any traces? - A. During my experience, yes.
Q. About the length of those tests Have you kept gas burning, say, for ten minutes? - A. Oh, yes, much longer than that.
Q. After it has been burning for ten minutes do you find any traces of the gas-any signs remaining on the gauzes of the gas having been burning ?-No.
Q. It does not show much after ten minutes, say? -A. No, one could not tell.
Q. After about what length of time would it begin to leave traces on the gauzes? -A. Unless the heat of the gas burning in the gauzes was sufficient that is to say, the gauzes were very hot indeed, one would not find any traces, so one cannot answer that question.
Q. But it is possible that gas might be burning in gauzes, and yet subsequently no trace would he shown on time gauzes? -A. Oh, of course.
By Mr. Miller:
Q. Will you tell us, Captain Platt, whether there is a difference in colour on the gauze through ordinary burning by the flame, or by coal gas, by firedamp? -A. Yes, there is a characteristic marking of the gauze if the gauze had been heated sufficiently by firedamp. It has an unmistakable appearance.
Q. That is, between the burning by gas and the burning by the flame? -A. Yes, the ordinary burning of the flame; oh, certainly.
Q. Suppose a collier takes in a flame safety lamp, and leaves it hanging at the top of a prop, near the roof for, say, two or three hours. It may be that there is a feeder of gas streaming towards that lamp, causing t to heat up. Is there a possible danger of setting fire to the gas outside? -A. No.
Q. Will you tell us whether gas will continue to burn inside of the gauze of the lamp after the flame has left the tube? -A. The wick, yes.
Q. Can you tell us how long it will burn? -A. So long as the gas is maintained sufficiently rich; so long as a rich mixture is supplied to the lamp.
Q. So that, assuming a lamp appears to be out so far as the workman is concerned, there call he a continuous flame inside of the gauze? A. Burning gas, yes.
Q. For so long a period as gas is fed to the lamp? -A. That is so.
Q. Assuming a lamp has been hung up for, say, two or three hours, with fire inside of the gauze, and a man came to take hold of that lamp, would it burn his fingers with the heat of the lamp? -A. Yes, it probably would be hot at the top, but .1 think not so hot on the oil vessel.
Q. I mean, by the bonnet? -A By the bonnet, certainly.
Q. The bonnet would burn the man's fingers? -A. Yes.
Q. He would then almost certainly drop the lamp?- A. He would.
Q. Would any danger accrue from a dropping of that lamp? - A. No.
Q. Not in a volume of gas? -A. No.
Q. Will you tell us why? -A. Because when the lamp is dropped the flame of the burning gas within the gauzes is extinguished within 12 inches of leaving his hand. That is to say, as it is falling through the air, the act of falling causes the flame of the burning gas in the gauzes to be extinguished, and it would be extinguished within the time of falling a distance of 12 inches. I have myself made tests of that.
Q. Is there any possibility of the burning gas inside of the gauze setting fire to an inflammable mixture outside, if the lamp is tilted? - A. No.
Q. Assume that firedamp is burning in the lamp gauzes? -A. Yes.
Q. And the ventilation is restricted by some object-the opening of a door for sixty seconds or a minute and a half? A. Yes.
Q. And then the ventilation is immediately brought on to that lamp? -A. Yes.
Q. Can it set fire to firedamp outside? --A. No.
Q. Then in your opinion it is not possible for firedamp to be lit by gas burning inside of a lamp gauze? - A. That is my opinion.
Q. Memorandum No. 8 of the Miners' Lamp Committee. " Record of Research on the Testing of Wire Gauzes in currents of explosive mix", at Paragraph 7 "says: When considering the possibility of a gauze than has become heated by the continued burning of firedamp within it causing an external explosion, it most be remembered that there are two ways in which it is possible for this to occur. First, the wires may be so intensely heated that they attain the ignition temperature of any inflammable mixture surrounding them"? A. Yes.
Q. "Second, they may become so hot that they cease to function as cooling agents for the flames of explosions, and such flames, if produced, therefore pass freely through the meshes"? A. Yes.
Q. Will you explain that? -A. Those conditions obtain only when sufficient volume of an explosive mixture of firedamp is forced into the lamp to cause the temperature of the gauzes to be raised sufficiently for ignition to occur outside them. That is to say, one has to have a very strong, a very quickly moving, current of explosive mixture passing the lamp, so that a large volume of gas in unit time is burnt within the lamp.
Q. What velocity would you say the ventilation should be travelling at? -A. In order to obtain ignition in the manner you have stated?
Q. Yes--A. Oh, of the order of 2,000 feet or more a minute.
Q. I am not quite sure, but I believe it has been stated that it was 12,000 feet of velocity with this ventilation.
The Commissioner: No.
Mr. Miller: I am sorry.
The Commissioner: 12,000 cubic feet.
Q. Mr. Miller: So that in your opinion, sir, it is not possible, under the conditions as stated, for this lamp to have caused an explosion? -A. Certainly not.
Further, by Mr. Ratcliffe Ellis:
Q. Assuming that lamp, or a lamp of the same description, was standing on the floor: we have got to assume that? -Yes.
Q. Was standing on the floor, and something fell from the roof, sufficient to make that dent in the bonnet and at the same time knock the lamp over, and the glass was broken: assuming all that? -A. Yes.
Q. And that there was gas burning in the bonnet of that lamp: When the glass was broken would not that be sufficient to ignite an explosive atmosphere outside it? -A. Well, I have not been able to make that actual experiment. It is rather difficult to do.
Q. I quite understand that-A. But I think it most unlikely.
Q. Why would it be unlikely? -A. Because the fact of tilting the lamp on its side is sufficient to cause it to go out. If the lamp is knocked on its side like that it goes out within a second.
Q. I am assuming the same blow had knocked it over and broken the glass. The wick might go out, but I am assuming also that the gas is burning in the bonnet at that time-A. Yes. I say I think it is extremely unlikely, because the very fact of putting the lamp on its side like that upsets the ventilation which supplies an explosive mixture to the lamp and maintains the flame of the burning gas in the lamp.
Q. You think it is unlikely, but you are not prepared to go as far as to say it is impossible? -A. No, I am not prepared to say that, but I think it is very unlikely.
By Mr. Charlton:
Q. Just a point about the lamp before we leave it. This was a spirit-burning lamp-a detector lamp? -That is so.
Q. And it is very easily put out with a shock? -Yes.
Contents
Electric signalling bells and circuits.
Two electric, signalling bells, as described below, were sent to Captain Platt for the purpose of ascertaining, in respect of either or both, whether the spark produced (a) by breaking the external circuit and (b) at the trembler contacts whilst the bell was ringing, was capable of igniting firedamp.
(1) "1920" bell, by which signals given in No. 8 Brow (No. 1 Engine Brow) were indicated to the hauling engine driver at the high side of No. 12 Level.
(2) A "Wigan Gastite" Bell taken from the haulage engine situated on the North side of No. 5 Brow opposite to the entrance to No. 12 Level.
The results of Captain Platt's experiments, in the light of his evidence, were briefly as follows: -
"1920" bell. -The spark produced by breaking the external circuit of the bell as received at the Mines Department Testing Station, that is, with the armature jammed against the magnet poles, ignited an explosive mixture of firedamp and air (8.3 per cent. firedamp) although the resistance of the circuit exceeded the calculated resistance of the circuit in the mine.
The same result was obtained when the bell was tested after it had been adjusted to ring.
The tests show that the incendivity of the spark produced on breaking the external circuit was not influenced materially by the position in which the armature was jammed.
No ignition was obtained in similar tests with a. less readily ignitable mixture (5.9 per cent. firedamp).
The spark produced at the trembler contact of the bell, after it bad been adjusted to ring, failed to ignite an explosive mixture of firedamp and air.
The case of the bell, as received, was flameproof, i.e. it failed under test to pass flame to an external explosive mixture (nine per cent.) of firedamp and air.
"Wigan Gastite" bell.-The spark produced by breaking the external circuit of this bell ignited an explosive mixture of firedamp and air (both 8.3 and 5.9 per cent. firedamp), although the resistance of the circuit exceeded the calculated resistance of the circuit in the mine.
The spark produced at the trembler contacts whilst the bell was ringing ignited an explosive mixture of firedamp (8.3 per cent.) and air when the resistance in circuit with the bell exceeded the calculated resistance of the circuit in the mine.
The case of the bell as received was obviously not flame-proof, so it was not tested.
Bell pushes. -Captain Platt also made tests to ascertain whether the pushes installed in conjunction with the bells were flameproof.. With the cover of the push removed, the spark produced at the make and brake contact, when the push was operated, ignited firedamp.
In a second series of tests which Captain Platt made to determine whether the actual case of the switch was flameproof, he found that when it was completely assembled, as intended by the maker, an ignition of gas within the case would not pass flame to the outer atmosphere. If, however, the small rubber gasket at the gland of the switch case and a small hexagon nut retaining the gasket in position, were removed, then a flame from within the case could pass to and ignite gas (8.3 per cent. firedamp) in the outer atmosphere. This occurred even though the line wire was in position through the gland. Ignitions were not, however, obtained every time and were, as Captain Platt described them, "chancy".
Contents
Medical report on the victims.
Dr. S. W. Fisher, H.M. Medical Inspector of Mines, attended at the mine on the day of and the day following the explosions. He also visited the Wigan Hospital and there, by the courtesy of the Hospital Authorities, be was allowed to see the two men, George Dallimore and Patrick Quinn, but they were so ill he made no attempt to speak to them.
The first 16 bodies which Dr. Fisher examined were laid out in the temporary mortuary at the surface of the mine. Dressings had been put on these bodies by the ambulance men and Dr. Fisher was not able, therefore, to make quite such a thorough examination of them as he was of the remainder who were brought out of the mine whilst he was there.
Dr. Fisher gave a list of the names of the men, the nature of their injuries and the cause of death. A copy of this list will be found in an Appendix to this report.
He also placed the victims of the explosion in the order of severity of burning for me as follows:-
1st Class-Nos. 16, 17, 21, 25 and 19-Very extensive ... … … ... …V.E.
2nd Class-No. 20 -Superficial and extensive ... ... ... … … …S++
3rd Class-Nos. 5, 18, 8, 22, 12, 10, 13-Superficial, less extensive… S+
4th Class -Nos. 6, 7, 4, 11, 23, 24, 15, 2-Superficial … … … ... S
5th Class-Nos. 14, 9, 1, 3-Hardly as high as superficial ... ... … ..S-.
I have had the body marked No. 1 shown on Plan 2 at the point where it was established in evidence it was found, and not at the point-the top of No. 7 Brow-where it was shown on the plans produced at the inquiry as having been found.
Of the five bodies found on No. 12 Level between the top of No. 8 Brow and the top of No. 7 Brow Dr. Fisher has placed three Nos. 17, 25 and 21, in the order of severity of burning, in the 1st Class and of the two bodies found on that level nine to ten yards outbye from the top of No. 7 Brow, one (No. 19) is placed in the 1st Class and one (No. 18) in the 3rd.
Only one further body is placed in the 1st Class, namely, No. 16 found on No. 8 Brow about four yards from the top and one only, No. 20, is placed in the 2nd Class; it was found in the shunt on No. 12 Level about five yards outbye from the top of No. 8 Brow.
Thus of all the bodies placed in the 1st Class, one only was not found on No. 12 Level and that one was found within four to five yards of it; on the other hand one body (No. 22), which was found at the top of No. 8 Brow, is placed in the 3rd Class. How it came to be less burned than the other I cannot explain.
It would therefore appear that the most severe heat in the first explosion-Dr. Fisher was quite satisfied that all those who died in the district were dead within a very few minutes after the first explosion and that their deaths were due to poisoning by carbon monoxide -was experienced in No. 12 Level from the top of No. 8 Brow to ten yards outbye from the top of No. 7 Brow.
The reason why one (No. 19) of the two bodies found ten yards outbye from the top of No. 7 Brow, should have been more severely burned than the other (No. 18), would appeal to be that the flame when it came outbye along No. 12 Level from the point where No. 17 body was found, shot up and down and past No. 7 Brow and that the tongue which shot past No. 7 Brow caught one man more than the other.
The release given to left and right up and down No. 7 Brow and the fact that that part of No. 12 Level had been stone dusted on the Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday prior to the explosion would account for the fact that Quinn was not burned and that Hesketh saw no flame, it having died out between Nos. 7 and 6 Brows.
There were two bodies in No. 8 Brow, Nos. 15 and 14, one of which (No. 15), Dr. Fisher placed in the 4th Class and the other (No. 14), in the 5th Class, and yet further down that brow there was a body (No. 13), which he placed in the 3rd Class. It was suggested in evidence by Mr. Coatesworth that these three men had been having their food in the place to the right of No. 8 Brow, looking upbrow, between Nos. 12 and 13 Levels and that one of these men- No. 15, had just started to have his food as in the place he found a can with some drink in it and some food on the floor. It may well be that the other two had finished their meal and that No. 13 had got out of the place on to No. 8 Brow just before the explosion and that the other two were burnt by a lick of flame into the place.
Of the three bodies found in No. 9 Brow, two near the bottom and close together are placed one (No. 10) in the 3rd Class and the other (No. 11) in the 4th; the third (No. 8), found about ten yards higher up, is placed in the 3rd Class as also are one (No. 12) found half-way between. the bottom of No. 9 Brow and No. 8 Brow and one (No. 5) found on No. 12 Level at the top of No. 9 Brow.
No. 9. found in the ribbing going towards No. 9A Brow from No. 9 Brow, is placed in the 5th Class and Nos. 6 and 7, found close together in No. 9A Brow, in the 4th Class, as is No. 4 which was found on No. 12 Level at the top of that brow.
Of the two bodies found near the bottom of the No. 7 Brow, one (No. 2) is placed in the 4th and one (No. 1) in the 5th Class. No. 3 found in the ribbing place to the left, going down brow, off No. 7 Brow is also placed in the 5th Class.
Dr. Fisher's evidence thus points to the site of greatest inflammation during the first explosion as having been on No. 12 Level.
When giving his evidence, Dr. Fisher bore testimony to the assistance given to him by the ambulance men and to the satisfactory nature of the ambulance arrangements.
Contents
CAUSES OF THE EXPLOSIONS.
Of the possible causes of the first explosion there were shotfiring: fire due to spontaneous combustion, to which the Ravin Seam is subject; a match struck for the purpose of smoking; sparks or heat due to falling rock; a damaged safety lamp; and electricity.
Examining these possible causes in the order given:-
(1) There was no evidence of any sort that a shot had been fired immediately prior to the explosion.
(2) The evidence of Mr. J. lvon Graham and of Dr. T. D. Jones disposed of any suspicion that a fire due to spontaneous combustion might have been the cause.
(3) Careful inspection of the affected area for matches or smoking materials failed to reveal any signs of such articles.
(4) There was no evidence of a fall having occurred prior to the explosion and the roof was shale and not rock. Two falls were found on No. 12 Level after the explosions but, as burned bodies were recovered from beneath each of them, it is evident that they occurred after the explosion.
There remain (5) a damaged safety lamp and (6) electricity.
Mr. D. Coatesworth. H.M. Junior Inspector of Mines, gave evidence of his activities and observations in the mine during the day of, and the day following, the explosion and of the inspections he made in the Ravin Seam and of the main return airway to the No. 2 Shaft subsequent to the explosion.
He expressed the opinion that the point of origin of the first explosion was "in No. 12 Level, somewhere between Nos. 7 and 8 Brows", and considered that an explosive mixture of firedamp and air accumulated on that level because the ventilation current was more obstructed by the restrictions in the path it was intended to follow than it was by the numerous brattice sheets placed across No. 12 Level. That firedamp, which had come off at the break in the roof at the bottom of No. 9 Brow in tremendous quantity had not been dilated by the air coming down No. 9 Brow, but had travelled along the higher side of the road between the bottom of No. 9 and No. 8 Brows, up No. 8 Brow and so found its way into No. 12 level; and having reached that level, accumulated in the shunt, the current of air along No. 12 Level being insufficient to carry it away.
He had had experience of firedamp sweeping along next the roof and running uphill, and to illustrate how the firedamp once having accumulated in No. 12 Level was not carried away, he produced sketches of the position in which be had found an accumulation of firedamp in a cavity in the roof of the No. 15 Brow off the North Level, when making an inspection in the North district of the mine on a date subsequent to the explosion.
Mr. Coatesworth considered that this accumulation of firedamp in the shunt in No. 12 Level was ignited whilst a signal was being given, either at a push or at the wires, to move the haulage rope on No. 12 Level, he had heard evidence that there were no pushes in the mine which did not have covers and that it was extremely exceptional for pushes to be found without covers; but he had also heard the evidence of Mr. Cowan, who found pushes without covers, and when in the North district subsequent to the explosion he had himself seen nine pushes, four of which had no covers and a fifth otherwise defective.
The second explosion, in Mr. Coatesworth's opinion, was caused by some thing left burning by the first, but he was not prepared to say definitely where that burning was; he thought at the fall at the top of No. 8 Brow, but it might have been elsewhere.
In regard to a suggestion that the damaged flame safety lamp might have been the cause of the explosion, Mr. Coatesworth said "From what I saw round about the place" (where the damaged lamp was found) "there is no evidence to support that that lamp had had anything to do with it".
Mr. Coatesworth gave it as his opinion that the signs he saw of the greatest heat were in the ribbing three parts of the way down and off No. 9 Brow. In this place No. 9 body was found and Doctor Fisher put that body in the 5th class, i.e., as being one of those which were the least severely burned. It would appear, therefore, that the signs of heat which Mr. Coatesworth saw here were the result of the second explosion and not of the first.
Mr. T.L. McBride, Senior inspector of Mines, said he agreed with the opinions expressed by Mr. Coatesworth but, when the damaged lamp was brought to him on its being found, he had thought it must have been the cause of the explosion.
As has already been reported, a damaged flame safety lamp- No. 62-was found at the foot of No. 9 Brow. I saw this lamp when on my way inbye on the Sunday evening. It was being brought out of the mine wrapped in a piece of brattice cloth by Mr. McBride. At that time I just looked at it, seeing no glass hut noticing that the gauzes were down on the oil vessel. With Mr. Charlton and others, I went to the place where this lamp had been found hut I could not find anything to which its damaged condition could he attributed. Careful search was made for the glass and several pieces were picked up from the floor on the goaf side of the spot where the lamp had been found. There were props set to the roof all around this spot and there was no sign of any fall having occurred nor was there anywhere near a pick or other tool by which the lamp might have been broken.
Mr. Sword's conception of the manner in which this lamp may have been broken and was the cause of the explosion and of the nature of the explosion was given by him in evidence in answer to Major Ratcliffe Ellis as follows:-
Q. Now I want you to come to the lamp. You have seen the lamp?-
A. Yes.
Q. And you have seen the point where it was found?-A. Yes.
Q. If that lamp had been in the position you see it now, and with gas burning in the bonnet in that position where it was found, and gas coming out from the break, what do you think would be the effect there? -A. I think there is no doubt that under these circumstances the gas would have been ignited; the gas surrounding the lamp would have been ignited.
Q. We do know that lamp is broken, but no one can say how it has been broken? -A. Quite.
Q. Can you think of any means by which the lamp could have been broken, looking at the condition it is in? -A. Yes, sir. In my opinion the lamp has been on the floor burning in an inflammable atmosphere. A stone has come from the roof and caught this lamp a side blow, knocked in the standard and at the same time punctured and shattered the glass.
Q. That is one way in which you think it might have been done? -A. That is one way in which I think it might have been done.
Q. That is not the only way, I suppose? There are other ways how it might have been done ?-There are other ways, yes.
Q. The Commissioner: Are you going to tell us the other ways?- A. Well, it might have been standing against a prop.
Q. I am wondering which one you are going to choose; which way you are going to favour.
Mr. Ratcliffe Ellis I am not asking him to say how it was broken.
The Commissioner: I see: the possible ways in which it may have been broken?
Mr. Ratcliffe Ellis Yes. I put it to him first that no one can say how it was broken.
The Commissioner: Quite so.
The Witness: The lamp might have been standing against a prop, and a stone dropped from the roof, catching it a sideways blow, damaging the crown of the lamp as it is damaged, and at the same time catching the glass and shattering it.
Q Mr. Ratcliffe Ellis; And if that lamp had ignited the gas under those circumstances, what sort of an explosion would you have expected it to have been? -A. I assume it to have been quite a mild explosion.
Q. I am talking of the first one? -A. The first one, yes. Do you want my theory? Do you want to know what I think about it.
Q. Yes, I want that?-A. Well, the Commissioner has already drawn attention to this large void here (i.e., the open goaf between Nos. 9 and 9a Brows), in which the velocity of the air would be very low indeed, We also know about this break (i.e., the break at the bottom of No. 9 Brow referred to by Mr. Coatesworth, in his evidence) from which the gas is supposed to have been issuing. I think it is Quite safe to assume that this air here would very soon become a mixture charged with a considerable volume of firedamp. I assume that the mixture in that area has been something more than an explosive mixture-perhaps 12 or 13 per cent, of methane in the atmosphere.
That lamp has been damaged by the fall from the roof, the glass has been shattered and the explosion has been started off, and in my opinion the explosion has gone in that direction, towards the intake, has come in a lesser degree towards No. 8, travelled up No. 8, and this one, after reaching No. 12 Level, has come along 12 Level, and the two flames have met at that point (i.e., the top of No. 8 Brow). That, in my opinion, would account for the fact that these men are comparatively badly burnt as compared with the others, although I think I did hear Dr. Fisher say that there was some man here who was quite as badly burnt as those men in the shunt.
Q. I think he did say that ? -A. Then in addition to that, if there was coal dust anywhere one would expect to find it in the shunt, where all the tubs are marshalled, and I think that would probably add to the flame.
The conception put forward by Mr. Sword-with which Mr. Whitehead and Mr. Latham agreed-is to some extent discounted by the evidence of Captain Platt when he said (1) that if the glass of the lamp had been broken by a fall from the roof and if firedamp were already burning within that lamp, an explosive atmosphere outside the lamp might be ignited but he thought it very unlikely and (2) that when he examined the damaged lamp, he found no evidence whatever of firedamp having been burning within the gauzes.
Although Captain Platt admitted that it was possible for firedamp to burn within a gauze and leave no trace, he had in fact dealt with this particular point in his report on the damaged lamp -in which he said that the deposit which he collected from the gauzes consisted of soot, such as would be produced during the normal burning of a flame safety lamp. Thus on this ground alone, the conception of Mr. Sword is negatived.
I have recounted from my own observations the condition of the area within which the damaged lamp was found and have said that not withstanding that 1 viewed this lamp with the gravest suspicion, I could not find there anything to which the damage done to it could be attributed.
I was not able to picture to myself in a convincing manner how this lamp could have been broken so as to have been the cause of the explosion. Nor, even how, after having heard the evidence of Mr. Sword and having studied that evidence with great care, am I able to form any such picture.
I do not think this lamp was damaged before either the first or the second explosion. I think it was damaged b the force of the second explosion, which was of a much more violent character than the first, throwing the lamp from where it had been hung to where it was found, and that its glass was broken and its bonnet damaged when it landed on the floor.
There is now left only one other cause, namely electricity, which was in use in No.5 Brow district at the time of the explosion. For the purpose of giving signals.
The evidence is quite clear that Harold Hesketh, driver of the haulage engine working the haulage along No. 12 Level, received a signal from the gangrider, who was in the shunt on that Level between No. 7 and 8 Brows, "to Stretch up" and that within a short interval -tested twice by Mr. Charlton, Hesketh gave that interval as 13 seconds and then as 18 seconds - he heard a report like a shot which came out of No. 12 Level and was followed by dust also out of that level.
There is no doubt whatever in my mind that an electric spark made when that signal was given ignited firedamp which had collected in the shunt on No. 12 Level.
How did firedamp collect in that shunt? The answer is simple and was given by Mr. Charlton in his evidence in answer to questions by me as follows: -
Q. Can you tell me, in connection with this explosion, where the firedamp came from? -A. From the goaf, sir.
Q. We have heard during this Inquiry that when the workings were in strait there was very little trouble with firedamp? -A. That is what we have heard.
Q. But that since the broken working, the taking out of the pillars, was begun there has been some trouble? -- A. As one might expect.
Q. And as Mr. Latham told us about? -A. Yes.
Q. When that firedamp came out of the goaf have you any idea where it went to? -A. In my opinion, sir, the gas coming out of the goaf would tend to go up-hill. In my opinion it would go up No. 5 Brow.
Q. If the seam had been flat would you have said that? -A. I should not.
Q. Is that opinion owing to the natural condition; that the seam is dipping - A. Entirely due to that.
Q. When you say it would go up, you think it would go up No. 8 Brow? -A. Yes I am told some air came down regularly, and I see that great efforts had been made to stop it from going along 12 Level.
Q. It would go up 8 Brow, the gas being made in the goaf, and when it got up No. 8 Brow what would happen to it? -A. Well, on No. 12 Level there are quite a number of canvas sheets, and a brick stopping with a frame in it.
Q. According to the plan there are three sheets. The intake is by way of No.9? A. The intake is 9 Brow.
Q. The air came down No. 9 Brow, and there was a sheet across that? A. The air came down No. 9 Brow. There was an attempt to travel down 9A and also down the panel side. Then the air was driven, we are told, certainly about 90 per cent. of it, down to the bottom of 9 Brow, passed along there on the left hand rib towards 8 Brow. We are now told, and it would appear to be so from all the measures taken on 12 Level to prevent leakage, that if there was any air going down 8 Brow it was certainly a very small amount, a very sluggish current, and that presents to my mind the likelihood that if gas came off this goaf on the low side that the gas would run up brow against the roof.
Q. Notwithstanding that air was trickling down? - A. Not withstanding that.
Q. And the gas that went up 8 Brow, you visualize it trickling up along the roof? -A. Yes.
Q. And it gets into 12 Level? -A. Yes.
Q. Having got into 12 Level what happened to it then? -A. Now we have leakages, we are told, and I conceive on this road, coming along 12 Level right out, some air perhaps going down 7 Brow, some down 6 Brow, and certainly diluting this gas, and taking it away, which we conceive as having gone up to 12 Level. Still the parts of those sheets that were disturbed were the bottoms of the sheets, and we have gas which tends to lie against the roof, and if the canvas sheets were extremely tight it would be very difficult for that gas to get along.
Q. Now in 12 Level between 8 Brow and 7 Brow there are canvas sheets nearer 7 Brow, and on the inbye side is shown what had been a door that at the time of the explosion a door frame set in brickwork? -A Yes.
Q. With a canvas sheets over it? -A. That is shown on the plan.
Q. You have just said that the gas that got up there would have some difficulty in getting through the sheets? - A. Yes.
Q. Would it not have been much more difficult in getting through the brickwork of that door? -A. A great deal more difficult. It would be like against a "canch".
Q. May I take it that you visualize gas creeping up 8 Brow next the roof, getting into 12 Level and lying in 12 Level in the form of an accumulation against the brickwork of that, door frame? A- Yes, that is exactly what I do visualize.
Q, You have got then your first requirement, have you not, for an explosion? - A. That is so.
Mr. Charlton's description of the brickwork above the door frame as being like a "canch" was very apposite. Firedamp will accumulate in a "canch" or "ripping". And, even if a strong current of air be passing beneath, will remain there just in the same way as was described by the late Mr. G. Scott Ram and Dr. J.S. Haldane in their Report * on an explosion in a house at Acton in 1927. After relating that both the back and front doors had been opened to let the gas escape, these authorities said it was probable that only the upper part of the shop (the front room of the house) above the level of the top of the door, was filled with explosive mixture, since most of the gas must have escaped in one direction or the other.
During the Inquiry my suspicions became fastened on the brick wall with a door in it which had been erected in No. 12 Level in an endeavour to prevent air from leaking from the intake outbye along this level. There were, as is shown on Plan 2, no less than ten brattice sheets across No. 12 Level in addition to the brick wall which had had a door in it but in which the door had been replaced by a brattice sheet because the movement of the hauling rope kept the door open.
The Manager, who said he knew the district better than the fireman, described in evidence the condition of the brattice sheets and of the brick wall in No. 12 Level, as follows:- They were good brattices; fairly heavy, about three or four layers of brattice swung ; swung from the roof bar, fastened to the roof bar and swung down; and fastened at the sides too. And in regard to the brick wall, he said it went up to the roof and had in it a door frame, about four feet by four feet, from which the door was taken away and replaced by a brattice sheet.
Mr Latham said too, that notwithstanding the good condition in which he described these brattice sheets to be, there still was leakage of air outbye along No.12 Level, but that that leakage was very small; that some air leaked through the three brattice sheets between Nos. 9 and 8 Brows and turned down No. 8 Brow; that some went on through the brattice sheet over the door frame in the brick wall and the brattice sheet between Nos. 8 and 7 Brows and turned down No. 7 Brow; and the remainder of the leakage went on and through the two brattice sheets between Nos. 7 and 6 Brows and turned down No. 6 Brow.
It was in evidence that the No. 12 Level was of good height and that the props used to support the roof were eight feet in length.
Keeping in view these conditions; remembering that the seam dipped 1 in 5½ to the goaf; that there had been no difficulty whatever with firedamp until goaf was formed and great difficulty after it was formed; and that the area along which the air had to travel from No. 9A Brow to No. 8 Brow between the low side of the coal and the goaf was large and therefore the air current sluggish, was it not natural that firedamp would creep along the roof from the goaf up into No. 12 Level in spite of the "very small" leakage of air along that level of which Mr. Latham gave evidence? The answer can only be "Yes".
Such behaviour of firedamp in such circumstances and in much less favourable circumstances-even in main intake airways-is within the knowledge of mining men with experience of the working of inclined seams. What Manager who has tried to course air |
