Explosion at North Gawber (Lidgett) Colliery. Yorkshire, l2th. September 1935. 19 killed.
Many thanks to Robert Mason for providing the report from which this information is taken.
REPORT
on the Causes of and Circumstances attending the Explosion
which occurred at North Gawber (Lidgett) Colliery, Yorkshire.
on the 12th. September 1935.
By
SIR HENRY WALKER) C.B.E., LL.D.
H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines.
Mines Department,
Dean Stanley Street,
Millbank, S.W.1.
14th. May 1936.
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To Captain Harry Crookshank, M.P..
Secretary for Mines.
In accordance with your instructions, I have held a formal investigation under Section 83 of the Mines Act, 1911, into the causes and circumstances of the explosion which occurred in the Nos. 3 and 4 South Districts, North Gawber (Lidgett) Mine. Yorkshire, about 2.45 p.m. on Thursday, 12th. September, 1935, whereby 19 persons lost their lives and five others were injured, and I now have the honour to report as follows:-
General.
Owners of the Colliery------------Messer. Fountain and Burnley Limited.
The explosion was confined to parts of the Nos. 3 and 4 South Districts. These districts are reached at a distance of some 1,600 yards from the shafts by way of the Main Haulage Plane, which is also the main intake airway.
The Lidgett Seam in these districts is about 2ft. 6in. thick and dips 1 in 11 to the North-East. It is a gassy seam and firedamp soon collects if the ventilation is interrupted.
The coal, undercut by electrically driven machines during the afternoon shift, was brought down by shots fired during the night shift and filled on to electrically-driven conveyors during the day shift.
The total number of men employed underground was 200 on the day shift, 120 on the afternoon shift and 80 on the night shift; the output per day being some 650 tons, which was raised between the hours of 6a.m. and 3 p.m.
Ventilation.
These Nos. 3 and 4 South Districts were ventilated by three splits taken off the main intake along Nos. 1, 3 and 4 South Levels. These splits when measured in August contained 4,050, 3,960 and 4,340 cubic feet per minute respectively.
Lighting.
The officials and some of the workmen used Teale's Protector Type flame safety lamps: other workmen used Ceag electric safety lamps.
Shot-firing.
Shots were fired in the coal during the night shift by the deputies and shot-firers. If further shots were required in the coal during the day shift, they were fired by a shot-firer. Shots in the ripping of the levels were fired by deputies during the afternoon shift. Bellite No. 1a was used in the rippings and Lodensite in the coal.
Stonedusting.
Stonedusting of the roads was done during the night shift. Samples of the dust taken from Nos. 3 and 4 South Levels during the month prior to the explosion gave the following percentage content of combustible matter:- (a) No. 3 South Level--- Roof 29.6; Sides 30.8: and Floor 36.9; (b) No. 4 South Level---Roof 40.8; Sides 38.4; and Floor 41.9.
Supervision.
Mr. S. Lawrence and Mr. C. Weaver were the Manager and Undermanager respectively; they visited the workings of the mine daily. There was a deputy in each district on each of the three shifts and, in addition, an overman on each shift.
Signals.
Signalling on the mechanical haulage roads was by means of electric bells.
Searching.
Twenty percent of the men on each shift were searched at the pit bottom.
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Work being done in Nos. 3 & 4 South Districts shortly prior to the explosion and occurrence of the explosion.
On No. 3 South face and No. 4 face Top Airway Gate.
On No. 3 South face men were filling on to the electrically driven conveyor the coal which had been undercut and shot down during the two previous shifts.
This coal was being delivered by the conveyor on to an electrically driven gate-end loader, fixed near the face of the No. 3 South Level, and so into tubs.
The youths attending to the loader and to the manipulation of the empty and full tubs and those taking the loaded tubs to the passbye and bringing the empty ones thence to the loader, were at their respective posts.
The deputy (William Brant) of No. 3 face was occupied at the top end of that face.
The shot-firer (Friend Clayton) visited the No. 4 face at about, according to his evidence, 12.20 p.m., and discussed with the two rippers ( George Wroe and Jacob Fallis) of the Top Airway Gate, the question of needing a shot in the ripping of that gate and, having told them that if they could not get the ripping done by hand and so found they required a shot, they were to send for him, returned to No. 3 face, where he fired a shot in the coal.
Shots were rarely fired in the ripping of the No. 4 Top Airway Gate. Clayton, who had only been a shot-firer in the district for a fortnight, had fired one several days before, but, prior to that, none had been fired in this ripping for months.
Between 1 o'clock and half-past, according to Clayton, one of the rippers, Clayton was not sure which one, came to No. 3 face for him and they returned to the No. 4 face Top Airway Gate where Clayton charged a shot-hole, which the two rippers had bored, with four cartridges of Bellite No. 1a which were handed to him loose by Jacob Fallis.
This shot-hole was 4½ feet deep, about 2½ feet from the left side of the gate, roughly ten inches to a foot from the roof, more less level, and running more or less parallel with the gate.
Prior to charging the hole he said he examined it for breaks with a special break detector (the "Rothwell-Haigh") but did not find any, nor did he see any breaks in the roof immediately by the ripping. There were breaks, he said, in the roof some 12 to 14 yards back in the gate.
He fired this shot at about 1.40 p.m., and then after spending a short time in No. 3 South Level, he returned to No. 3 South face where he fired two more shots in coal in the vicinity of the middle gate of that face. He made an examination after firing these two coal shots and found everything all right but, about five minutes after he fired the second shot, a sudden rush of wind and dust came up the No. 3 face from the low side.
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On No. 4 South face.
Evidence of what was being done on No. 4 face shortly before the explosion was given by John Thomas Walley, coal-cutting machine-man, who, with his crew consisting of his brother George Arthur Walley, Clifford Walker and Richard Hurrell, went down the pit between 1.45 and 2 p.m., and having passed "the time of day" with two colliers, Jack Howard and Earnest Senior, in the travelling road at a point some 10 to 15 minutes walk from the No. 4 South Top Airway Gate, arrived in that gate at about 25 minutes to 3. Walley left his three mates in this airway gate, where also were two panmen, Thomas Roberts and Leo Bunting, working with Jacob Fallis, ripper, who was putting the ripping dirt, previously brought down by the shot in the airway gate, on to the conveyor and so sending it down the face where George Wroe, having broken the pans, was casting it into the goaf.
There was still in the centre of the airway gate about a tub and a half of ripping-dirt to be shifted when Walley passed into the face from that gate; the top side of the gate had been ripped right up to the face but on the low side some of the side was hanging over the breaking-off bar, and in his opinion, was likely to fall, but he did not think, even if it had fallen on to the tub and a half of ripping-dirt which he saw in the centre of the gate, that it would have stopped the air.
On the left-hand side of the airway gate going inbye there was a pack which had been built to about four yards from the coal face. On the right-hand side was the old settling gate which, for the most part, had fallen in and in which, in parts, old timber could be seen.
The coal-cutting machine, had been stabled in the middle gate and Walley, having to fit it with new picks, went down the face to that gate passing, on his way, first Joe Washington and then George Wroe; he saw no one else but there were two lights about 18 yards further down the face.
Of his three mates he said two, Clifford Walker and Richard Hurrell, would attend to the timber, and his brother George Arthur Walley, would first see that the electricity was switched off at the switch-box in the airway gate from the conveyor motor and then, having taken the pommel out of that motor, would take it and the cable up to the top of the face, and then bring it down the new track to the coal-cutting machine. There was only one cable.
On arriving at the middle gate Walley found that his hammer was missing so, in order to borrow one, he went back some few yards along that gate to where four rippers, Clement Gladstone Moores, Gladstone Ledger, Ernest Stephenson and Patrick Harrison---were stripping off their clothes prior to beginning work. These rippers had come inbye a short way along the No. 3 South Level and then through the manhole door in the slit leading to the No. 4 middle gate and then along that gate to about 50 yards from their working place, which was the ripping of that gate.
Having obtained a hammer Walley returned to the machine; he then examined the switch handle, looked to see that the clutch was out, saw that the pommel casing was clear and no dirt in it and knelt down to start changing the picks, with Patrick Harrison, who had come inbye to the ripping edge, watching him. He had only changed on pick when there was a blast which came down the face. He was blown over the machine and the whole place became filled with dense smoke and dust. He did not see any flame. He heard Harrison groaning and Moores shouting they were to lie down. Moores also asked where Harrison was and Walley answered that he was there but he could not find him. Moores came and got Harrison and they, with Ledger and Stephenson, made their way out to the middle gate and eventually came through the manhole door into the No. 3 South Level. That door was shut when they got to it and there was a brattice sheet fastened on the doorframe as well.
Walley said the explosion occurred not more than 10 to 15 minutes after he left the airway gate. He had felt no slackening of the ventilation and Harrison said there was plenty of air before the explosion occurred. He saw no flash or flame or sparks.
Some 16 yards on the low side of No. 4 middle gate John Williams was boring a shot-hole and another shot-hole borer, Amos Dransfield, was 40 yards further down the face. Two pan-shifters, James Nixon and George Betton Whewall were also at work on this part of the face.
Williams was killed and Whewall so badly injured that he died in hospital the same day, but Dransfield gave evidence saying that he was looking down the face towards No. 4 South Level when a big gush of hot air came behind him and lifted him about three yards further down the face. There was nothing wrong with the ventilation before the explosion happened.
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On No. 3 South Level.
Just before the explosion, four youths---James Crowe, Robert Chatterton, Sidney Hunter and George Bowen---were at work at the inner end of No. 3 South Level. Crowe and Chatterton were at the loader: Hunter was some ten yards further outbye and Bowen some three yards on the inbye side of the haulage return wheel. Another youth William Boydell, was in the No. 3 face about three yards up above the end of the level.
Crowe, in evidence, said that just before the explosion occurred, he was at the loader and looking outbye along the No. 3 South Level. He could see the lights of the two pony drivers. Hubert Kelly and Claud Ackroyd, and those of Albert Smith, corporal, Robert Brant James Senior and Thomas Poyser, colliers, all of whom were about 30 to 40 yards outbye from him. Brant, Senior, and Poyser, had been filling on the No. 3 face, and having finished their work were on their way outbye.
Suddenly Crowe saw a flash at the top of the settling gate (i.e. at the top of the innermost slit connecting No. 3 South Level with the settling gate) and he was thrown down. Immediately succeeding the flash smoke came towards him. There was no noise but plenty of dust. Kelly was shouting so he went towards him and found him at the top of the settling gate where also were Walter Riley, collier, and Ackroyd. The clothes of all three were on fire. He suggested they go outbye along the level but they could not get, and could not see, beyond the settling gate, because of the dense smoke. They then turned inbye and on reaching the loader Crowe shouted to the borer, Tom Smith, who was working on the face at the low side of the level putting holes in, "to get some help as there are some lads burned down here". He saw Smith cross the face of the level to go up the face and heard him shout, repeating Crowe's call for help, but he never saw him again. They then went up No. 3 face---"Kelly and Riley went in front with Hunter and Chatterton, and I told Ackroyd to cling on me at the back and I went up the face". The air was thick until they reached the middle gate but above that it was clear. They got assistance at the middle gate from the shot-firer, Friend Clayton, who led them to the top of the face. When Crowe was at the top of the settling gate immediately after the explosion, he heard Albert Ibberson, collier, who was in the settling gate, shouting "Save me, my head is burning".
George Bowen, whose work was tramming between the passbye and the loader gate, gave evidence to the effect that, at the time of the explosion, he was about three yards on the inbye side of the haulage return wheel; he was nearer to Kelly and Ackroyd than anybody still alive. Kelly was at the top of the settling gate---just inside---and Riley came running out of that gate. At the time of the explosion Bowen was looking inbye when a gust of wind, followed be reek, came behind him and knocked him down. He got up and rushed inbye towards the loader. Then he and Robert Chatterton, Jim Crowe and Sidney Hunter went outbye along the level towards the top of the settling gate. He saw Riley, who came running out of the settling gate, and Kelly at the haulage return wheel, but he did not see Ackroyd. They tried to go outbye along the level but could not on account of the smoke, so they went the other way and up the face and out by No. 1 South Level. The light of his flame safety lamp was put out by the explosion; it was all right before.
Sidney Hunter also gave evidence, saying he was about five tub lengths from the loader, which was running. The conveyor was also running. The haulage was not running, but had been a minute before the explosion occurred. He was looking towards the face when suddenly he was knocked down on to his face as if something had hit him in the back. The level then became filled with smoke. He went towards the haulage return wheel and there saw Kelly, Ackroyd and Riley and helped to get them to and up the face to the middle gate. There were two flame safety lamps hanging up when the explosion occurred---"one against the conveyor end" and the other "over the top of the loader". He was looking towards them when the explosion occurred; they were burning all right but the explosion put them out.
William Boydell said at the time of the explosion he was on No. 3 South face about three yards above the level. He was throwing bars up the face. He had a flame safety lamp hung on a bar; it was burning all right. He felt a gust of wind which blew him up the face and after about a minute there was smoke. He turned round and went towards the haulage return wheel but could not see anything. He heard Crowe shouting to get to the switch to switch the pans off, so he went back to the face but found they had already been stopped. He found an electric lamp under the loader and went up the face where he saw Friend Clayton, the shot-firer, and told him there were some lads hurt and he had better go and help them and he (Boydell) then went along the middle gate and so outbye. Above the middle gate the air was quite clear; below it was all smoke.
Robert Chatterton did not give evidence. He had left the neighbourhood and, having regard to the evidence given by his mates, it did not appear to be necessary to call him.
I have given the evidence of these youths more fully perhaps than is strictly necessary. To have done less would have been to do less than justice to their indomitable spirit.
Unhappily, the two pony driver boys, Claud Ackroyd and Hubert Kelly, and the collier, Walter Riley, succumbed in hospital to the injuries they had sustained and, of the other men already mentioned, Albert Smith, corporal, Robert Brant, James Senior, Thomas Poyser, Albert Ibberson, colliers, and Tom Smith, borer, lost their lives in the explosion. The death of the latter would seem to have been due to going back to look for Albert Ibberson, who was working at the face of the settling gate and so lower down than Smith.
It will be remembered that Crowe had shouted to Smith "to get some help as there was some lads burned down here" and that he (Crowe) saw Smith cross the face of the level to go up the face and heard him repeat his call for help. After that no one seems to have seen Smith but as his body was found later, unburned and uninjured, in the settling gate, close to that of Ibberson, the assumption made that he returned to look for Ibberson and in doing so lost his life, would appear to be correct. He was poisoned by the afterdamp.
The other men on No. 3 South face were unharmed.
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On No. 4 South Level.
Benjamin Sanderson, afternoon shift deputy of No. 4 South District, said he went down the pit about 1.55 p.m. and set his men off to work---Walley and his party to cut the face: Clem Moores and his mates to rip the middle gate: Tommy Roberts and Leo Bunting to pan the top end: Jim Nixon and George Betton Whewall to pan the bottom end; three rippers to the No. 1 South Level and two to the No. 4 settling gate at the low end of the face.
On his way inbye he met the day-shift deputy, Davis Townend, at No. 3 South Level way-end and after conferring with him, went on inbye. He was approaching the ripping edge in No. 4 South Level when there occurred a sudden gust of wind and bits of coal hit him on the face and hands and he stumbled backwards. He had a flame safety lamp but the light was not extinguished. He at once sent a man to let the overman and the undermanager know that something had happened and then, putting a handkerchief over his mouth and nose, set off up the face. He tested for firedamp but found none on the level; he did not test in the face because of the smoke. Nixon came out of the face and passed him in the 'dint' of the level and he met Whewall near the low side of the No. 4 middle gate. Whewall had been badly injured so he got the men who were on the No. 4 South Level to come in and take him down on to that level. Someone above the middle gate called out and he tried to get up the face to him but had to retreat on account of the black smoke on the top half of the face. The bottom half , by the time he had got up to the middle gate, was practically normal. He then made his way out by way of the middle gate to No. 3 South Level and along the level to the outbye end where he told some men who were there to go into the No. 4 South Level to attend to Whewall, for whom they would need a stretcher.
Sanderson's further movements and those of other men who have already been mentioned, come under the next heading, but the foregoing narratives summed up shortly amount to this:- Everyone in the two districts was going about his usual work in the usual way and nothing out of the ordinary had occurred within an hour of the happening of the explosion, except the firing of the shots in the ripping of the No. 4 Top Airway Gate by the shot-firer, Friend Clayton.
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Rescue Attempts.
Having despatched men from No. 3 South Level way-end to No. 4 South Level, to attend to Whewall, Sanderson went inbye alone. He was followed shortly after by William Brant, deputy of the No. 3 South District, who had come from the top of No. 3 South face to the No. 3 South Level way-end by way of No. 1 South Level and the Main Engine Plane. Brant got as far as the haulage-engine house but then returned to the way-end; he then went inbye again, accompanied this time by John Thomas Walley, Clem Moores, Gladstone Ledger, Walter and Alex Street, and followed by the haulage-engine man, Albert Truelove. About 200 yards along the level, they found Sanderson, and he and they moved off inbye, and eventually came upon the body of Thomas Poyser, about 30 yards on the outbye side of the entrance to the No. 4 Top Airway Gate. Brant then went back to the way-end, and there asked George Williams, afternoon-shift overman, who had been in No. 4 South to help with Whewall, and to carry on. Brant had been affected by the afterdamp, and was later sent to hospital, where he recovered.
Williams went inbye and Sanderson and he, with the men already mentioned, other than Truelove, who went outbye for a stretcher, moved forward to the entrance to the No. 4 Top Airway Gate. Sanderson, Moores and others went into this gate as far as the bend, where they found the body of Jacob Fallis. The air being very foul, they returned to the level, and were at the entrance to the No. 4 Top Airway Gate when the day-shift overman, George William Poxon, and the undermanager, Cyril Weaver, arrived.
The bodies of Robert Brant and James Senior were then reached, and a little later, that of Albert Smith.
The undermanager, and the overman, Poxon, being concerned about the pony drivers and the youths, who worked at the loader, and unaware that they had already gone out by way of No. 3 face and No. 1 Level, persisted in attempts being made to get further inbye, and eventually two dead ponies were seen, and the haulage return wheel reached. The afterdamp, however, was having its effect, and the two overmen, Williams and Poxon, and a deputy, Davis Townend, had to be taken out of the mine. William Brant, deputy, had had to be taken out earlier, and he and Poxon and Townend were so seriously affected that they had to be taken to hospital.
The Manager, S. Lawrence, had come in shortly before, and at about 4.20 p.m. a Rescue Brigade arrived, and went into No. 4 Top Airway Gate. A fall blocking the airway was found at the face and, as given in evidence by the Captain of the Brigade, William Mansfield, as soon as they (the brigade) started to move this fall, the air moved down the face, and the atmosphere became fit for persons not wearing breathing apparatus to go into the face, the bodies of Jacob Fallis, Leo Bunting and Thomas Roberts, which were found in the No. 4 Top Airway Gate and those of George Wroe, Joseph S. Washington, Richard Hurrell, Clifford C. Walker, George Arthur Walley and John Williams, which were found along the face, were recovered.
The bodies found in the level were also recovered, and a second rescue brigade brought out those of Albert Ibberson and Thomas Smith, which they found in the settling gate.
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Investigation.
Mr. H.J. Humphrys, Divisional Inspector, was informed of the explosion by telephone at 4.30 p.m. by Mr. S. Diggle, Agent. He at once went to the Colliery and on arrival, after sending a copy of the Report entitled "Medical Treatment of Persons Burned in Colliery Explosions" to the Beckett Hospital, Barnsley, wither the injured were taken, went below ground, where he found Mr. Diggle at the pit bottom. At No. 3 South Level way-end he met Mr. Herbert Smith and Doctors Millar and Whincup. With Mr. Smith he went along No. 3 Level and there they found the Manager, Mr. Lawrence, who informed them that all the bodies had been recovered. He and Mr. Lawrence then went along the level to the face and were joined by Mr. J.R. Parkinson, Superintendent of the Barnsley Rescue Station, and later by Mr. G. Cook and Mr. F.E. Stone, Senior and Sub-Inspector respectively.
An accumulation of firedamp was found at the bottom of the second outbye, or intermediate, slit between the No. 3 Level and the settling gate below, but little further investigation was done, Mr. Parkinson having warned the party against going into the inbye slit on account of the presence there of carbon monoxide. Mr. Stone took duplicate samples of the air in the South Return Airway six yards below the overcast across No. 1 South Level which, on being analysed, were found to contain 1.45 and 1.48 percent, of firedamp.
Mr. Lawrence, Mr. Harold Smith, undermanager in the Haigh Moor Seam, and Benjamin Sanderson, deputy of No. 4 District, inspected that district but noticed nothing in particular except that just above the middle gate some props and bars had been blown downhill.
Inspection of the Workings.
Everyone then left the mine until the following morning when a party which included Messrs. Diggle and Lawrence, Agent and Manager, respectively, Messrs. Illsley, Hibbert, Dawson and Booth representing the Yorkshire Mineworkers' Association and the North Gawber Branch of that Association; Messrs. G. Cook and F.E. Stone, H.M. Inspectors, began a thorough inspection of the area affected by the explosion. Mr. Humphrys and Mr. Herbert Smith being engaged at the Inquest on the bodies of those killed in an explosion at South Kirkby Colliery on 23rd. August were not able to take part in this inspection nor was the Undermanager, Mr. Cyril Weaver, he being too ill consequent upon his strenuous efforts in the afterdamp-laden atmosphere the previous afternoon.
This party of inspection found by lamp test at the places enumerated below firedamp in the general body of the air in the percentage shown. Samples for analysis were also taken at the same places, and the results are shown below: -
This party also found that the return airway between No. 3 South and No. 4 South was crushed at several places, the approximate section of these parts being 4 feet by 4 feet; that No. 4 South return airway at the inner end was in good condition but at the outbye end it was crushed but evidently under repair. An electric coal-cutting machine was seen near the ripping lip in No. 4 South return airway; the electric cable was not attached to it, the jib was clear and on it was lying a set of sharp picks. There did not appear to be any sharp picks in the cutting chain but there was a pick key lying at the side of the machine. The only sign of force noticed on the No. 4 face was that some roof supports had been blown downhill from a little above the return airway. This sign of force, as previously stated, had been seen by the manager, and Mr. Harold Smith and the deputy, Sanderson, the previous evening.
On reaching the conveyor motor it was seen that the cable was not connected to it but was lying on the waste side of the conveyor pans to a point near the top of the face where it was looped into the face track thus indicating that the machine man had been preparing to transfer from the old to the new track; the pommel was lying in the conveyor pans six yards above the motor.
The timber supports were covered in dust and signs of coking were seen on the low side of the timbers near the centre of that part of the face to the rise of the return airway.
The conveyor had been disconnected in three places preparatory to its being moved forward.
In the No. 4 Top Airway Gate on the right side looking outbye near the foot of a prop eight yards from the face, four 3 oz. Cartridges of explosive---Bellite No. 1a---were found. As this was the kind of explosive used in rippings, a very careful search was made to find any trace of a shot-hole that had been drilled or any evidence of a shot having been fired in the ripping of that gate, but none was discovered. Along this airway gate there were signs of burning out to the No. 3 South Level and, from the junction of the airway gate with that level, for a few yards outbye, there was coke on the outbye side of the roof bars, whilst inbye from that junction to beyond the haulage return wheel, coke was found on the inbye sides of the bars.
There were two signs of force seen on the No. 3 South Level, namely, the signal wires along the level had been blown down and, immediately opposite the second outbye, or intermediate, slit between the level and the settling gate, an empty tub had been derailed and pushed towards the rise side of the level.
The inspection was resumed by the same party, which Mr. Humphrys joined shortly after one o'clock on the following day, Saturday, 14th. September, when further lamp tests for firedamp were made and samples for analysis taken with results as under: -
The following matters were also noticed during this inspection: -
Up to a point about 300 yards from the face the No. 3 South return airway had been repaired and enlarged and was of good section but from that point to within 30 yards of the face it could only be travelled on hands and knees, the size at one point, as measured by Mr. Cook, being 2 ft. 1 in. high by 3 ft. 4in. wide.
Twelve yards from the inbye ripping of this airway, there was an open wooden box containing six 3 oz. Cartridges of explosive Lodensite.
In the No. 3 South face eight yards to the rise of the return airway a shot-firing battery was found and nearby, but not connected to the battery, a shot-firing cable in two parts. Higher up the face there was a buttock of coal 4ft. 6 in. wide in which a shot-hole had been drilled in a weight break and, at the time of the inspection, a light held on one side of the buttock could be seen from the other. The two parts of the cable when joined together did not reach from the shot-firing battery to the buttock of coal.
On a stone in the settling gate just on the outbye side of the innermost slit a message written in chalk.
Burnt clothing hanging on props at the No. 3 Level end of the innermost and next outbye slits, at the face side of these slits.
Further investigation, according to the evidence of Messrs. Humphrys, Cook and Stone, revealed heavy coking on the inbye ends of tubs 16 yards outbye of the inbye slit and roof bars burnt to a point 13 yards inbye of this slit. Evidence on timber and paper of the passage of flame in this inbye slit and in the settling gate for six yards inbye and 73 yards outbye to a fall, over which there was a space about 4feet high. On No. 3 Level outbye of the inbye slit the bars burnt and slightly charred on the inbye side. Pronounced coking on the inbye side of the bars 25 yards outbye of the inbye slit. The coking on the inbye side of the bars continuous to the next slit and on the upper part of the bars, three or four yards into this slit.
Evidence of flame in this slit and along the settling gate in an inbye direction to the fall already noted. At the bottom of this slit to the left a fall with burnt paper embedded in it. Along No. 3 South Level evidence of flame outbye from the top of the second slit outbye but disappearing three or four yards inbye of the junction with No. 4 Top Airway Gate and then reappearing and continuing for a few yards outbye from that junction. Coking on the outbye side of the bars in the No. 4 Top Airway Gate and in this gate charred articles of clothing and burnt pieces of paper as well as coke on the props set at the high side of the gate on the side next the old settling gate.
On 13th. and 14th. September, Mr. Stone took ten samples of dust from the floor in the No. 3 and No. 4 faces---five samples taken from each face. The samples from the No. 3 face were found to contain, in round numbers, from 43 to 59 percent of combustible matter and those from the No. 4 face, 47 to 64 percent.
On 17th. September samples were taken by Mr. Stone from the roof, floor and sides at places in the No. 3 South Level between a point five yards outbye from the junction with No. 4 Top Airway Gate and a point 15 yards inbye from the inbye slit. These samples gave for the roof from 46 to 56 percent: for the floor from 46 to 65 percent; and from the sides from 26 to 56 percent of combustible matter.
The percentage of combustible matter in samples taken by Mr. Stone on the 19th. September was (a) sample from the inbye slit, roof 53, floor 38, sides 44: (b) sample from the intermediate slit, roof 66, floor 37, sides 41; (c) sample from the No. 4 Top Airway Gate, roof 28, floor 44.
These investigations coupled with information supplied by Dr. S.W. Fisher, Medical Inspector of Mines, in reference to the condition of the bodies as to burns, established the area over which flame or intense heat had prevailed; showed the direction of force to have been down the No. 4 face and out of the settling gate by way of the "intermediate" slit i.e., the second slit from the No. 3 face; indicated that the point of ignition had been in the vicinity of the top end of the No. 4 face but revealed no obvious cause of ignition. No evidence of shot-firing had been seen and, in view of the position in which the various items of electrical gear in the No. 4 face had been found, ignition did not appear to have been due to electricity. Nevertheless this gear and the electric signalling apparatus were thoroughly examined, as well as the lamps which had been in use in the area covered by the explosion, with results as follows:-
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Inspection of Electrical Apparatus.
Following the explosion, Mr. James Cowan, Junior Electrical Inspector, made inspection of the roadway and flexible cables, and of the switch-gear and motors in the part of the mine involved in the explosion. He saw that the mechanical interlock between the plug and the starting switch of the conveyor engine in No. 4 face was inoperative and he saw that the plug box on the engine was half filled with coked coal dust, implying that the plug had been removed from the box before the explosion occurred.
The design of the plug, however, was such that not withstanding the defects in the interlock, withdrawal of the plug would not result in open sparking if it were withdrawn while the engine was running.
He observed that arcing had occurred at one of the terminals in an armoured-cable coupling box in No. 4 gate road, adjoining the gate-end switch, and he subsequently a test of this cable box at the Mines Department Testing Station, at Harpur Hill, when it was shown to be flame-proof.
He also observed that the armoured-cable in No.3 South Level had been severely injured at one place about 14 yards inbye from the gate connecting No. 3 South Level to the No. 4 face, but on dissection of the cable, he found that the injury had not affected the conductors and that there had been no arcing at this point.
He assisted in the examination of the trailing cables brought out from No. 3 and No. 4 faces, in which he observed a number of places where these cables had been injured by puncture caused by broken strands of the coal-cutter haulage rope and by shot-firing in the vicinity of the cable, but he found no injury to which the explosion could be attributed.
He also examined and removed for test at the Mines Department Testing Station at Sheffield, two signal bells in use in No. 3 South Level. These bells were found to be intrinsically safe.
Mr. Cowan did not find any electrical defect to which he could attribute the explosion.
Mr. J.A.B. Horsley Electrical Inspector, made inspection of the electrical apparatus in the part of the mine involved in the explosion and he subsequently made a detailed examination of the flexible cables which had been taken to the cable makers' works where facilities were provided for locating defects that could not be found readily by unaided visual inspection.
He found that these cables had been punctured in a number of places by fragments of wire, which were probably broken projecting ends of the strands coal-cutter haulage rope, and he also observed punctures which were probably caused by small stones, or stemming projected from shot-holes.
He did not, however, find any defect in the cables, or in the electrical apparatus, to which the explosion could be reasonably attributed.
Test of Signalling Apparatus.
Two mine signalling bells---one a "Tangent"---25 ohm bell, and the other a "Handco" 25 ohm bell---and a Wigan bell push in use in No. 3 South Level were collected by Mr. Cowan and handed over to Captain C.B. Platt, Mines Department Testing Officer.
Captain Platt made tests on these bells and on the push which proved that it was impossible for them to ignite the most explosive mixture of firedamp and air.
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Test of Lamps.
Thirty-two electric hand-lamps, one Ceag electric cap-lamp and 11 Teale flame lamps, which had been in use in the No. 3 and No. 4 South Districts at the time of the explosion, were sent to Captain Platt, who at the Inquiry read his report showing the tests to which he had submitted these lamps and summarised his conclusions as follows:-
"As received, none of the lamps, excepting lamp No. 785, was in such a condition that an ignition of firedamp and air could be directly attributed to it.
In those electric lamps which were received unlocked and from which the batteries had been removed, there was no evidence that they had contained a battery in such a condition as to be a source of danger.
Although the replacement in the fuse units of wire of heavier gauge than originally supplied by the maker of the lamps was not a contributory cause of ignition, the use of such wire destroys the purpose of the fuse.
The flame safety lamp, No, 785, with the broken glass was unsafe as received, but it is not possible to say when the glass was broken. Flame might have passed to the external atmosphere and ignited it if the glass were broken in the presence of an inflammable atmosphere of firedamp and air, or if the lamp had remained alight after the glass had been broken and an inflammable atmosphere had then come to the lamp."
The flame lamp No. 785 had been issued to W. Brant, day-shift deputy in the no. 3 South face, who at the time of the explosion, it may be remembered, was occupied at the top end of that face, and when the explosion occurred made his way outbye along No. 1 South Level and down the Main Engine Plane to No. 3 South Level which he went so far along by himself and then with others, but eventually was so affected by the afterdamp that he had to be taken out of the mine and to hospital where he happily recovered and was able to give evidence at the Inquiry. He said his lamp, No. 785, was in order when he went along No. 3 South Level after the explosion and, in fact he made tests with it whilst travelling along that level and he thought he must have dropped it when he finally staggered out. It was found at the side of the level on the following day, with the glass broken, by Joseph Brook, afternoon-shift deputy of the No. 3 South District, who gave evidence to this effect.
It was thus certain that it had not been the cause of the explosion. In regard to the electric lamps which were received unlocked and from which the batteries had been removed, referred to by Captain Platt, the lampman explained, in evidence, that he had so dealt with these lamps before he had received instructions that all lamps from the Nos. 3 and 4 South Districts were to be put on one side untouched.
Captain Platt had some strictures to make in reference to the lead-rivet locks of some of the lamps being inadequately secured and capable of undetected removal and replacement.
Mr. Humphrys had asked Captain Platt to examine the handles of the lamps to see if there were any sign of arcing such as might occur if a lamp handle had inadvertently come in contact with an electric power circuit, but no such evidence was found.
These investigations did not reveal the cause of the explosion but, whilst they were being pursued, statements were being taken from men who had been at work in the two districts, and when the shot-firer, Friend Clayton, on 19th. September came to give his statement he disclosed that he had fired a shot at 1.40 p.m. on the day of the explosion in the ripping of the No. 4 South Top Airway Gate. This fact started another line of investigation.
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Investigation in reference to shot fired in No. 4 South Top Airway Gate.
The significance of this shot was (a) that it was fired in the ripping of a road (the No. 4 Top Airway Gate) near the loose end of a face abutting upon an old unventilated road (the settling gate): (b) that the lay-out of the workings was such that the roof over the airway gate would in all probability be broken by breaks running not only across but also along.
The danger therefore to be feared, in such circumstances, was that the firing of a shot in the No. 4 South Top Airway Gate might ignite firedamp in the breaks and this ignition be communicated by way of those breaks to firedamp accumulated in cavities in the roof of the settling gate and so bring about an explosion accompanied by violence.
There was a conflict of evidence in regard to the time this shot was fired. The shot-firer, (Friend Clayton) said he fired if at about 1.40 p.m. and there was evidence to support him but four colliers (Harry Robinson, John Henry Howard, Earnest Senior and George Tel???) said they did not leave the No. 4 South Top Airway Gate until 2.15 p.m. and the shot in the ripping had not then been fired, and, as proof of the time, they said that as they were on their way outbye they met coal-cutting machine-man, John Thomas Walley, and his three mates, at a point in the travelling road which would be ten minutes to a quarter of an hour's walk from the No. 4 South Top Airway Gate. Walley, in his evidence, had already said that he had met three men in the travelling road and that he arrived at the No. 4 South Top Airway Gate at about 2.30 p.m. or perhaps 25 minutes to 3, and at that time there was about a tub and a half of ripping dirt still to be shifted. Now as the shot would bring down some 10 or 12 tubs of material and if, as Walley said, there was only a tub and a half at 2.30 or 2.35p.m., it is obvious that the shot must have been fired before 2.15 p.m. but the exact time at which it was fired it is not possible to say.
Only three shots had been fired in the ripping of the No. 4 South Airway Gate since May and Friend Clayton fired two of them---one within an hour of the occurrence of the explosion and the other six or seven shifts previously. Clayton had only been employed for a fortnight on the morning shift during which the ripping was done; previously he had been shot-firing during the night-shift.
Evidence in reference to the presence of breaks in the roof of the No. 3 South District and to the finding of firedamp issuing from those breaks was given by deputies in charge of that district. They said the breaks ran parallel to the face and the firedamp they found in the middle gate and in the face on the low side of that gate came from those breaks. That these breaks occurred frequently is shown by the fact that between 1st. March---the report books were not examined prior to that date---and 12th. September there were 377 such findings of firedamp. The deputies had also found firedamp in the intake---the No. 3 South Level--- on the top side coming off "a little break" on 18 occasions and the day-shift overman (George William Poxon) said he also had found on this intake "the slighted trace in the top side occasionally from these roof breaks".
Evidence of breaks and of firedamp in the settling gate was also given by the day-shift overman, who said that occasionally he went into that part of the settling gate which lay between the inbye and the next outbye slits and, on testing for firedamp, found the condition there to be the same as on the No.3 South Level.
Firedamp issuing from breaks was found in the No. 4 South District between 1st March and 9th. July on 309 occasions, namely 123, in the top gate, 185 in the middle (or cross) gate and on 9th. July it was reported as being "given off from breaks" in the face 20 yards on the top side of the middle gate. It should be explained that the top gate just referred to had been cut off by the No. 4 South Top Airway Gate subsequent to 2nd. July, when firedamp was last reported as having been found in the top gate.
Benjamin Sanderson, the afternoon-shift deputy in the No. 4 South District, said that the firedamp found in the top gate issued, from time to time, from breaks in the roof about two yards from the ripping end; that the breaks were practically vertical and ran the same way as the gate; they did not lean over towards the settling gate.
Alfred Senior, the night-shift deputy, said the firedamp in the top gate issued from a break 30 yards from the face, and the overman George William Poxon) said when he saw it; it was issuing from a break 30 to 40 yards from the face.
Shot-firer, Friend Clayton, said that it had been fairly common to have breaks in the roof of the No.4 Top Airway Gate during the fortnight he had been there; they ran parallel to the gate and finished 12 to 14 yards back from the face. There were none in the roof immediately by the ripping. He had never found firedamp in this mine.
The under-manager said he had found breaks running parallel to this gate, some 30 or more yards back from the working face; he had never found any breaks running across the gate nor any sign that they communicated with the settling gate: the breaks appeared to be vertical.
The manager said that, prior to the explosion, he had never seen any breaks in the roof of that part of the No. 4 South Top Airway Gate which was open. He had seen breaks from time to time in that part of the gate which had been abandoned; they were usually vertical breaks some 14, 20, and as much as 30 yards from the working face; he had not seen anything which would suggest to him that these breaks had any connexion to the settling gate. Some days after the explosion he saw breaks of which Mr. Cook and Mr. Stone gave evidence.
Mr. Stone said he first noticed breaks in the roof of No. 4 South Top Airway Gate four days after the explosion: they ran parallel with the gate and extended right up to the face; he did not notice any running across. The breaks he saw were due to the presence of the old settling gate running parallel to the Airway Gate and were inclined towards the old settling gate; he would not like to say definitely that they existed at the time of the explosion but he thought the evidence gathered since the explosion suggested that they did. They were not wide breaks and he could not say at first whether they did or did not communicate with the settling gate, but later, when a holing was made from the airway gate to the settling gate, it could clearly be seen that one break continued to the settling gate and into cavities in that gate.
In addition to the breaks in the roof, Mr. Stone said he saw a horizontal opening or parting at the top of the ripping between the clod and the blue stone which formed the roof, and Mr. Cook said he measured this parting on 24th. September to be half an inch wide and he could insert a steel tape into it at various places to depths of from 6 to 30??? Inches. He (Mr. Cook) said on the same date he saw two vertical breaks which extended practically the length of the gate and were leaning into the old settling gate. He took two samples of air from the parting and these were found to contain 29.7 and 7.75 percent of firedamp respectively; a sample he took from the vertical break contained 0.98 percent of firedamp.
Mr. Cook further said that he saw a break in the roof of the No. 4 South Top Airway Gate on the second day after the explosion and it was photographed two days later. Besides being in the roof it extended through the clod down to the coal but he could not say what the condition was prior to the explosion. Later, when a holing was made from the airway gate to the settling gate, it was seen that the break at the side of the settling gate ran into the that gate.
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Cleaning out of settling gate.
To complete the investigation the settling gate was ridded out. A holing was made into it some four yards from the face of the No. 4 South Top Airway Gate. Firedamp at once emerged and entry could not be made until arrangements had been made to carry air into it. The roof was found to be fallen in places and upstanding in others, cavities thus being formed in which firedamp could, and, when the ventilation was cut off, did accumulate.
Opposite the holing there was a cavity some 10 to 11 feet high. After a few yards had been ridded a current of air was noticed to be coming outbye and a break running into the rib side and towards the No. 4 South face could be seen.
For a distance of 41 yards from the No. 4 South face inbye, although old dry pit props and pieces of paper were found, no sign of burning or flame was seen but, beyond that distance, the roof and sides were darkened. The rib of coal between No. 4 South Top Airway Gate and the settling gate was found to be from 1½ to 2 feet thick but crushed, and Mr. Cook said the two roads for all practical purposes could be counted as one.
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Cause of the explosion.
Taking those witnesses who were asked for their opinion as to the cause of the explosion in order in which they were called, the shot-firer Friend Clayton, said he had not the faintest idea what was the cause. Joseph Brook, deputy, said he had not formed any opinion. Mr. William Hibbert, representing North Gawber Branch of the Yorkshire Mineworkers' Association, who was present at the examination and test of the lamps, said he did not think they had been the cause. In regard to electricity having been the cause, Mr. Laud, chief electrician at the North Gawber and Darton Collieries, said, from his examination of the electric plant after the explosion, he was satisfied electricity had not been the cause; Mr. Cowan, Junior Electrical Inspector, said that, in spite of his detailed examinations of the electric plant, he found nothing to which the explosion could be attributed; and Mr. Horsley, Chief Electrical Inspector said he was satisfied the explosion was not due to electricity. Mr. Stone, Sub-Inspector, said he had come to no definite conclusion as to the cause.
Mr. Weaver, Undermanager, said he had no idea what had been the cause of the explosion; he was satisfied that it was not due to a lamp or to electricity and he felt there was a doubt about the shot, which was fired in the ripping of the No. 4 South Top Airway Gate, being the cause. He felt this doubt because that shot was fired from 30 to 60 minutes prior to the explosion, and he thought "if that shot had possibly ignited gas surely some persons in that vicinity would have seen gas alight. On top of that, the shot-firer and the persons concerned were positive the shot had its work and they went away and left it satisfied".
Mr. Cook, Senior Inspector, gave it as his opinion that firedamp in breaks communicating with the old settling gate had been ignited by the shot fired in the No. 4 Top Airway Gate, and that this gas burned for some time and later exploded. He referred to two somewhat similar reported case, namely one at Rothwell Haigh Fanny Pit and the other at Dodworth Colliery. In the former case, a shot-firer, having fired a shot in a ripping and having made an examination and being satisfied that everything was all right, had actually left the place when was brought back by another man who was working on the face to the left of the gate and had seen firedamp burning in the waste. The shot-firer withdrew the men from the district, and half an hour later with a deputy examined the waste and found firedamp still burning. A further examination was made some 30 minutes later when the flame was found to be out. Mr. Cook examined this waste the same morning and found a cavity which he was able to get into and examine, but he could neither find any trace of firedamp having been burning in it, nor any sign of burning on the timber set at the edge of the cavity.
In the Dodworth case, a deputy fired three shots in a ripping and everything seemed to be in order, left the place. Some three hours later three men who were completing the packs in the gate in which the shots had been fired heard a loud noise and saw a flash come from the face. These men went outbye and told the deputy, who examined the ripping, but found no firedamp. He instructed a ripper to set a prop to the ripping edge and, whilst this was being done, a second flash, accompanied by noise, occurred. No sign of burning was left and no further explosions occurred.
Mr. Cook also referred to a further similar case which had occurred within the previous three weeks, namely at St. John's Colliery, where at 2.30 a.m. on 10th. October, five minutes after the firing of the second of two shots in a ripping, the shot-firer saw flame emerge from a break which shots had exposed. The occurrence was at once reported to the manager and he, with the undermanager, visited the place, but saw nothing further, but at 10.15 a.m. another flash of flame emerged from the break. Mr. Cook inspected the place the same day, but, while he was present, there was no sign of flame. He visited the place on the following day and a third time on the 12th. October, in company with Mr. Humphrys, but apart from finding that firedamp was coming from the break, there was nothing out of the ordinary to be seen. But 96 hours after the first occurrence loud rumblings in the roof were heard, and were followed by two further flashes of flame from the break.
To show that flame will travel long distances in a break, Mr. Cook referred to an occurrence at Crigglestone Colliery on 4th. November, 1930. Two miners were working in a gate 67 yards from where a ripping shot was fired, were burned. Firedamp in the break had been ignited by the shot; men working in intermediate gates did not see flame and were not injured.
Mr. Lawrence, Manager, whilst ruling out electricity and lamps, said he could not form any definite opinion as to the cause of the explosion.
Mr. Humphrys, Divisional Inspector, said in his opinion the explosion occurred between the top of No. 4 South face and the bottom of the second outbye slit from the face of No. 3 South Level, and was due to the firing of the shot in No. 4 South Top Airway Gate.
He drew attention to the explosion at Rothwell Haigh. Dodworth and St. John's Collieries, which Mr. Cook had mentioned, and added that there were grounds for thinking that firedamp continued to burn for more than a fortnight in Birley East Colliery in 1924, and that the existence of that burning was not known for a week.
Mr. Samuel Diggle, Agent, agreed that the firing of the shot in the No. 4 Top South Airway Gate was a possible cause of the explosion, and that was the only possibility he could put forward. He could not suggest any place where firedamp may have been other than in the settling gate.
On the other hand, Mr. Joseph Hall said he was quite satisfied that the shot fired in the ripping of the No. 4 South Top Airway Gate had no connexion with the explosion. He thought that the deceased man, George Arthur Walley, attempted to pull the pommel out of the conveyor motor in No. 4 South face, and that, catching against the conveyor, it caused a spark which ignited firedamp that had accumulated consequence upon a blockage at the top end of the face. That was his first idea, and it remained his idea after hearing all the evidence.
Having inspected the area covered by the explosion, and having heard and considered the evidence, I am of the opinion that the shot fired by Friend Clayton in the No. 4 South Top Airway Gate was the originating cause of the explosion. That opinion is not capable of proof, but is based on experience and not on speculation.
There can be no doubt that this shot should not have been fired. The conditions surrounding the No. 4 South Top Airway Gate were such that the ripping in that gate would be more difficult to keep up than to take down. Three shots had been fired in this ripping in six months, and it is significant that two of them had been fired within seven days of the explosion by the same man ----Friend Clayton---who had only been employed on the day shift, when the ripping was done, for a fortnight.
In my opinion, to fire a shot so close to an abandoned unventilated road---the settling gate---was extremely foolish and not the action of a thoughtful pitman. It is only fair to add that Clayton's judgement was no poorer than that of the manager and undermanager, who both said there was nothing to indicate to their minds that it would be risky to fire such a shot.
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Other Matters Arising During The Inquiry.
Several matters not directly connected with the explosion arose during the Inquiry, for example:-
(1) Shot-firing. -Following correspondence with Mr. Humphrys and actual trials when Mr. Collinson, Junior Inspector, was present, the Manager, Mr. Lawrence, in January, 1935, posted a notice prohibiting the firing of more than 30 shots by any one person during any one shift. This prohibition, judging by the entries in the daily record of shots fired, appears to have been observed until 6th. August when Friend Clayton fired 35 shots. He also fired 35 shots on the 7th, 8th, 12th, 26th, 27th, 28th, and 29th. August, and 34 on the 14th, and 15th. T.H. Thompson and A. Williams fired more than 30 shots a shift on six days in August. In September, T.H. Thompson fired 35 shots on one of three days he was shot-firing; W. Hawksworth, on the 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th, fired 35, 34, and 35 respectively: A. Senior fired 32 on the 10th.
The fixing of a maximum number of shots to be fired during a shift was the proper thing to do but when, as was the case, the manager allowed each shot-firer to have issued to him five detonators in excess of this maximum number of shots a temptation to fire more than the maximum was put in the way of the shot-firers, and when they fell to this temptation no effective steps were taken to check them.
(2) Size of airways.---During the investigation on 14th. September, the return airway from the No. 3 South face was found to be small.
This return was about 550 yards in length and Mr. Cook said that for the first 300 yards it had been enlarged and was of good section but progress along the remainder, except for about 30 yards next to the face, was by crawling on hand and knees. The size at one point was 2 ft. 1 in. by 3 ft. 4 in. wide.
Mr. Weaver said that for probably 150 or 160 Yards one would have to creep.
Mr. Lawrence said this return was of adequate size for the ventilation of the No. 3 South face. He did not contend that it was adequate for a travelling road; it was not Intended for that purpose; two good travelling roads were provided.
On the 28th. and 29th. September, Mr. Hall, Mr. Illsley and the local miners' officials Mr. Hibbert, Mr. Dawson and Mr. Booth, made an inspection of the mine prior to work being restarted. Mr. Illsley, speaking of this inspection, said "so far as the ventilation was concerned on the faces and the road size, there was no condition that should alarm any pitman so far as the ventilation itself as registered by flame tests. Certainly the airway is not in a condition that anyone need be proud of".
I
The airway of which Mr. Illsley was speaking was the return from the No. 3 South face which has already been referred to. He did not travel the return airway from the No. 2 North district---he was engaged in taking air measurements--- but Mr. Hall did and his evidence was as follows:-
" The next day Mr. Lawrence took us on the North side of the pit, and we inspected the whole of the level and the face conditions. No one could complain about the face conditions either in 3 or 4 South or the North side. Face conditions were as normal compared to any other pit. But when we had finished the North Section, North face, we had consultation together, and ultimately Mr. Harold Smith and Mr. Illsley left us at that point for, I believe, to go and take air measurements at another part of the pit. Mr. Lawrence, myself, Mr. Hibbert, Mr. Dawson and our other colleagues then started to travel the second North return airway. Mr. Lawrence made mention before we commenced this return airway that it may be a difficult proposition, and certainly was advising me not to attempt to go up it. Mr. Lawrence had never done a worse thing as far as that was concerned, because when he suggested my not going up the return airway, I was more determined to go up it. We started on the face, and ultimately we came to the point where the return airway commences, and there were times when it was nearly impossible for a human being to pass through it. There were times, considerable in number, when I should have returned if there had been the least possibility of being able to return. In fact, the height of that return airway was not more, on an average, throughout the length of that bad part, than 17 inches high. The width, on an average, would not be more than 15 to 16 inches. It may appear an impossibility for a human body to penetrate such an area, but with a struggle we ultimately emerged from this dungeon. . .Ultimately we got from this return airway, and I cannot complain about the return airway from a point 200 yards from the face."
Mr. Lawrence said that for roughly 70 yards, this No. 2 North return airway was 2 ft. high by 2 ft. 6 in. wide and Mr. Weaver said there was another length of 20 yards which was 1 ft. 7 in. high by 3 ft. wide.
Mr. Hall expressed himself as quite satisfied that H.M. Inspectors, if they had visited the No. 3 South and the No. 2 North return airways and seen their condition, had not done their duty but on being asked by Mr. Humphrys to point out the section of the Coal Mines Act which had been contravened, he naturally was not able to do so for there is no section which requires airways to be of not less than a stated height or width.
The section of the Act bearing on such airways has reference to them only when they form a means of egress. It is Section 36 (3) which reads:-
"Every part of the mine in which ten or more persons are employed at the same time shall be provided with at least two ways of affording means of egress to the surface, and so arranged that, event of either becoming impassable at any point, the other will afford means of egress to the surface."
There is no mention of size.
Asked if he had found a road such as Mr. Hall had complained of, where he had to crawl on his stomach, whether he would be satisfied, Mr. Humphrys said he would not; he would go beyond what the Act requires and ask the management to make a better road.
The question of fixing a minimum size for airways has been mentioned in evidence to the Royal Commission on Safety in Coal Mines now sitting.
(3) Type of lamp used by deputies.---Mr. Frowen asked Mr. Lawrence if he would say whether he thought a lamp with a top-feed for the air was better for testing for firedamp than one in which the air-feed was by way of the middle ring and Mr. Lawrence replied that the middle-feed lamp was all right but that with a top-feed was better.
Mr. Frowen put the same question to Mr. Weaver and he replied that he thought the middle-feed lamp was quite efficient and he would not adopt the top-feed type.
I think all deputies and shot-firers should be supplied with the type of lamp which allows of the air-feed being either at the middle ring or the top at will.
(4) Message written in chalk on a stone by one of the deceased men.
Earlier in this report it is mentioned that during the investigations on 14th. September, there was found on a stone in the settling gate just on the outbye side of the innermost slit a message written in chalk. The message had been written by Albert Ibberson, one of the men who was killed, and Dr. Fisher, Medical Inspector of Mines, when asked if he could explain how a man could write such a message and yet be unable to walk outbye, said that one of the peculiarities of poisoning by carbon monoxide is that the power in the legs is the first loss; that a man so affected, though feeling very ill, would be conscious and know what he was doing and would be able to write a message.
A similar message was written by the late Sir Clement le Neve Foster, Inspector of Mines, when affected by carbon monoxide following a fire in the Snaefell Mine in 1897. He was unable to move but was quite conscious and wrote a description of his sensations and symptoms.
In conclusion, it should be stated that Mr. Lawrence said settling gates would, in future, be either ventilated or stowed up; shots would not be fired near such settling gates and sheathed explosives would be used throughout the mine.
I desire to thank the representatives of all the parties to the Inquiry for their help and especially Mr. Illsley for the lucid report he produced when giving evidence of his investigation underground.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedience servant,
Henry Walker.
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Names of the men who lost their lives.
Claud Ackroyd.
Robert Brant.
Leo Bunting.
Jacob Fallis.
Richard Hurrell.
Albert Ibberson.
Hubert Kelly.
Thomas Poyser.
Walter Riley.
Thomas Roberts.
Albert Smith.
Thomas Smith.
James Senior.
Clifford C. Walker.
George Arthur Walley.
Joseph S. Washington.
George Betton Whewall.
John Williams.
George Wroe.
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