Agar, Joseph, aged 16, Agar, Matthew, aged 16. Allan, Robert, aged 20. Anderson, Thomas, aged 20. Batty, William, aged 21. Bell, James, aged 54. Benfold, John, aged 15. Booth, George (Jnr), aged 20. Booth, Thomas, aged 18. Bottoms, Terrace, aged 32.	Bowers, George, aged 32. Brennan, James, aged 24. Broadmore, Richard, aged 17. Brophy, William, aged 14. Brown, Robert, aged 43. Burns, Joseph, aged 48. Burns, Richard, aged 22. Carr, George, aged 37. Carr, Thomas, aged 23. Carter, John, aged 18.	Carter, Joseph, Jnr., aged 23. Charlton, James, aged 15. Charlton, Thomas Nelson, aged 21. Charlton, William, aged 53. Chaytor, William, aged 52. Clark, John, aged 58. Clark, William Henry, aged 24. Clarke, John James, aged 19. Coils, Archibold, aged 31. Coulson, Matthew, aged 20.
Coulson, Thomas, aged 62. Counsell, Allan, aged 23. Counsell, John, aged 58. Cowen, Mark, aged 66. Coxon, Matthew Robson, aged 35.(?). Coyne, Thomas, aged 28. Croney, James, aged 15. Croney, John Henry. Crozier, Thomas, aged 18. Crozier, William (Jnr), aged 29.	Crozier, William (Snr), aged 53. Cummings, Joseph, aged 38. Davison, Edward, aged 23. Dean, James William, aged 19. Donkin, James, aged 14. Donnelly, Francis (Jnr), aged 18. Donnelly, John, aged 34. Doran, Patrick, aged 41. Dover, John William, aged 17. Doyle, William, aged 16	Dunn (McGarey), Albert, aged 14. Dunn (McGarey), Henry, aged 15. Fewster, George, aged 33. Finningham, John, aged 32. Foster, James, aged 22. Foster, John, aged 20. Foster, Robert, aged 33. Gallagher, Frank, aged 25. Gardner, James, aged 14. Gibbons, Peter, aged 35.
Gill, George, aged 16. Gill, Henry, aged 13. Gittens, George, aged 30. Glendinning, John, aged 16. Glendinning, John, aged 44. Glennon, Joseph, aged 19. Glennon, Patrick, aged 35. Gourley, Stephen, aged 17. Graham, John William, aged 40. Green, William, aged 34.	Halliday, George Bell, aged 17. Harrison, James, aged 35. Hennessey, Patrick, aged 32. Herron, Thomas (Snr), aged 60. Hodgson, Anthony, aged(?). Hodgson, Joseph, aged 25. Hodgson, Sydney, aged 19. Ivy, John (Snr), aged 53. Jamieson, James, aged 62. Jefferson, William, aged 24.	Johnson, John, aged(?). Johnson, John Richard, aged(?). Johnson, John William, aged 46. Johnson, Joseph, aged(?). Johnson, Robert, aged 15. Johnson, Robert, aged(?). Killingback, Thomas, aged 26. Lackenby, John, aged 18. Lambert, James, aged 17. Laverick, Ralph, aged 19.
Lawson, George, Jnr., aged 17. Lawson, George, Snr., aged 42. Lawson, Thomas, aged 19. Leadbitter, Robert, aged 28. Lodge, Edward, aged 17. Mackay, John, aged 22. Manistre, Edward William, aged 19. Manistre, Henry, aged 13. Manistre, John Henry, aged 15. McAloon, Cornelius, aged 30.	McGough, William, aged 31. McGreavy, James, aged 16. McGreavy, Peter, aged 18. McGurk, Michael, aged 34. McKenna, Patrick, aged 26. McNestry, John, aged 22. McShane, William, aged 17. Miller, Allen, aged 43. Miller, Henry, aged 15. Morris, William, aged 33.	Murphy, James, aged 15. Murphy, William, aged 42. Nicholson, William, aged 35. Nixon, John Thomas, aged 24. Nixon, Joseph, aged 16. Palmer, Willie, aged 58. Pattinson, Matthew, aged 39. Payne, James, aged 32. Pearson, John, aged 19. Peart, John Alfred, aged 15.
Pilkington, James, aged 26. Pilkington, John, aged 57. Proud, Richard, aged 62. Quinn, William, aged 17. Ranson, William, aged 49. Readman, Charles, aged 15. Reay, Luke, aged 37. Riley, Stephen, aged 17. Riley, Thomas, aged 42. Robson, John, aged 54.	Robson, Thomas, aged 43. Rogers, John, aged 57. Rowell, William, aged 52. Samuel, William, aged 17. Scott, Walter, aged 43. Scott, William, aged 22. Selkirk, John, aged(?). Shackleton, Thomas, aged 39. Shepherd, Arthur Thomas, aged 32. Short, Thomas, aged 18.	Simm, John, aged 23. Smith, Ernest Blair, aged 28. Smith, John Joseph, aged 20. Smith, John William, aged 18. Smith, Thomas, aged 16. Smith, William, aged 13. Smithson, John Joseph, aged 18. Statt, John Isaac, aged 35. Storey, George, aged 58. Stoves, Robert, aged 30.
Thompson, Thomas, aged 22. Uncles, James, aged 16. Walker, John Parkin, aged 25. Wallis, William, aged 39. Walton, Isaac, aged 26. Watson, George, aged 56. Watson, Thomas, aged 17. Welsh, Joseph, aged 24. Whelan, Thomas, aged 17. Whitehead, Thomas, aged 38.	Whitfield, John William, aged 40. Wilkinson, Alex, aged 22. Willis, Joseph, aged 55. Wood, John, aged 36. Wood, Ralph, aged 17. Wood, Stephen, aged 39. Worby, Thomas, aged 26. Wright, Henry, aged 46.

The Beginning.	Inquest.	Description of the colliery.	Shot-firing.
Ventilation.	Inspections.	The Explosion.	Concluding Observations.

West Stanley Colliery Disaster, 16th February, 1909. 168 killed. Extracts from the report by H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines, R. A. S. Redmayne and R. Donald Bain, H.M. Inspector of Mines. The Colliery is situated in the North-West of the County of Durham, about six miles to the west of Chester-le-Street. The Inquest. The inquest was opened on the 18th February by Mr. John Graham, Coroner for the Chester Ward of the County of Durham, and it was adjourned from time to time for the identification of the bodies as they were recovered and brought to the surface, and to take the evidence of the medical men as to the cause of death in the case of persons who lost their lives. (165 were found dead, one rescued alive, died from his injuries. Two persons unrecovered from the pit). On 29th March the inquest was resumed for the purpose of proving the condition of the mine prior to the accident, and, of arriving, if possible, at the cause of the explosion. Present at the enquiry were:- Mr. Reginald Guthrie, representing the Durham Coal Owners Association. Mr. R. W. Cooper, of the firm of Messrs. Cooper and Goodger, Solicitors, Newcastle-on-Tyne, representing the Owners, the Manager and Undermanager of the Colliery. Mr. L. A. Atherley-Jones, K.C., M.P., instructed by Mr. H. F. Heath, Solicitor, Sunderland, representing the Durham Miners Association and the Miners Federation of Great Britain. Mr. E. Shortt, Barrister-at-law, instructed by Mr. W. H. Bell, Solicitor, Sunderland, representing the Durham Deputies Association. Mr. A. Mundel and Mr. N. L. Parmeter, representing the Owners of the Towneley Estate. Messrs. R. A. S. Redmayne (Chief Inspector of Mines), R. Donald Bain (District Inspector of Mines), H. Walker, W. J. Charlton (Assistant Inspectors of Mines), and R. Nelson (Electrical Inspector of Mines). Messrs. John Wilson, M.P. J. Johnson, M.P. W. House, S. Galbraith, T. H. Cann, and others representing the Durham Miners Association. Messrs. E. Harvey, M.P., and H. Twist, of the Miners Federation of Great Britain. The Inquest occupied ten days, the Coroner summed up leaving nineteen questions for the jury to answer:– Question 1) What was the cause of death in each separate case? Answer. As stated by the medical witnesses. Question 2) Was the Towneley seam in safe working condition (including cables and their insulators, electric and all other plant, whether worked by electricity or otherwise) when the deceased men and boys were working therein on the 16th of February, 1909, and up to the moment of the explosion, and had all proper precautions been taken by watering and sweeping to prevent dust explosion? Answer. All in good working order and all proper precautions taken. Question 3) Tilley seam. Was the Tilley seam in safe working condition (including cables and their insulators, electric and all other plant, whether worked by electricity or otherwise) when the deceased men and boys were working therein on the 16th February, 1909, and up to the moment of the explosion, and had all proper precautions been taken by watering and sweeping to prevent dust explosion? Answer. All in good working order and all proper precautions taken. Question 4) Busty seam. Was the Busty seam in safe working condition (including cables and their insulators, electric and all other plant, whether worked by electricity or otherwise) when the deceased men and boys were working therein on the 16th of February, 1909, and up to the moment of the explosion, and had all proper precautions been taken by watering and sweeping to prevent dust explosion? Answer. All in good working order and all proper precautions taken. Question 5) Brockwell seam. Was the Brockwell seam in safe working condition (including cables and their insulators, electric and all other plant, whether worked by electricity or otherwise) when the deceased men and boys were working therein on the 16th February, 1909, and up to the moment of the explosion, and had all proper precautions been taken by watering and sweeping to prevent dust explosions? Answer. All in good working order and all proper precautions taken. Question 6) Downcast shaft. Was the downcast shaft in safe working condition (including cables and their insulators, electric and all other plant, whether worked by electricity or otherwise) when the deceased men and boys were working therein on the 16th February, 1909, and up to the moment of the explosion, and had all proper precautions been taken by watering and sweeping to prevent dust explosions? Answer. All in good working order and all proper precautions taken. Question 7) Upcast shaft. Was the upcast shaft in safe working condition (including cables and their insulators, electric and all other plant, whether worked by electricity or otherwise) when the deceased men and boys were working therein on the 16th February, 1909, and up to the moment of the explosion, and had all proper precautions been taken by watering and sweeping to prevent dust explosion? Answer. All in good working order and all proper precautions taken. Question 8) Ventilation. Was the fan of sufficient capacity and was a sufficient current of air passed along intakes and returns during the back shift? Answer. Yes, in both cases. Question 9) Lamps. Were the lamps issued to the men and boys in good condition and safe as against gas, and were they properly locked? Answer. They were issued in good condition and properly locked. Question 10) Was West Stanley Colliery in all respects properly provided with all the necessary mechanical power and materials necessary for the safety of the men and boys employed on the 16th February? Answer. In all respects the jury consider this has been done. Question 11) Were the manager, under-manager, overmen, deputy-overmen, master-shifter, engineers, enginemen (both steam and electrical), and all officials men of sufficient experience and ability, and did they discharge their respective duties in a satisfactory manner, and were the general and special rules in force at the colliery strictly complied with? Answer. We are of the opinion that all the officials as enumerated were competent men, and that all rules had been complied with. Question 12) In which seam did the explosion originate? Answer. In the Busty seam. Question 13) Was there one explosion, or more than one? Answer. One explosion. Not able to say if more than one. Question 14) In what part of the seam (or elsewhere) did the explosion originate, and in what other parts were there other explosions (if any)? Answer. On west way, Busty seam, between curve and air crossing. Question 15) Was the explosion gas or dust, or partly gas and partly dust explosion? Answer. A dust explosion. Question 16) How was the gas or dust ignited so as to cause the explosion? Answer. What was the cause of the ignition, the jury are unable to find. Question 17) Who, if any, one or more, is (or are), and in what respect culpable? Answer. No one. Question 18) Was the explosion the result of a cause or causes, which has or have not been,. and cannot be ascertained? Answer. A dust explosion. What was the cause of the ignition the Jury are unable to find. Question 19) Do the Jury desire to make any recommendations or suggestions for the guidance of the present or future owners of West Stanley Colliery, or other similar collieries? Answer. None. At this point Mr. Atherley-Jones, speaking on behalf of the associations he represented, thanked the coroner for the able and impartial manner in which he had conducted the enquiry, and paid an eloquent tribute to the devotion and bravery of the officials and workmen and those who had assisted in the exploration of the mine, as well as to the generosity of the owners in providing immediate relief to those bereaved. The other legal gentlemen engaged in the case associated themselves with Mr. AtherleyJones’ remarks. Contents. Description of the colliery and Condition of the workings prior to the explosion. The colliery had two shafts. The downcast, known as the Busty Pit, 12 feet diameter. The upcast, known as the Lamp Pit, 9¾ feet diameter. Both sunk to the Brockwell Seam. Seams passed through by the shafts were :– Shield Row. 39 fathoms from the surface. Five Quarter 52½ fathoms from the surface. Brass Thill 62 fathoms from the surface. Low Main 93 fathoms from the surface. Towneley 123 fathoms from the surface. Tilley 133½ fathoms from the surface. Busty 139 fathoms from the surface. Brockwell 163 fathoms from the surface. All these seams had been worked at one time or another. At the time of the explosion only the last four were in operation. The average thickness of the four seams being worked:– Towneley 2 feet 2 inches. Tilley 2 feet 3 inches. Busty 3 feet. Brockwell 2 feet 5 inches. The coal was "bituminous." Coal from the Towneley Seam was lowered down a staple to the downcast shaft at the Busty level. Coal from the Tilley Seam was run down a stone drift to the Busty level at the opposite side of the shaft. Busty coal was also drawn up this shaft. Coal from the Brockwell Seam was drawn up the upcast shaft from the Brockwell level. Number of officials. Manager, Mr. J. P. Hall. under-manager, Mr. R. Heslop. Two foreovermen. One back-overman. Two master shifters. Twenty-two deputies. Employees. 527 men and boys were employed underground. 118 on the surface. Total = 645. Output. Was from six to seven hundred tons per diem. Ventilation. Ventilation was by a Guibal fan 35 feet in diameter by 10 feet wide. At 35 revolutions and a water gauge of 1.5 inches, circulated 76,000 to 78,000 cubic feet of air per minute through the mine. Distribution:(from last recorded measurements on 12th February:– Towneley Seam 21,756 cubic feet. Tilley Seam 15,545 cubic feet. Busty Seam 10,210 cubic feet. Brockwell Seam 17,297cubic feet. Small scales into each of the upper seams amounted to about 12,000 cubic feet. Method of working. The Towneley and Tilley Seams were worked by the longwall method. The Brockwell Seam, on the south side of the shafts, longwall method. The Brockwell Seam, on the north side of the shafts, pillars were being removed. The Busty seam consisted entirely of the removal of pillars. Coal-cutting machines. Four electrically driven Hurd Bar type coal-cutting machines. Towneley seam (two machines). Tilley seam (one machine). Brockwell seam (one machine). Brockwell seam also had a spare machine in a stenton near the upcast shaft bottom. Other machinery underground. Electrically driven Brass Thill seam. A 25 h.p. motor for driving a pump. Towneley seam, a 100 h.p. haulage motor. Hauling from the straight West District. A 5 h.p. motor driving a 3-throw pump situated in the straight West Way. Tilley seam. A 25 h.p. motor, driving an air compressor. Busty seam. A 100 h.p. motor driving a three-throw pump close to the downcast shaft. Two 5 h.p. motors, driving small pumps in the West Way. A 5 h.p. motor driving a creeper on the south side of the downcast shaft. Brockwell seam. A 48 h.p. motor, driving an air compressor. (had never been used.) General distribution of electric current. The electric current for driving the above-mentioned motors was generated on the surface at the colliery in the form of 40-period three-phase current at 550 volts. The current was led from the generator to a switchboard in the generator house, and distributed thence through separate switches to the surface buildings and the mine. It was taken down the downcast shaft by means of three 37/14 copper cables insulated by dialite composition, but unarmoured. The three mains leading to the shaft were controlled by a single triple pole oil-immersed switch and three fuses, the latter of 150 amperes capacity, all on the main switchboard in the generating station. Electric lighting. The shaft sidings at the Busty seam, the hauling engine house and the staple top in the Towneley seam were lighted by incandescent lamps. Twenty lamps in the Busty seam, and fifteen in the Towneley. Other lights in use were safety lamps. Of these there were 637, of which 526 were of the Marsaut and 111 of the Donald type. All of these were lighted and locked by lead rivets in the lamp room on the surface prior to being taken down the mine. No relighting of lamps was allowed underground; all lamps extinguished were sent to the lamp room on the surface to be re-examined, re-lit, and re-locked. Oil used in the lamps:– 175 Marsaut ... Colza 111 Donald .... Colza 351 Marsaut ... Petroleum (Homelight). Only those engaged on the haulage roads – putters, drivers, and others – used the Donald lamps. The coal hewers and stonemen were provided with Marsaut lamps with double gauzes. Natural Character of seams. The workings in each of the four seams were more or less dusty throughout. The workings in the lower section of the Busty seam were wet, and there was also a wet area in the Tilley seam; part of the Towneley seam was damp. The upper section of the Busty seam, consisting as it did of old crushed pillars, produced considerable quantities of dust. Dust carried from the surface. The screens are close to the shaft and formerly considerable quantities of dust were carried in the air down the downcast shaft from them and from a shoot down, which coals were delivered to the boilers. In order to lessen this source of dust the downcast shaft, from the ground level to the heapstead, and the shoot to the boilers, had been recently boxed in. Watering of roads. The main roads in each seam were frequently watered by means of water tubs fitted with a semi-rotary pump and spray arrangement to reach the roof and sides. The evidence at the Inquest was to the effect that the Towneley seam was watered every other day. The Straight West and South West Districts were naturally damp. A section of the Busty was watered every night, an alternate section each night, commencing at 4 p.m., and finishing at midnight. That is to say, a length of from 500 to 600 yards of the haulage road was watered in two days. Besides this, the road near the bottom of the downcast shaft was swept once or twice a week, the sweeping taking place before watering The South side of the Brockwell seam was watered on Monday night, that is to say, the day before the explosion, right up to the flat, within about 200 yards of the face. The North side of the seam being watered from the shaft to the flat, or to within about 130 yards of the face on the Sunday night. The Tilley Drift was watered also on the Sunday night. The rest of the Tilley did not require to be watered because of its being naturally wet owing to water dropping from the roof. In the ordinary course of events the Brockwell seam would have been watered again on Tuesday night, (the night of the day of the explosion). A week before the occurrence of the explosion the dust was removed from the Brockwell seam by shovelling. If the seams were thoroughly watered as and at the times stated they should have been fairly damp at the time of the disaster, for the temperature at the face was not great, namely about 56° F. in the Busty and 50° F. in the Townley. But it is questionable how far watering, as usually practised in collieries, is really effective as a means of preventing or allaying dust. The floor is never perfectly smooth, the water quickly runs into pools, and the dust on the intervening hills is quickly dried by the air current. Short of the actual drenching of the roof and sides, which is hardly practicable, it is not possible to ensure the wetting of the dust on the timber and in the interstices of the stone and coal. Certainly on our examination of the workings subsequent to the explosion, though we observed occasional pools of water, there were large quantities of dry dust in all the seams, and in some instances dry dust on the surface of pools of water. Contents. Shot-firing. Towneley Seam. The stonemen, and no others, took explosives into the mine. They obtained the explosives at the magazine on the surface in a locked box. Only deputies had a key to open the boxes containing explosives in the mine. They fired the shots during the night shift. The stonemen in the Straight South District in this seam went down the pit at 3 p.m. For other districts at 4 p.m., a deputy being with them. In the Straight South District, the backshift deputy, as soon as he had seen the men and boys on their way outbye, which would be about 3.30 p.m., would start to fire shots if the stonemen had then arrived in the faces and were ready. Tilley Seam. All shots in this seam in stone were fired between the hours of 4 p.m. and 4 a.m. The explosive was taken down the mine at 4 p.m. in boxes locked at the magazine on the surface as above described. A further locked box of explosive was taken in at 10 p.m. by the night shift deputy. This last lot of explosive was used, when required, for blasting down the coal on the longwall face. Busty Seam. All shots in this seam in stone were fired between 4 p.m. and 4 a.m. There was no shot-firing in the coal at all. Brockwell Seam. The restrictions which existed with regard to the firing of shots in the Tilley Seam, applied to this seam. Deputies, who were appointed shot-firers, fired every shot. Only they had keys for opening the boxes containing the explosives. Detonators were issued to deputies in locked boxes. All shots were fired electrically. Explosives were Monobel powder in the coal. Saxonite in the stone. Contents. State of the ventilation. The return airways in the Towneley Seam were all travelled during the week prior to the explosion, and those in the Tilley, Busty, and Brockwell Seams during the week ending January 22nd, 1909, so it is to be presumed that no heavy falls obstructed the airways of the mine. The presence of "gas" had only been reported once during the present year. January 13th, in the Straight South District of the Towneley Seam. That the seams did not give off gas in any quantity is proved, we think, by the fact that, although temporary stoppings of brattice cloth were the only means of keeping the intake air in its proper channel in the workings during the work of restoring the ventilation after the explosion, it was possible to travel the workings a day or two after the accident. Atmospheric conditions on the day of the explosion. There was nothing abnormal or unusual in the atmospheric conditions on the day of the explosion. Contents. Inspections under general rule 38. Inspections by representatives appointed by the men had been made regularly at three-monthly intervals except, for some reason or other, in January last. The latest reports made by these Inspectors, therefore, which are available are those dated September 21st, 22nd, 23rd, 24th, 1908, and are as follows. "WEST STANLEY COLLIERY. "We, the undersigned, being practical working miners, appointed by the persons employed in the above-named colliery to inspect the mine, in accordance with General Rule 38, report that such inspection was made on Monday, the 21st day of September, 1908, and the following is a true report of the result thereof: "Ventilation good; planes good; working places satisfactory and free from gas; returns in good order. "General Report. "We, the undersigned, have inspected the Brockwell Seam and find it satisfactory and free from gas. Timbering good; ways well watered; all right as stated above." On the following day, Tuesday, 22nd September, 1908, the Tilley Seam workings were inspected, and the following report made and signed: "Ventilation all right; planes all right returns satisfactory; working places all right." General Report. "Travelled Tilley Seam, found ventilation good; planes and timbering in good order." On the same day a part of the workings in the Towneley Seam was examined with the following result : "Ventilation satisfactory; working places all right and free from gas; returns good; planes satisfactory." General Report. " We, the undersigned, have inspected the Straight West and South of Towneley Seam and find intakes and returns all right, and working places satisfactory and free from gas. Plenty of timber." The remainder of the workings in the Towneley Seam were examined on Thursday, the 24th September, 1908, and the report on them is as follows: "Ventilation satisfactory; planes all right; returns good; working places satisfactory and free from gas." General Report. "We, the undersigned have inspected the South West of Towneley Seam and find as stated above; timbering good and all satisfactory." On Thursday, the 24th September, 1908, the workings in the Busty Seam were also examined. The report of the result of this examination is as follows: "Ventilation good; working places satisfactory; returns all right." General Report. "We, the undersigned, travelled the Busty Seam, Straight West and Bugle South flats; ponies scrubbing in South fiat; all things very satisfactory." On the 23rd September, 1908, the following report was made by the same local inspectors: "We, the undersigned, have inspected No. 2 (upcast) shaft and find it in working order. Guides and buntons satisfactory; walling in the shaft satisfactory." Contents. The explosion. The explosion occurred at 3.45 p.m. or thereabouts on the 16th February, 1909. On the arrival at the colliery of the district inspector and his assistants it was found that both the downcast and upcast shafts were damaged and that shaftmen were engaged in clearing a way for the cages, which fortunately were but little damaged. Whilst the work of clearing the shafts was going on, steps were taken to contrive a temporary hospital in the joiners’ shop. Medical stores, oxygen, and other materials likely to be needed were brought to this temporary hospital. Draeger and other rescue apparatus was on the spot under the control of Mr. Simonds, of Messrs. Sir W. G. Armstrong Whitworth & Co.’s Elswick Works, who arrived on the scene by motor-car within two and a half hours of the explosion, and before anyone had been able to get into the mine, having brought with him men trained in the use of the apparatus. A telephone call was received at the Elswick Works at 5.27 p.m., Mr. Simonds leaving at 5.40 and arriving at the colliery at 6.15 p.m. No opportunity offered itself in which the use of the rescue apparatus could have been of any assistance. Unfortunately the excellent arrangements made in the joiners’ shop were only required for three men. These three men, one from the Busty Seam and two from the Towneley Seam, were brought up the downcast shaft by the shaftmen on the completion of the necessary temporary repairs in that shaft. The downcast shaft being then available, it was about 2 a.m., rescue parties at once went down into the Towneley and Busty Seams. From the Tilley Seam 26 men, who had been unaffected by the explosion, due in all probability to the comparative absence of coal dust in the drift leading from the Busty to the Tilley Seam, to the wetness of the landing in the Tilley Seam, and to the fact that the men did not manage to reach either shaft but remained where they were, were brought out; and from the Towneley Seam. Patrick Joyce, John Smith, Patrick Cogan, and Robert Leadbitter. The last-named man after a hard struggle for life for 30 hours, during which he was given unremitting attention by doctors and nurses in the temporary hospital, succumbed to the ill effects of the foul air he had inhaled. Mathew Elliott, the onsetter was rescued from the Busty Seam. With these exceptions no other man or boy was brought out of the mine alive. The work of exploration went on unceasingly, and by the 22nd February, 165 bodies had been recovered and brought to the surface. Two men were still missing and search for them was carried on until 5th March, when all hope of recovering them was given up. It was known where they were likely to be, but although every effort was made to find them, the search was unavailing, and owing to the increasing danger to which the exploring parties were exposing themselves, it was ultimately abandoned. We have previously stated that both shafts were damaged by the explosion. This damage extended to the surface in the case of the downcast shaft, the casing erected from the ground level to the underside of the heapstead being blown down on three sides, and the roof of the heapstead was also damaged. At the upcast shaft on the surface there was little or no damage; the fan was uninjured and continued to run. The usual water gauge of 1.5 inches fell to 1.3 inches. Two separate indications that an explosion had occurred, with an interval of about 50 seconds between them, were observed on the surface. The first was in the shape of a cloud of smoke or dust; the second is best described in the words of an eye witness, the colliery engineer, Ralph Stephenson, who said : "I stood on the lip or edge of the pit (downcast) and looked at the ropes, then fairly steady, and then down the shaft. I heard a roar and saw a red flame right down the shaft. As the roar increased I stepped quickly back and called to other men to keep clear. I then stumbled about four yards from the shaft and fell sideways and just at that moment I saw a large ball of fire issue from the mouth of the pit, followed by a thick black cloud. The cloud spread around about me whilst I was still on the ground. I was in darkness, still prostrate. When I was in the act of rising again the air in the shaft reversed and carried the remainder of the black cloud with it, and I was then in clear air." In the Fan drift there were evidences that something was on fire underground. A watch was kept in this drift, but the evidences fortunately soon died away, and as was afterwards seen, there had not been any extensive ignition of material. Five minutes or thereabouts prior to the explosion, the engineman in charge of the pump in the Busty seam near the downcast shaft telephoned, as was his custom, to the electric generator house that he was ready to start the pump and wished to do so. A reply was given to the effect that he could start the pump. Shortly afterwards, about five minutes, two out of the three fuses on the switchboard in the generator house, in the circuit carrying electricity into the mine, "blew." First there was a loud "burring" noise indicating an overload on the generator arid then the "blowing" of two of the three fuses. Simultaneously smoke issued from the downcast shaft, and the doors at the "horse-hole" at the upcast were blown open but swung to again by themselves. Fifty seconds afterwards, a ball of flame issued from the downcast shaft followed by a dense black cloud. A reaction then took place and the whole of the dense black cloud was sucked into the downcast shaft again and disappeared down that shaft. The upcast shaft was little disturbed. Originating point and possible cause of the explosion. In order to arrive at the cause of a colliery explosion it is necessary in nearly every case to determine the point at which it originated, a matter sometimes fraught with great difficulty, but in no case that we have investigated has it been more perplexing than in the one under consideration. The principal evidence to guide one is that of indications of the direction of force, the presence of flame, the nature of the death which has overtaken the victims of the disaster, and the statements of survivors. So conflicting, however, is this evidence in the present instance that we have been unable to arrive at any definite conclusion respecting either the originating point or the cause of the explosion. We can only put forward the facts as they have come to our knowledge, and carefully weigh the value of each theory that has been advanced in explanation. On the plans of the working seams accompanying this Report we have indicated the direction of the force in so far as we have been able to determine it, the points at which coked dust was found and on which sides of the props, and also the position of the bodies and whether burnt or not. But the evidence as to force, in so far as it is a means of determining the direction of the explosive blast, is vitiated by the fact that its value is largely destroyed by the succeeding back lash. Taking a general view of the whole of the seams, we were at first impressed with the idea that the explosion had occurred somewhere in the neighbourhood of the shafts and not inbye at any of the working faces. At first it seemed as though the place of origin was in or about the hauling engine house situate at the eastern extremity of the Straight West Engine Plane in the Towneley seam. To some it seemed possible that it might have occurred in the engine house itself, but more probably that it had originated where a heavy fall buried a cable carrying current to the motor driving the hauling drums. The cable came from a distribution box at the downcast shaft along a road which was seldom travelled, but which was an intake airway and close to the downcast shaft. Owing to these circumstances, dust carried from the screens down the shaft in the ventilating current would be present in this road in quantity. Given then a fall, raising enough dust, and an electric arc, owing to some injury to the cable, the whole requirements of an explosion were present. But this idea we were obliged to abandon, for, although on testing the cable it was found that there was electrical connection between two of its cores, its insulation to earth was over five megohms; and, on the fall being ridded, the cable was found intact externally. We turned our attention to the Brockwell seam, and we still have doubts in regard to this seam, for on the north side of the shafts there were suspicious circumstances. In two juds on the east side of the North Way, six bodies were found in such positions, and one in particular, showing, apparently, that they had not received any warning whatever of the explosion. The coal was being taken off at a small hitch by juds. The goaf was of considerable area and would possibly contain gas. The lamps of the six men were filled with coked dust outside the gauzes, and the floor of the two places was covered with coked dust to a depth of half an inch or more. In this Brockwell seam, too, there was the only sign throughout the mine of material having been actually on fire. But, although in possession of this evidence, we were unable to find any cause of ignition of gas which might have come off at the small hitch referred to or been forced out of the goaf, or liberated from the overlying strata by a heavy fall. That large quantities of gas are sometimes liberated from the strata by heavy falls came under our notice so recently as March last, and this at a colliery where gas had seldom been seen previously. In addition to our inability to find any cause of an ignition of a possible accumulation or blower of gas, there was evidence which seemed to point to a force having swept inbye prior to any fire or flame having come outbye. This evidence consisted of : (a) the condition of the props on the North Way. (b) the position of the separation door next the downcast shaft. The props in the North Way were not burnt or charred on their outbye side, although on all other sides they were; the outbye sides were covered with mud, which to all appearances had been thrown on the props by a wave of force prior to fire having come from inbye. The separation door, which in its normal position was on the North side of the downcast shaft, was found blown several yards further North. If the second and more extensive explosion had originated in the Brockwell seam, we think that this door, if found at all, would have been blown to the South or across the downcast shaft. There was no question of the explosion having originated in the Tilley seam. This left the Busty seam, in which, to our minds, the evidence was so perplexing that we were unable to satisfy ourselves whether the explosion originated in this seam or not. Evidence of the onsetter, Matthew Elliott, which, as it is the only evidence available from a survivor who witnessed the approach of the blast, and as there can be no doubt that it more than anything else directed the attention of the mining experts to the Busty seam for the possible originating point of the explosion, we produce beneath, the greater part of it. And for the last three years you have been in the Busty seam? Yes. Now, on the afternoon of the explosion were you on the flat sheets near the shaft? Yes, sir. And you were on the South side? Yes. Did you notice anything particular until you suddenly heard a loud noise? I just heard a loud noise. Which side did it come from? The South. The South side of the pit at the Busty? Yes. Did the sound seem to shake the whole shaft side? Yes. Was the shaking very violent? Yes Did you hear the tubs rattle? Yes, as if they had all upset. That was where? On the shaft siding. And that was followed by a big cloud of dust? The lights all went out. Probably you would see the dust before the lights went out? I had a small lamp burning in the cabin, and it showed the cloud of dust. Did the lights go out before you saw the dust or not? Before the dust. Before I leave that about the electric lights, were they electric lights on the South or the North or both sides? Both sides, sir. Those lights went out before you saw the big cloud of dust? Yes. You saw that by the small lamp? Yes. Was it a safety lamp? Yes. Was it hanging in the cabin? Yes. You heard the tubs rattle as if they were all upset at the shaft siding. That was followed by a big cloud of dust. The electric light on both the North and South sides of the landing went out before you saw the cloud of dust. You saw the cloud by the light of the safety lamp hanging in the cabin. You heard a boy shouting? I heard a boy shout, "Help me" three times. You tried to get to your cabin to get some water? Yes. Was that for him or for you? I tried to get it to give him a drink. But in doing so, you felled yourself against the side of the cabin door. You remember nothing more after that? You were unconscious more or less for a month after the accident? You cannot tell whether the noise came from the West way or the Bugle way. All you know is that it came from the Busty on the South side. You say nothing came by the shaft of the Brockwell. The last person you had spoken to before you heard the loud noise was the pump man, Jack Forster? Yes. He was passing you on the flat sheets going to the pump. He asked you the time, and you told him twenty-five minutes to four. You then heard the telephone bell ring. Where did. it ring? Just round the corner of the shaft. You went round and found Jack Forster at the telephone? Yes. How long was that before the explosion? About five or ten minutes. In addition to seeing the lamps go out and the dust did you see any flame? No, sir. They were all electrical lights were they not? Yes. Prof. Redmayne. Did you hear the noise of the explosion before or after the light went out? Before the light went out. Was the set of tubs in motion at the time of the explosion? I cannot remember, sir. Can you measure the time? How long would it be between hearing the explosion and the lights going out? I could not say, sir. Was it almost instantaneous? Yes, it was instantaneous. There was no appreciable interval of time between the noise of the explosion and the lights going out? No. Do you remember whether the rattling of the tubs or the noise of the explosion was heard first? I heard the noise of the explosion first. Could you say whether the other was directly after? Yes, sir. There was no interval of time. Mr. R. Kay. Do you know anything about the set being rapped "hold" at the curve? I cannot remember. Perhaps you did not hear the rap "hold" at all? No, sir. Do you know whether the set was running? I cannot remember. Can you tell us whether the set had stopped or not before the explosion? No. Prof. Redmayne. If the road was not clear through there being tubs in the way you would have authority to stop the set? Yes. Mr. Kay. How many tubs were standing when you heard the noise? Seven full ones. The Coroner : Was the road clear to the shaft? I had four full tubs standing ready to hang on at that shaft on the South side, but I had plenty of room to get the set to the shaft. Dr. Thornton. When you heard the noise did you turn in any direction to look or listen? I just stood. Were you facing the South at the time? Yes, I was facing South when I heard the noise. I did not turn my head until I heard the lad Readman shout out. Which way did you turn then? I turned east to my cabin. The Coroner. After hearing the first sound of the explosion, did you hear a second sound? No. What was it that knocked you stupid? I struck my head against the door of the cabin. The door is very narrow and low, and I had to stoop my head in entering. We are fortunate in having before us the evidence of the mining engineers who were put forward by the owners, Mr. W. C. Blackett, Mr. Simon Tate, and Mr. Philip Kirkup, all men who have on previous occasions investigated colliery explosions and well known in the Northern coalfield for their ability and wide practical mining experience. The evidence of Mr. Blackett, who arrived on the scene at 8.0 o'clock on Tuesday evening, is very clear and able. He had formed three theories as to the approximate locality of the first ignition The first of these was the Towneley, which became untenable on the fuller ascertainment of facts. The second was in the Brockwell, but he confessed that Elliott’s "direct experience in the mine" shook this. The third was the Busty. The fact that the "whole of the working places and even right into the goaf of "the North side Brockwell appeared to have been filled more or less with flame, which had rushed out by the return to the shaft" made a strong impression on his mind. Mr. Blackett’s evidence continued as follows "If then both the Towneley and Brockwell seams are absolved from blame, it is necessary to revert to the contemplation of Elliott’s impression being correct, and in that case the only possible point of initiation to be suspected is somewhere in the immediate vicinity of the big fall just round the Busty West way, and the only cause I can conceive is a very thick and heavy cloud of dust being raised by a fall of stone which may have been brought about by an accident to the set which was being hauled outbye and was the cause of it having been rapped hold. "What has ignited such cloud of dust I cannot say. "While contemplating the possibility of the ignition starting here I am met with some arguments which I find difficult to answer. "I cannot honestly say that the position of the baulks under the fall convey to my mind as they do to Mr. Tate’s the certainty that they have been blown outbye. I cannot distinguish such a force from that due to the fall. The crossing about 200 yards from the curve shows unmistakable force going inbye. "While it is quite easy to trace it inbye here West and inbye to the Tilley drift and Bugle, it is not so easy to understand why, when it reached the shaft, it did not go straight across and up the Towneley staple. "There are indications of a slighter force having crossed the shaft a short distance towards the North and there are the hangers at the shaft siding bent outbye in favour of this theory, but I cannot quite see why the explosion should prefer to go up the downcast shaft rather than straight on to the Towneley staple. The position of the intumesced dust is on the inbye side of the props, all the way out of West way and past the suspected point of ignition. All the stoppings from the curve to the crossing in the West way had been blown out into the North return, and this return here showed coked dust on the props also on their inbye side. "The tubs going down the shaft are not conclusive evidence of any direction of explosive force, as the spring of the suddenly released rope could effect all this, and even the hangers might have been bent by an effect from back lash. "I am informed that the upcast doors at bank blew wide open with the first explosion. It is interesting to try and think whether an explosion in the Busty or in the Brockwell would most readily do this. There is no evidence of disturbance at the upcast pit in the Busty, whereas in the Brockwell there was considerable violence. "The force of the explosion went up the drift into the Tilley seam and shattered the staple also upwards. "From the top of the latter it went with great violence into the stables and to the old crossing. "It also went from the top of the Tilley drift for a short distance inbye and then died away. "Assuming then that the suspicion of the explosion starting near the West curve of the Busty is correct, its course has been, "Westward in the Busty, South into Tilley and Bugle way, North down the shaft to the Brockwell, where it developed in the intakes on both sides, bursting through into the returns, and up the shaft into the Towneley and down again through the staple to the Busty. "I am very disappointed that I am unable to give any more definite conclusions, and I regret the somewhat uncertain state in which I must leave the matter. "I could not have believed that such an explosion could have occurred and developed in all seams without leaving clearer evidence of its cause." Mr. Tate was more definite; he stated that on his first visit to the Busty seam he was struck with certain indications "which pointed to the force and trend of the explosion having come along the Busty shaft siding towards the downcast shaft. I afterwards had a strong impression that it had occurred at the Towneley haulage motor, but this latter idea I found was untenable, and after hearing the evidence of Elliott (the onsetter) I had to reconsider my first opinion, and having made further careful and exhaustive examinations, I have satisfied myself that the explosion originated on the South side of the pit in the main intake of the Busty seam at a point beyond the curve at the entrance to the Busty west way. "I have ascertained that at the moment of the commencement of the explosion the engine set of laden coal tubs was just coming out of the Busty way end and would cause a cloud of coal dust. Just beyond the point where the end of the set had reached and near to the shaft siding there is a fall of stone, and several balks and props under this fall appear to have been driven outbye towards the way end, whereas at a short distance further inbye the indications are all inbye over. I also noticed that the explosive force shown in this neighbourhood, and from thence out over towards the shaft, was not of a very violent character, and there is an absence of any serious damage. "All the persons employed in the shaft siding and at the pit bottom appeared from the position in which they were found to have had some intimation of the explosion, and most of them had made an attempt to obtain shelter from the blast which was approaching them; thus proving that it was at that moment a comparatively slow travelling force which had just commenced; moreover the bodies did not appear to have been subjected to so much violence as some of the other bodies which were further away from this initial point. We also have it from Elliott that he heard one of the victims crying out for help. "All these incidents point to the possibility of this point being the neighbourhood of the first ignition; consequently it must be a coal-dust explosion, as gas could not possibly have been present here. "From this point of ignition the force travelled in every direction inbye to the face of the Busty way, inbye into the Bugle way and up the Tilley staple and up the Tilley drift and outbye to the downcast shaft, and up this shaft to the Towneley seam, and down the shaft into the Brockwell seam. It afterwards came down the Towneley staple into the Busty seam at the other side of the shaft. "In my opinion it was an explosion of coal-dust which was ignited at a point on the Busty waggonway on the inbye side of the curve." Mr. P. Kirkup’s evidence did not differ materially from that of Mr. Tate. He said : What has been the initial cause of the explosion it is impossible to say definitely. The road is reported to have been watered the night before, but a quantity of dust would he in the atmosphere from the fact that a full set had just been hauled out against the intake air current (7,240 feet) so that it might fairly be estimated that the whole of the west waggonway from the engine-set near the curve to the inbye landing would contain minute dust in suspension. The west workings were in two thin seams (top and bottom Busty separately worked) and the laden tubs of coal would contain probably 75 to 80 per cent. of small. The engine-plane at the outbye end was a gallery driven 30 years ago. It was the oldest engine-place or waggonway which was working on the day of the explosion. The Busty coal has the reputation of depositing dust of a dangerous character. Previous explosions and the recent valuable experiments of Professor Bedson, of the Armstrong College, Newcastle-on-Tyne, published in the Transactions of the Institution of Mining Engineers last year proves this: "Busty dust inflamed at under 700 degrees centigrade ; Harvey or Towneley took 970 degrees centigrade." There is further an incident which occurred at Middleton Colliery in Yorkshire on September 2nd, 1907, and described by Mr. John Neal in the same Transactions. This case was one where the dust given off and raised by a slow horse-drawn set inflamed at an open light, and I doubt not would have resulted in an explosion bad the circumstances been more favourable as regards the fineness of the dust and the character of the same. I simply give this instance to illustrate the dangers of coal-dust, and do not wish to infer that a naked light caused the explosion. There are also instances of where dust has been ignited by sparks caused by the friction of a pulley. All pit dusts have not the same degree of danger. Some ignite more readily than others. The sensitiveness of coal-dust varies as the minuteness of the particles, the gaseous character of the coal, and the exact degree to which these particles are suspended in the air. I much regret I cannot give reasons for a more definite opinion, it is not for want of investigation or time spent in patient consideration of all the available data, but my suspicions centre at a point somewhere immediately on the inbye side of the west curve in the Busty seam. This is an intake airway remote from the face. It would be impossible for gas to be present here, and therefore nothing but dust alone can account for my supposition, but what was the initial igniting cause of the inflammation of dust which resulted in such a terrible disaster, I am unable to say. As to the possible means of ignition the following have to be considered. (1) Open lights, whether defective lamps or matches. (2) Shot-firing. (3) Sparking from mechanical friction. (4) Electricity. Open lights. As to the possibility of existence of open lights it will be remembered that no naked lights were allowed to be used. The types of lamp in use were good and safe, and those that were recovered uninjured by the explosive force were found to be in a satisfactory condition. There was no evidence or even suspicion of misuse, but up to the 20th of May there were 12 safety lamps still unrecovered; of these two belonged to the Towneley seam, one to the Tilley seam, and nine to the Busty seam. Of the unrecovered lamps one of the two in the Towneley seam belonged to a man whose body was found under an extensive fall of stone, his lamp is probably under that fall. Five of the nine lamps missing from the Busty seam belonged to hewers who were working in the bottom section of that seam. The water rose in this section of the seam after the explosion and it is probable that the missing lamps are in the water. The remaining lamps belonged to the two men whose bodies have not been recovered. All the lamps brought out of the mine after the explosion were very carefully examined, but no trace of any damage was found in any lamp which could have been from an internal cause, nor is there any evidence forthcoming of matches having been taken into the pit or of other means for improperly obtaining a light. Shot firing. The careful system in operation at the colliery in respect of shot firing and all appertaining thereto has already been described. A very careful search was instituted for the magneto shot-firing apparatuses, shot and detonator boxes, and when found a careful examination was made of the same. All were accounted for, and in no case was it possible to connect them with the firing of a shot. Every shot hole was examined with like result, and we regard it as satisfactorily proved that no shot was fired either at the time of or immediately prior to the explosion. Sparking from mechanical friction. Another suggestion of the possible cause of the explosion was made by the Coroner, and is alluded to in the evidence of Mr. P. Kirkup, that sparking caused by the set coming out of the Busty West way might ignite a cloud of coal dust, and so initiate an explosion. Mr. Hall, the manager of the colliery, gave it as his opinion, in answer to questions put to him by the Coroner, that such was possible, and went even further, putting the sequence of events as, tubs off the way, a cloud of coal dust, fall of stone, sparks, explosion ; but a little consideration will show the untenability of this theory. It must be borne in mind that in the cases which were quoted in support of the theory, the conditions were quite different. The sparks were being continuously generated, and the coal dust in the neighbourhood in which the sparks fell smouldered and was doubtless gradually fanned into flame; and the fact remains that a Sub-committee of the French Firedamp Commission made experiments with marsh gas and firedamp (the latter obtained from the workings of a colliery) which would be much more easily ignited than the finest and most inflammable of coal dusts, and producing sparks by means of a mechanical drill and hard stone failed to inflame the gas. Sparks also produced by pressing a bar of steel against a rapidly revolving emery wheel, a dazzling and continuous shower, failed to ignite a very large jet of an inflammable mixture of air and marsh gas and of air and firedamp directed into the sparks. Electricity. As regards electricity, before due weight can be given to the pros and cons some technical knowledge is necessary. There can be little doubt that the jury must have felt this in considering their verdict, and for this reason, however carefully that verdict may have been considered, and on this point there can be no doubt in the present instance, it cannot be held to carry as much weight in this direction as attaches to it in other directions. In these circumstances it becomes the more necessary to carefully examine the possibilities opened out by the presence of electricity in the mine. We have satisfied ourselves that none of the coal-cutting machines were at work at the time of the explosion. The hauling motor in the Towneley seam and the pump motor in the Busty seam close to the downcast shaft were running at the time of the explosion, and these appear from the evidence to have been the only two motors which were running. Each was found to be in order after the accident, and therefore the possibility of any motor having caused the accident apart from the other electrical apparatus must be rejected. The electric lights were burning in the Busty seam shaft siding prior and subsequent to the explosion (evidence of Matthew Elliott, onsetter in this seam), and lights in the Towneley seam would be burning too, though there is no direct evidence to show this. From the fact that after the accident all the fuses in the mine were found to be intact, it was very generally agreed in the course of the investigations preceding the inquest, and even during the inquest, that electricity could only be regarded as a remote first cause. It came out in evidence, however, that a main cable near a gate-end box in the Towneley South District had on an occasion about four months before the accident been the cause of considerable sparking, sufficient indeed to completely sever one core of a three-core cable, which core had been previously damaged by a fall of roof, without the fuse opening circuit. Mr. Richard Heslop, the colliery electrician, was cross-examined on this point :– (Mr. Redmayne asking the questions). Q. In the main cable did the fuse blow? A. No, sir. There was only one core damaged. Q. Distinctly, I understand that. But the fuse did not blow? A. No. It is therefore clear that under the conditions which obtained at West Stanley Colliery previous to the accident sparking external to a cable was not invariably followed by the blowing of a fuse. No part of the electrical system was, we understand, connected to earth. The fact is therefore not extraordinary, but the conclusion is important as discounting the value of any argument based upon the fact that all the fuses in the mine were found to be intact after the explosion. It was also sought to attach some weight to the fact that by the evidence of Matthew Elliott (the survivor from the Busty seam) electric lamps were burning for a few seconds, or it may have been only the fraction of a second, after the explosion. This point was cleared up in cross-examination of Dr. Thornton : (Mr. Nelson asking the questions). Q. Do you remember the evidence of the witness Elliott? A. Yes. Q. He said that he heard the explosion and that after that he saw the electric lamps still burning? A. Yes, for a moment. Q. It might be that an arc had occurred either in the cable, or as you suggest, in the fuse box, though I think this less likely, and yet the lamps might burn, because the circuit would be taken from the supply side of the fuses? A. Yes. Q. The point is argued in this way the fact of the lamps burning afterwards removes the possibility of the explosion having been caused by electricity? A. By a dead short circuit. Q. Do you agree with me that it does not altogether remove that possibility A. Oh no, it does not touch the point. There is no doubt there could have been a flash and the lights might still remain burning. We have then two points upon which reliance has been placed in rejecting electricity as a possible cause more or less destroyed, the first by experience at this very colliery, and the second by a mere consideration of the way in which the electrical circuits were actually run. Dr. W. M. Thornton, Professor of Electrical Engineering at the Armstrong College, Newcastle-on-Tyne, who was called by the Durham Miners’ Association, and who practically committed himself to the opinion that the explosion had had an electric origin, gave three possible points of origin :– (1) A lamp which hung in front of the large pumping tank in the Busty seam and which was found smashed. (2) The breaking of a fuse in the pump house in the Busty seam. (3) A short circuit set up by a train of coal dust between the terminals in any of the junction boxes or gateway end switches. He fixed upon the third as being the most likely, and mentioned in particular "a junction box in the Busty West seam on the North side just before reaching the small three-throw pump; this box is in court, smashed, electrically disembowelled." Since the inquest one of us has seen three of the fuses, which were in the junction box mentioned in particular by Dr. Thornton. All of them are intact and show no sign whatever of heat, nor do their cases. A further theory which in the absence of definite proof found considerable favour, is that the explosion originated in the Busty seam at a point some distance inbye of the curve indicated by Messrs. Blackett, Tate, and Kirkup. According to this theory the set of full tubs in coming out got off the way, and either then, or immediately afterwards, knocked out some of the timber, allowing the roof to fall and creating a dense cloud of dust; simultaneously the electric cables were injured by abrasion and an arc formed which ignited the dust and so caused the explosion. Such an occurrence is possible if the arc was formed at the exact moment that the dust was in suspension at the spot, but at the best it can be only a conjecture. It is not considered likely that any explosive gas could be present, but the unlikely does occur, and it is possible that a small quantity may have been liberated or brought down by the fall and this may have initiated the explosion. One of us has also since the inquest been able to examine the cables in question, but he was unable to find any marked sign of electrical damage or of fusing; the damage the cable had suffered was external, probably due to falls of roof and other causes; on the other hand there can be no doubt that the effect of an explosion might very easily remove all visible trace of the original injury. On the assumption that the explosion did originate in the Busty seam, we are of opinion that electricity is a more likely first cause than any of the alternatives already discussed. We desire to draw attention to the six recommendations, suggested by the evidence at the inquest, and contained in the Memorandum with which we have been furnished by Mr. Nelson, the Electrical Inspector of Mines. Mr. Nelson made many underground inspections at West Stanley subsequent to the disaster and overhauled the electrical machinery, and we wish to acknowledge the great assistance he has been to us in respect to this side of the question. Contents. Concluding Observations. To sum up our observations, it appears fairly certain that a small initial explosion, a mere puff, was succeeded within about 50 seconds by a much more extensive and severer explosion which did practically all the damage, and which was projected from seam to seam. Where either of these explosions originated we are not prepared to say, but clearly it was not in the Tilley seam. The main explosion may have been initiated by an explosion of gas, but was undoubtedly propagated by coal dust. What the means of ignition were we cannot say. We are anxious to emphasise the impression made upon us in investigating this and other explosions, that unless the grave danger which exists at many collieries owing to the presence of coal dust is attacked with much greater earnestness in the future than it has been in the past, disasters of a similar character will occur from time to time. There is one feature of the case to which we have not yet alluded, but to which we are desirous of directing attention, namely the inability of those concerned with the management of the colliery to make any but a very wide estimate of the number of persons underground at the time of the explosion. It was at first supposed that these were under 100, and it was not until nearly all the bodies had been recovered several days after the explosion, that a correct estimate was arrived at. We directed our cross examination of the lampman, John Todd, to elucidating the reason for this, and he gave us in explanation the fact that the spare lamps were sent out irregularly from the mine to be relit, and that the numbers in consequence got confused. There was no system of tokens or tallies in vogue at the colliery. Were each man to hand a token with his number to the banksman before entering the cage to descend the mine and receive it back on arriving at the surface, it would be possible to determine at any moment of the day the number of persons below ground. Some such system is in operation at some collieries and is easily worked. The register which is required to be kept under the Eight Hours Act will, however, obviate all uncertainty in the future. It is our pleasant duty to bear witness to the fact that willing helpers, agents, managers, officials, and men from the neighbouring collieries as soon as they heard of the disaster came forward at once and offered their services. Relays of men belonging to West Stanley Colliery and to the neighbouring collieries were organised, and, under the leadership of experienced mining engineers, the work of recovering the bodies and exploration of the workings was carried on uninterruptedly until the colliery staff were able to cope with the work without outside assistance. Also we should mention that after the explosion the mine was inspected carefully and thoroughly by officials of the Durham Miners’ Association, prominent amongst whom were Messrs. J. Wilson, M.P., J. Johnson, M.P., T. H. Cann, S. Galbraith, and others. It is gratifying to be able to state that throughout a long and exhaustive inquiry no breach of the Coal Mines Regulation Act or Special Rules was brought to light. Contents.